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by 
Nazia Kazi 
Advisor: Vincent Crapanzano 
The events of 9/11/2001 intensified the hypervisibility of U.S. Muslims, making them the 
subject of academic, artistic, and cultural curiosity. Alongside this public hypervisibility came a 
campaign of institutionalized Islamophobia, manifest in such measures as the anti-Muslim 
legislation of the USA PATRIOT Act. The result for Islamic Representative Organizations (or 
IRO’s) was that combatting Islamophobia became a central concern. In this dissertation, I 
consider the multifaceted and complicated politics of representation used by IRO’s in the 
aftermath of 9/11. I consider both the negative, or Islamophobic, and the so-called positive, or 
Islamophilic, representations of U.S. Muslims in the discourse of these groups. Based on multi-
sited ethnographic fieldwork at IRO events dealing with the subject of “Islam in America,” this 
dissertation addresses the racial, class-based, and cultural politics of representing U.S. Muslims. 
I consider the aspirations and ambitions of IRO members: Do they understand their anti-
Islamophobia activism as a way to include Muslims in the existing social order, or do they 
imagine themselves engaged in a revolutionary process of transformation? I present ethnographic 
data that reveals IRO members imagining the United States as at once a pluralistic, diverse, and 
egalitarian nation and a foundationally racist, imperial formation. Hardly uniform, IRO 
representations reveal both transformative, counterhegemonic processes and a deeply entrenched 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 In this dissertation, I consider the intersection of race, the War on Terror, and 
multiculturalism by focusing on Muslim American organizations and the representational politics 
they have employed in the face of Islamophobia. The amount of scholarship devoted to U.S. 
Muslims has undoubtedly skyrocketed since September 11th, 2001. Much of this work has 
focused on the racialization, demonization, and exclusion experienced by Muslims, South 
Asians, and Arab Americans. Certainly, this is an important scholarly focus. The events of 
9/11/2001 and the ensuing War on Terror ostensibly reconfigured Muslims, Arabs, and South 
Asians1 as a potential threat to homeland security. As Bayoumi (2009), Ewing (2008), Stubbs 
(2003), Cainkar (2002), and others demonstrate, Muslim Americans (and those mistakenly 
thought to be Muslims) have been the prime targets in this hostile climate.  
 While leaders assured Americans that 9/11 would not usher in an era of anti-Muslim 
bigotry2, the age of Islamophobia has been undeniable. On an official or institutional level, 
domestic Islamophobia is evident in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 attacks. More than 
1200 people were detained without trial in the immediate months following 9/11, most of whom 
were detained not for reasons related to terrorism but rather immigration-related charges such as 
overstaying a visa (Hing 2006). The Special Registration program similarly subjected thousands 
of Arabs and Muslims to additional surveillance in a purported attempt to uncover terror links. 
                                                 
1 In an analytic and practical sense, it is important to note that the term “Muslim” is a slippery 
category. Those of us who study Muslim Americans find ourselves awkwardly using terms like 
“Muslims and South Asians,” “Muslims and Arab Americans,” or “Muslims and Sikhs,” 
demonstrating the inadequacy of the term “Muslims,” a difficulty Naber has called “the politics 
of naming” (Naber 2008: 5).  
 
2President George W. Bush famously visited a mosque on September 17th, 2001 and delivered 




The passage of the USA PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001 ushered in a new age in which civil 
rights, especially for those deemed 'suspicious' of terrorist activity, were waived, and a newfound 
surveillance state took shape.  
On a cultural and structural level, Islamophobia surfaced in the abundance of pejorative 
racialized representations in film and on television, of an Islamophobia “industry” that targeted 
not just Muslims but their pro-Muslim allies, and an overarching bigotry and questioning of 
Muslim's “Americanness.” The national anxiety about President Obama's potentially “Muslim” 
identity was just one manifestation of the overarching climate of U.S. Islamophobia. During my 
time in the field, one interviewee put it eloquently by saying that he felt two types of 
Islamophobia had emerged. “You have the ignorant, bigoted, right wing Islamophobia, which is 
basically the same as any age-old white supremacist attitude,” Saeed told me over a cup of 
coffee. “And then you have this highbrow, ivory tower, Samuel Huntington type of 
Islamophobia. This kind is really scary, because you see it in academia and among very 
educated, well-read Americans.”  
The most useful way for me to understand Islamophobia(s) was as follows: 1) 
domestically (as in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act or the growth in anti-Muslim bigotry) 
and 2) internationally (the military actions in Afghanistan or targeted assassinations in Yemen, 
for instance) and 3) institutionally (encoded in law, such as the NDAA) and 4) socioculturally 
(existing on the level of representation, discourse, and language). The table below demonstrates 







TABLE 1: SCALES OF ISLAMOPHOBIA 
 DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL  USA PATRIOT Act 
 Fingerprinting & Special 
Registration 
 Drone Program 
 War in Afghanistan 
 War in Iraq 
SOCIOCULTURAL  Formation of anti-Muslim groups 
 Community to mosque building 
 Media images of evil 
Arab men 
 Need to “save” women in 
the  Muslim World 
 
 I categorize the justifications and framings given for U.S. Islamophobia in three ways: as 
essentialist, nativist, and national security-focused. In its first form, anti-Muslim sentiment rests 
on some preconceived notions of Arab and Muslim barbarity, sexism, and proclivity to violence. 
This is a continuation of age-old colonialist tropes such as ‘the Arab mind’ (Patai 1973) in which 
environmental determinism, racism, and ethnocentrism suggest a terrifying essence of all 
followers of Islam. As Bill Maher told Anderson Cooper, “They bring that desert stuff to our 
world…You know, we don’t threaten each other, we sue each other. That’s the sign of civilized 
people” (Cooper 2010). The nativist brand of U.S. Islamophobia, on the other hand, focuses 
more on the fear of a takeover of normative American culture by Muslims, through the 
imposition of shariah law or the introduction of Muslim holidays. For instance, a group called 
Stop Islamization of America is committed to public awareness of a Muslim campaign to destroy 
American values. The national security-focused brand of Islamophobia uses acts of terrorism as 
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justification for anti-Muslim sentiment. When former NPR journalist Juan Williams appeared on 
Fox News admitting that he gets anxious upon seeing Muslims on his flight, he expressed a type 
of fear of violence that has become synonymous with Islam and Muslims.   
 Yet my project departs from a singular focus on Islamophobia. Instead, I turn to the ways 
in which Muslim Americans have responded to Islamophobia using what I term representational 
practices. Islamic representative organizations (which I refer to as IRO's) of varying sizes and 
constituencies have been at the forefront of combating Islamophobia through a number of 
strategies that aim to undo the negative popular images of Muslims. Following 9/11, IRO's – 
even those who were not officially focused on the mission of representing Muslims to 
mainstream Americans or of combatting Islam – essentially had to make fighting Islamophobia a 
central concern. “Regardless of their original mission and goals, the 9/11 backlash necessitated 
that Middle Eastern and Muslim American organizations engage in claims making on behalf of 
their consitutents” (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009: 118).  
 This project looks at the discursive practices and activist strategies employed by IRO's 
and the ways these practices fit within a larger context of U.S. militarism, the so-called 'post-
racial' landscape, and a renewed interest in the Huntingtonian “clash” between Islamic and 
Western civilizations (Huntington 1996). For most Muslims living in America, Islamophobia has 
hardly been an all-encompassing, oppressive force against which they are powerless to respond. 
Indeed, and given the varying shades of privilege among a diverse population, the experience of 
Islamophobia has been unevenly experienced by America's Muslims. My project looks instead at 
some of the many ways in which Muslim Americans have been active agents in the face of a 
climate of both xenophobic hostility and multicultural sensitivity. In this way, I challenge the 
commonplace narrative of Muslims as a newly-demonized, racialized, and othered group. 
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Instead, I offer an account of simultaneous privilege and marginality and a conflicted sense of 
belonging and exclusion experienced by U.S. Muslims.  
 In fact, one of the central questions my work asks is the ways privilege along lines of 
class, educational attainment, and immigrant status affects the experience of Islamophobia. It is 
true that high-profile cases like that of Sami al-Arian or Salaam al-Marayati suggest that even 
fame and wealth do not fully protect one from experiencing Islamophobia. Dr. Al-Arian's case 
became one of the most infamous American cases surrounding surveillance, academic freedom, 
and the War on Terror as his ties to Palestinian terrorists groups came into question, putting his 
professorship in jeopardy and leading to his subpoenas for terrorism-related investigations. 
Salaam Al-Marayati, renowned leader of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, was also detained 
with his family at LAX airport, in spite of his vocal activism as a moderate Muslim American 
spokesperson. In spite of these cases in which privileged Muslims became targets of 
Islamophobia, it also becomes evident upon closer inspection that the domestic War on Terror 
disproportionately affects underprivileged groups, many times not even Muslims. For instance, 
the detention of undocumented immigrants after 9/11 – none of whom were found to have any 
connection to the attacks – left documented immigrants and U.S. citizen Muslims untouched. 
Additionally, it brought into peril non-Muslim undocumented immigrants through the increased 
policing of overstayed immigrant visas. While Muslims are undoubtedly the intended targets of 
much Islamophobic action and discourse, some Muslims bear the brunt of the burden. 
Meanwhile, those who do the 'representative' work are often from the most privileged among 
U.S. Muslims – U.S. citizens, highly educated, relatively well-to-do Muslims. The 
'representative' voices combatting Islamophobia, then, may be sheltered from the worst aspects 
of the domestic War on Terror.  
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 My work aims to explore the ways in which Muslim American or “Islamic” organizations 
in the U.S. have, especially since September 11th, 2001, been enmeshed in the politics of 
Islamophilia. Ultimately, a singular focus on Islamophobia may actually obscure the lived 
experiences of Muslim Americans and ignore the diversity of Muslim American experiences. 
Shryock argues that Islamophobia is a polemical term that may actually gloss over diverse 
phenomena, including racism, anti-terrorism, and xenophobia (2010). Looking closer at the term 
Islamophobia itself, it assumes that Muslims are the explicit targets. In fact, in the aftermath of 
the attacks of 9/11/2001, a Sikh man was murdered in a hate crime, presumed to be an Arab or 
Muslim (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009). After the fatal shooting at a Sikh temple near 
Milwaukee in 2012, many speculated that it was likely a case of “mistaken identity,” as Sikhs are 
not Muslims. Most recently, in New York City, a Hindu man, Sunando Sen, was killed after 
being pushed in front of a train in what is generally understood to be an act of Islamophobia. 
Furthermore, Arabs have ostensibly come under attack as victims of “Islamophobia,” in spite of 
the large Christian Arab population. Islamophobia as a term also does not attend to the ways in 
which various types of privilege mitigate the experiences of Muslim American populations.  
 As Alsultany points out, the rise in visibility of Muslims has also included a striking 
increase in sympathetic or positive portrayals (2007). Even in the immediate aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks, prominent political leaders denounced anti-Muslim bigotry and urged Americans to 
avoid Islamophobia (Milbank and Wax 2001). Muslim American leaders were invited to meet 
with President George W. Bush at the White House, and concerned politicians visited mosques 
and appeared at IRO events. On September 17th, 2001, President Bush said during a visit to a 
mosque, “The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That's not what Islam is all about. Islam 
is peace” (Bush 2001). While many mosques and Islamic schools received hate mail and bomb 
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threats, several also reported receiving flowers and vows of support from churches, synagogues, 
and community members. The “generalized affection for Islam and Muslims” is what has come 
to be known as Islamophilia (Shryock 2010: 9). Islamophilic tactics often define a modern, safe, 
or acceptable Muslim who is to be folded into a diverse and pluralistic U.S. society. Through 
Islamophilia, often encapsulated by a larger, uncritical multicultural discourse, American 
Muslims are positioned as patriotic, peaceful, or moderate; the 'good' American Muslim may be a 
critic of extremism and a champion of American secularism or individualism (Shryock 2010; 
Mahmood 2008). By looking at the work of Islamic organizations and the involvement of U.S. 
Muslims in these organizations, my work begins to explore the ways the politics of inclusion, 
multiculturalism, and tolerance function for the very population whose Americanness has been in 
jeopardy in the wake of the War on Terror.  
 Based on 16 months of fieldwork (described below), I came to understand these 
representational acts as critical components of larger global phenomenon. While the U.S. 
domestic racial landscape and global geopolitics are often seen as distinct theoretical concerns, 
my research suggests that we must attend to domestic politics of multiculturalism as inseparable 
from U.S. empire and militarism. Indeed, I have come to understand the representational 
practices of Muslim American organizations as intertwined with the U.S. role in international 
politics, often times in contradictory or surprising ways. In this way, my work responds to claims 
by Grewal (2005), Puar (2007), and Maira (2009) to situate uniquely 'American' conditions 
within transnational processes and power dynamics. As McAlister points out, there are links 
between U.S. racial realities, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the supercarceral U.S. state, “in 
which Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are part of a much longer US story of war and torture 
enacted on racialized bodies, often in the name of empire” (2010: 221). I explain this connection 
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in greater depth below.  
 While I take the events of September 11th, 20013 as a key moment of intensification in the 
story of Islamophobia, I do not mean to imply that anti-Muslim sentiment was not a concern for 
IRO's before the events of 9/11/2001. In fact, one can see a growing concern with public image, 
political involvement, and representation in the programming of CAIR or ISNA events well 
before 2001. Indeed, topics such as interfaith dialogue, tolerance, negative stereotypes surface at 
many pre-9/11 IRO events. Yet it is clear that 9/11 made these concerns paramount, even for 
organizations that had a decidedly more theological orientation before 9/11. It seems that, though 
Islamophobia has been present in the U.S. for decades, combatting Islamophobia only became a 
primary concern to IRO's after 9/11. This is an important distinction: it reminds us that 
Islamophobia as a practice was not born on 9/11, but was a long-standing feature of the U.S. 
racial landscape. The fact that Islamophobia became a staple part of the lexicon of civil rights 
activists and Muslim Americans after 9/11 is telling: because 9/11 intensified the anti-Muslim 
gaze, IRO's went from being concerned with it to singularly preoccupied with it. 
 Indeed, American Islamophobia has deep roots. Mastnak shows how the birth of 
Christian Islamophobia likely began in the mid-ninth century, when Muslim authorities in 
Europe executed several Christians found guilty of blasphemy (2010). Mastnak highlights waves 
of ebbing and flowing anti-Muslim sentiment in European history that were embedded in the 
psyches of American settlers, a long history that includes the Spanish inquisition, the European 
                                                 
3 While I use the term '9/11' for the sake of brevity throughout my work, it has been noted that 
the US “branding” of 9/11 serves perhaps as a form of prioritizing the 2001 attacks over several 
historic events, including the US-backed overthrow of Salvador Allende or the 2012 factory fires 
that killed hundreds of Pakistani workers. The 'monopoly' over the term 9/11 may be critiqued as 




compulsion to drive out all “Turks”, and the Crusades. The fact that the Columbian expedition of 
1492 coincided with the Spanish Inquisition, which aimed to purge Spain of its Jewish and 
Muslim populations, places anti-Muslim sentiment squarely in the center of the very founding of 
“America.” In a sense, one could argue that Islamophobia is embedded in the very foundation of 
America, that the “colonization of America was, to a large degree, conceived in the framework of 
a crusading imagination” (37).  Much of European identity as defined by the Muslim as “other” 
crystallized with the Crusades; when George W. Bush evoked the Crusades in a speech initiating 
the War on Terror, many Muslims were rightfully disturbed by the connotation. Mastnak shows 
how the Crusades were perhaps the moment when Islam was deemed the enemy of all of 
Christendom. In more recent history, the 1979 hostage crisis in Iran reinvigorated anti-Muslim 
sentiment, providing another moment of intensification of Islamophobia. Jack Shaheen locates 
the many ways media images denigrated Arabs and Muslims well before 9/11 (Shaheen 1994; 
Shaheen 1984). I outline this history to underscore the fact that US Islamophobia has deep roots 
preceding 9/11.  
 Indeed, many of the themes and strategies I identify as part of the representational 
practices were present even before September 11th. Organizations like the Islamic Society of 
North America (ISNA) and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) were already 
engaged in projects of inclusion and cultural citizenship quite similar to the ones I describe 
below prior to 9/11. For instance, Muslim Student Association (MSA) chapters across the 
country have sponsored “Islam Awareness Week” on campuses for decades as a means of 
educating college students about the presence of Muslims in the US. However, 9/11 ostensibly 
intensified the vilification of Muslims and, on a policy level, was an ideological tool used to 
garner support for many components of the War on Terror on a domestic and international level. 
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In this way, the representational strategies already present took on an urgency and intensity that 
had perhaps not been present before. I noticed an uneven engagement with 9/11 in the field, as 
some deemed it an unequivocal turning point in the story of U.S. race and tolerance and others 
saw it as just another event among many in a long history of foundational U.S. racism. The 
tension between those who understand the United States to be a fundamentally inclusive, 
tolerant, open country and those who consider racism and imperialism of the U.S. is explored 
throughout my work.  
 
Muslims and Islamic Organizations in the U.S. 
 The story of Muslims in America is essential to understanding the more recent practices 
of representation. While the early documented history of Muslims in America is sparse, strong 
evidence points to a Muslim presence as early as at the time of Spanish voyages to the Americas 
(Turner 1997). The slave trade from Africa brought practicing Muslims to the “New World,” 
many of whom continued to practice Islam privately in spite of violent and forceful conversions 
to Christianity (Gomez 1994). Furthermore, even those who did convert likely held on to various 
Islamic traditions that had lasting impacts on African American culture. The narrative of African 
American Muslim slave Yarrow Mamout was a popular example at IRO events where black 
Islam or the history of Islam in America was being discussed. Mamout, a manumitted slave in 
Georgetown in the early 19th century, is regarded as one of the few known slaves to resist the 
often violent, generally coercive conversions to Christianity (Turner 1997). The term “black 
Islam” popularly conjures up images of Malcolm X or the Nation of Islam, overlooking the vast 
diversity among African-descended Muslims living in America (Abdullah 2010; Turner 2003; 
Rouse 2004). While Islam is generally associated by many Americans with Arabs and South 
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Asians, the remarkable history and diversity of African American Islam can enrich the 
possibilities for discussion of race, xenophobia, and Islamophobia in the U.S. 
 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire brought many West Asian Muslims to the United 
States in the early 1900s, labeled in the immigration documents as “Turks” or “Syrians” (Nyang 
1999). This period also saw an influx of Yugoslavian and Albanian Muslims. U.S. immigration 
policy during and following the Cold War brought over droves of Asian Muslim professionals, 
including scientists, engineers, and physicians (those whose presence would ultimately be used 
to bolster the myth of the Asian American 'model minority'). These professionals would, often 
times, sponsor other relatives from their native countries to emigrate, resulting in a “two-tiered” 
Asian immigrant population resulting from the immigration policies of the 1960s and chain 
migration. The sponsored immigrants often lacked the professional credentials and did not satisfy 
the same labor needs at the time of their arrival as their sponsoring families, leading to a 
bifurcated, stratified Asian Muslim presence. Diasporic South Asian immigrants from the West 
Indies included Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus, leading to the presence of American Muslims from 
Guyana, Trinidad, and Jamaica. Following the Iranian revolution in 1979, there was a surge in 
the Irani Muslim population in America, and subsequently a marked rise in the proportion of 
U.S. Shi'ite Muslims. In recent decades, refugees from Bosnia, Somalia, and other parts of the 
Muslim world has led to a rise in the presence of Muslims in small rural towns across the country 
(Singer and Wilson 2006). Mistakenly, many assume that American converts to Islam must 
necessarily be African-American. Yet, white Muslim converts (dubbed 'reverts' due to the 
Muslim principle that all people are born Muslim) also occupy an interesting niche in the 
Muslim American population. I explore in my work the prominence of the white convert, 
especially in the post-9/11 climate of Islamophobia. Recently, the rise in Latino American 
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converts to Islam has also captured attention in the mainstream media (Aidi 2004; Aidi 1999).  
 This demographic overview highlights the breadth of Muslim American experiences and 
the diversity of the population at hand. As my project will demonstrate, this diversity is 
constitutive of the strategies undertaken by organizations tasked with representing this 
multifaceted population. Indeed, the fact that Muslim Americans are diverse, fragmented, and 
often divided, in addition to the fact that many non-Muslims fall victim to the dangers of 
Islamophobia, to speak of my ethnographic subject as “the American Muslim” is inaccurate. 
Instead, my project focuses on the ideological construction of the “American Muslim” by IRO's. 
“In the aftermath of 9/11 and the war on terrorism, Islam has emerged as a major classification 
category for governmental policy, and it has subsequently been adopted by the media and the rest 
of society” (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009: 243). Those groups that may strongly identify with 
nation of origin, race, or ethnic group have thus been grouped together as “Muslims.” Indeed, the 
term American Muslim is a catchall phrase that is utilized strategically by Muslims and non-
Muslims alike. As a descriptive term, the demographic term may mask more than it reveals. 
Indeed, I explore the tensions around the construct “American Muslim” in my work, attending to 
the ways a 'colorblind' logic has dominated many calls for unity and togetherness by IRO 
messaging.  
 It was over the past several decades that official organizations formed with the aim of 
representing, uniting, and organizing diverse populations under the label “Muslim.” Distinct 
from mosques or ethnically-specific cultural groups, these organizations served an important 
function in creating something like an American ummah. The Islamic concept of ummah refers 
to a pan-Islamic community. Professing faith in (often-debated) Islamic principles is enough for 
membership in the ummah; membership in the ummah for many Muslims takes precedence over 
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ethnic, tribal, or racial affiliations. (The Prophet Muhammad is credited with saying that the 
Muslim ummah is like one human body – when any one limb aches, the whole body feels this 
pain.) During my time in the field, I heard the Prophet Muhammad's final sermon in which he 
eschewed racial hierarchies and tribal differences cited numerous times in attempts to forge unity 
among diverse Muslims. Naber considers the Iranian revolution the moment at which a pan-
Islamic 'ummah' became important in the U.S., describing the “socio-historical context that 
makes the emergence of “Muslim first” as a collective identity possible” (2005: 479). Naber 
claims that the label “Muslim” is also a “politics of identity, a politics of race, and a politics of 
gender” (480) and that using the “Muslim first” form of identification is also a method of 
strategic essentialism in claims-making. In this way, the concept of ummah for IRO politics is 
not simply a theological one. For the IRO's I study, creation of a specifically American “ummah” 
surfaced as an utmost concern.  
  The history of such organizations is vast. Islamic organizations beyond the mosque have 
arisen with a number of missions, a range of sizes, and varying levels of orthodoxy and 
engagement with “mainstream” America. While often delegitimized by the orthodoxy as 
distorted or even blasphemous, the influence of the Nation of Islam introduced and circulated 
Islamic principles that would inspire many African Americans to convert to Islam in the mid- to 
late-20th century. The Nation of Islam provided a forum for Black Muslims to assemble outside 
of mosque settings and explore matters of Americanism, race, politics, war, and religion. 
Malcolm X, a central leader within the Nation before his expulsion from it, remains a crucial 
figure for American Muslims of all colors.  
 Immigrant Muslim students also played a critical role in forming IRO's. Nyang describes 
the wave of immigrant Muslims who came to the U.S. due to Cold War policies favoring the 
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“recruitment and training” (18) of Third World students. While the U.S. ostensibly opened its 
doors to these immigrant students as a way to expand U.S. influence in the face of the Soviet 
threat, many of whose initial desires to return to their native countries would go unfulfilled and 
they would remain in the U.S. These students were the founders of the Muslim Student 
Association (MSA) in 1963, a thriving force to this day on college campuses across the country. 
Today, most university MSA chapters are affiliated with MSA-National, an umbrella 
organization dedicated to Islam on college campuses. At the time of this writing, MSA is 
celebrating its 50th anniversary. (While I was in the field, MSA briefly captured headlines in 
mainstream media when it was discovered that local MSA chapters were being monitored for 
suspicious activity by the NYPD. I explore this incident in a separate chapter.) It is significant 
that many credit the MSA as being the historic locus of IRO's, given their university affiliation 
and largely immigrant composition. MSA's founders “are the founding fathers of such Muslim 
organizations as the Islamic Society of North America, (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North 
America (ICNA),...” (Nyang 18). ISNA leadership considers MSA to be the early iteration of 
ISNA itself, tracing its origins to the 1963 founding of MSA. ISNA is generally considered the 
largest Muslim organization in North America. Organizations like ISNA are significant in their 
divergence from the traditional mosque, in which obligatory prayers form the primary function. 
These organizations set the tone, so to speak, for how Muslim Americans are to be represented to 
the rest of America. They are the hub in which the “image” of the Muslim American is 
manufactured, and the medium through which this image is deployed to the rest of the country.  
 While historically, these organizations were largely composed of immigrant Muslim 
memberships, the merging of “black Islam” with so-called “mainstream” Sunni Islam has 
marked a turning point from these organizations as historically immigrant-based toward a more 
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(at least in principle) pan-Islamic membership. Warith Deen Muhammad, son of Nation of Islam 
leader Elijah Muhammad, disbanded the Nation of Islam in 1976 in order to bring the movement 
closer in line with more orthodox (Sunni) Islam. I noticed a deliberate effort by organizations 
like ISNA to increasingly reach out to African American Muslims and to shun ethnocentrism 
among immigrant Muslim populations. Ethnic and racial difference and unity across diversity 
surfaced repeatedly as organizational concerns.  
 
Representational Politics in the Age of Islamophobia 
 Since 9/11, targeting Islamophobia and representing America's Muslims favorably has 
become a far more central concern on an organizational level for many IRO's. To this end, goals 
such as unity across difference among diverse Muslim populations, interfaith dialogue between 
Muslims and other religious communities, and combatting negative mainstream media and 
cultural representations have become of utmost importance for many such organizations. 
Furthermore, finding a solid foothold for Islam in America – by discursively and culturally 
positioning Islam as a permanent fixture of American diversity – has become a solid tactic for 
IRO's. In this way, there emerged certain cohesive strategies that were thought to be both a 
source of support to America's Muslims – a way to build unity and community for often far-flung 
populations and thus amass institutional and social power – and a way to project a positive image 
outward.  
 Certainly, these strategies are a response to the newfound hypervisibility experienced by 
Muslim communities since September 11th. Their mosques, headscarves, beards, accents, skin 
color, and restaurants have become more conspicuous since 9/11/2001 and the ensuing surges of 
Islamophobia. Muslim Americans are acutely aware of this hypervisibility. “We are being 
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watched,” I was told in the field by an aspiring Muslim American journalist. “Everything we do 
is being watched. I'm seen as a Muslim, not a person. Anything I do, it's seen as something a 
Muslim did. I can't run a stop sign and not have it reflect badly on all American Muslims.” 
Indeed, awareness of this spotlight seemed at times to be an embodied reality for many people I 
met in the field. The decision to wear a hijab, to remove a hijab, to grow a beard, to shave, to 
paint ones nails, to hold doors open for strangers, to smile at non-Muslims upon making eye 
contact – each of these surfaced in the field as examples of how Muslim bodies must navigate 
this climate of being watched. This hypervisibility has also taken the form of more university 
departments and course offerings in Islamic studies, fiction and non-fiction literature about 
Islam, and news programs, films, and documentaries about Muslims.  
 Perhaps most significantly, this hypervisibility is evident in the massive surveillance 
apparatus that has been institutionalized against Muslims over the past decade. Surveillance 
became even more intensified after the completion of my fieldwork, when Muslim communities 
sued the NYPD over its use of surveillance and the American public learned about the NSA's 
relationship to internet privacy. Yet even during my time in the field, surveillance was a central 
concern. The USA PATRIOT Act marked the beginning of the institutionalization of anti-Muslim 
surveillance politics and ostensibly reconfigured the ways in which Muslim Americans 
understood (lack of) privacy rights. This climate of hypervisibility is of central concern for this 
project, as I examine the strategies used to manage and subvert this hypervisibility.  
 I ask in this work, what possibilities are enabled, and which are foreclosed, by this project 
of positive hypervisibility? By focusing on Islamophilic strategies, my project looks past the 
totalizing narrative of Islamophobia as an inescapable, oppressive force upon U.S. Muslims. 
Islamophilic strategies, I argue, are debatable in their transformative potential. As Bakalian and 
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Bozorgmehr point out, Islamic organizations have made 'integration' a primary focus in the face 
of anti-Muslim backlash (2009). Yet this strategy is not unproblematic; rather, it is fraught with 
marginalization, divisiveness, and hegemony. Rather than assuming that Islamic organizations 
have necessarily responded to Islamophobia in transformative, progressive ways, I look closely 
at the representational strategies that have emerged and argue that responses have often been 
unrepresentative or mitigated by a climate of stifled or limited discourse. Furthermore, IRO 
members have varying levels of approval of these strategies. An uncritical multiculturalism often 
dominates the strategies I describe, as opposed to an activism that holds accountable the very 
roots of contemporary Islamophobia.  
 As Susser and Maskovsky suggest, the domestic consequences of a new U.S. imperialism 
often go ignored in anthropological scholarship in North America (2009). My project uses 
ethnographic analysis to examine American Muslim responses to Islamophobia as a domestic 
manifestation of U.S. imperialism. The War on Terror has offered a dichotomous 'us versus them' 
duality to U.S. citizens in combatting terrorism. Faced with this opposition, many American 
Muslims have been eager to exonerate themselves of blame for the events of September 11th, 
2001, positioning themselves as "not with the terrorists.” Proving oneself to not be a terrorist is a 
fraught act, as is proving oneself to be “one of us.” My fieldwork suggests that Muslims in the 
U.S. use the language of civil rights and multiculturalism to combat Islamophobia, yet often 
deliberately silence certain geopolitical or foreign policy concerns. The quest for legitimacy and 
recognition in a new imperial homeland perhaps necessitates these silences. By this logic, 
Muslims are free to demand inclusion and tolerance provided that they are unquestioningly 
patriotic subjects, or at the very least that they fully support the War on Terror.  
 By employing Islamophilic representations of American Muslims, these responses often 
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fit into a discourse about colorblindness, pluralism and tolerance. American Muslims, who often 
times feel powerless to discuss geopolitical concerns such as the War on Terror, US militarism in 
the Muslim world or their concerns about Palestine and Israel often find ample space to express 
their concerns about tolerance and inclusion in the U.S. This tradeoff – between portraying U.S. 
Muslims in a favorable light and tackling difficult domestic and foreign policy concerns – is a 
salient one that demonstrates the domestic ramifications of U.S. imperialism. U.S. Muslims who 
do critique foreign policy or military intervention are painted as unpatriotic or anti-American. In 
the field, I learned that many have internalized a sense that, in order for successful claims 
making, certain topics are not to be discussed. Thus, the possibilities for earnest engagement are 
limited, and it is these limitations that figure centrally in my work.  
 
Methodology 
 I spent a total of 16 months in the field exploring my questions about possibilities, 
visibility, and inclusion emanating from Muslim American organizations. Because 
'representational strategies' are not geographically bounded (i.e. in a heavily Muslim town), I was 
required to look beyond sites such as residential towns as my analytic units. Instead, my 
fieldwork focused on the relationship between Muslims from across the U.S. and their 
“representative” organizations. I studied individuals who are mobile and closely connected to 
geographically distant U.S. Muslims through important formal and informal networks. These 
networks have been central to my analysis. My methods required focusing on those events in 
which Islamic organizations grappled with the issue of “Islam in America”, a broad topic 
encompassing religiosity, race, multiculturalism, and current politics. Thus, I spent my time in 
the field traveling across the country to Islamic conventions, panels, conferences, and workshops 
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that convened Muslim Americans concerned with the issue at hand. I attended workshop, 
conventions, fundraisers, and conferences in cities across the country, including Washington, 
D.C., Detroit, Cincinnati, Chicago, New York. Those I spoke with included members/participants 
and organizers/leaders. I quickly discovered the 'celebrity' status (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 
2009) that many prominent IRO leaders enjoy and thus, consequently, had limited access to 
speak directly with many of these leaders. Leading up to and following attendance at these 
events, I interviewed attendees and (when possible) organizers and speakers regarding their 
involvement and planning. Most of the events lasted two to four days, though I also attended 
several banquets, fundraisers, and afternoon workshops. The larger events included a mix of 
cultural events, panels, bazaars, film screenings, and social functions.  
 The lack of a geographically bounded field-site is an important one. It is significant to 
note that Muslim Americans, as such, do not necessarily have “community” in a traditional sense 
of geographic proximity. In fact, as discussed above, the term “Muslim American” itself serves 
as a misnomer, an ideological term that eludes more than it reveals. While a dense Bangladeshi 
neighborhood in Jackson Heights, NY is largely Muslim, there is little connection between it and 
the large Islamic organizations I explore. Similarly, the Arab American neighborhoods of Detroit 
are not representative of the national population of South Asian, African American, and African 
Muslims, nor is the dense African-American Muslim population near Masjid Al-Taqwa in 
Brooklyn. These “Muslim” neighborhoods are usually ethnically- or racially-specific enclaves. 
Furthermore, for many Muslim Americans, a stable sense of community is often at large. In a 
conversation with a young Pakistani-American lawyer (also the former president of his 
university MSA), I was told that “community exists wherever you bow your head in prayer. I 
travel a lot for work. So for me, the Muslim community happens to be whichever mosque I'm 
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praying at that week. It struck me when I went away to college, and again when I relocated for 
law school. There aren't really “Muslim” towns, and even very few “Muslim” neighborhoods in 
this country. There are Bosnian neighborhoods and Yemeni neighborhoods, but that's not a 
“Muslim” neighborhood. So the sense of community in a pan-Islamic sense is fleeting, unless 
you're at an ISNA convention or something.” Another respondent told me that she's a “self-
proclaimed masjid-hopper,” that she rarely performs congregational prayers at the same mosque 
twice in a month. I agree with Grewal’s claim that scholars “often overterritorialize Muslim 
American communities, relying far too heavily on demographic variables when dividing Muslim 
Americans into separate communities, perhaps as a practical concession to their incredible 
diversity. The isolation of Muslim Americans by nationality, ethnicity, and race creates the 
illusion of discrete ‘villages’ (Arabs in Dearborn, Iranians in Los Angeles, South Asians in 
Chicago, Senegalese in Harlem). This ‘village effect’ obscures the fluid and overlapping qualities 
of Muslim American communities, including their shared investments in distant Islamic places” 
(50).   
 This required me to define my field site in an alternative way. I was amazed by the 
prolific, active nature of IRO's. Despite the fact that many of these national organizations held 
their events in various cities across the country, membership would often travel great distances to 
attend these events. While regional IRO events (such as the ISNA Midwestern Zone Conference 
or the ISNA Diversity Forum, both of which I attended) primarily convened Muslims from 
nearby states, events like the annual ISNA or ICNA convention draw Muslims from across the 
country (and even many Canadians). The type of community that forms at these events is unique, 
and quite different from the space in a common area of a mosque, for instance. At IRO events, 
the celebrity status of speakers is paramount. Having names like Shaikh Hamza Yusuf, Imam 
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Zaid Shakir, or Dr. Ingrid Mattson in the program guaranteed large audiences.  
 While mosques/masajid are important places that convene Muslim American populations, 
I chose not to use mosques or mosque communities as my primary analytic unit for several 
reasons. First, masajid often serve the primary function of offering Muslims a place to pray in 
congregation. While the five daily prayers, when offered in a mosque, convene Muslims, they do 
not consistently generate the type of institutional discourse around Americanness and Islam that I 
was interested in. Second, offering prayer in congregation is (according to most orthodox 
interpretations) more incumbent upon males than females. Therefore, jummah4 and the five daily 
prayers often gather significantly larger male worshippers than females. Because men and 
women rarely pray in integrated spaces5, I would have limited access to dialogue among men or 
between men and women in mosque spaces. Furthermore, many mosques across the country 
cater to a specific ethnic or racial group. “That's a black mosque, here's a Pakistani mosque, 
there's an Arab mosque,” Linah told me during an interview in Detroit. “Rarely do you find 
mosques that are inclusive or even representative of the true diversity of Muslim Americans.” 
Certainly, Sunni and Shi'a Muslims rarely convene in a mosque setting (due largely to 
theological differences that affect the ways prayer is performed). Because my investigation is 
around issues of “Muslim Americans,” any ethnically exclusive mosque community would fall 
short. Of course, I did regularly attend mosque functions as part of my fieldwork in the location 
of the IRO event at hand. Indeed, several smaller-scale IRO panels, town halls, and workshops 
are often held at community mosques. 
                                                 
4 Friday prayers, compulsory for men to offer in congregation.  
 
5 Amina Wadud sparked controversy across the nation when she led a mixed-gender prayer in 




 The 'slippery' nature of the term Muslim American figures prominently in the ways my 
methodology took shape. Part of my project examines the very construction of the concept 
“Muslim American,” a term that in reality is fraught with fractures of race, sect, class, 
immigration status, political orientation, and geography. My project aims to understand how, 
given the “multitude” present in the millions of Muslims that reside in America that these large 
organizations claim to represent, social difference figures in anti-Islamophobic strategies. I argue 
that the “Muslim American” construct is formed heavily through the workings of these large 
representative groups.  
 Because my project focuses on the politics of representation, I spent much time looking 
at media created by IRO's and their members. Magazines such as Islamic Horizons (the 
publication of ISNA), press releases by CAIR, and blog and Twitter activity by active IRO 
members and volunteers were all revealing for my project. Furthermore, I attended to the ways 
representations of Muslims in non-Muslim media (i.e. in mainstream news media, in Hollywood 
films, and on television) portrayed Muslims and Muslim reactions to these portrayals. The media 
analysis portion of my fieldwork is critical for understanding the project of positive 
hypervisibility. Not only are IRO's active in responding to negative media portrayals, they are 
agents in advocating for Islamophilic representations, such as those in Mooz-lum, All American 
Muslim, and Little Mosque on the Prairie. 
 
Overview 
 In the chapter “Everything I do is being watched,” I examine the concept of 
hypervisibility in the age of Islamophobia. Taking 9/11 as a point of intensification for the 
AMEMSA population, I examine the ways in which this hypervisibility took shape and was 
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experienced. The abundance of cultural production, including films, literature, academic 
departments and course offerings, and art exhibits stood alongside the general anxiety in the U.S. 
social imaginary about its domestic Muslim population. I explore the ways Muslims involved 
with Islamic organizations experienced this hypervisibility. Additionally, this chapter explores 
the lingering 'invisibility' of being a Muslim American. Often included under the sweeping 
generalizations of the “model minority” stereotype, Asian Muslims' (including Arabs and South 
Asians) experiences of marginality, racism, and xenophobia are overlooked. Bakalian and 
Bozorgmehr (2009) and Naber (2000) remark on the invisibility of Arab Americans due to the 
U.S. racial scheme, allowing distinct and constructed racial categories for identification. 
Furthermore, with Muslims configured discursively as a “foreign” threat, America's own 
Muslims face an interesting configuration of belonging and exclusion. At once quintessentially 
American – with several second- and third-generation Muslim American IRO members – the 
'othering' of Muslims through Islamophobia creates a Moebius strip of simultaneous inclusion 
and exclusion. Muslims are at once of and in the U.S. and cast outside, alienated. Like Simmel's 
“stranger” (1950), Muslim Americans’ very presence in the U.S. creates their alienation. The 
invisibility of American Muslims, in spite of their hypervisibility, was evident in public 
perception of the drone attacks that killed Yemeni American cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki and his 
young son.  
 This paradox of hypervisibility and invisibility, I argue, positions America's Muslims as 
'citizen outsiders,' an American minority population that at once is rendered hypervisible and 
simultaneously cast out of conventional understandings of U.S. race and difference. Arab 
Americans, for instance, have had an inconsistent relationship with 'whiteness' (Samhan 1999). I 
bring in ethnographic detail from my time in the field to explore how this hypervisibility figured 
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in the strategies put forth by IRO's. I also examine the conflicted, ambivalent ways IRO members 
and leaders have engaged with the massive surveillance apparatus that has emerged as part of the 
War on Terror. Here, I also explore the ways in which my fieldwork experience was shaped by 
awareness of surveillance. My presence in the field was repeatedly acknowledged as another 
possible form of surveillance – either as overt surveillance by government intelligence, or simply 
that academic curiosity about Muslim Americans served as an unofficial branch of the 
surveillance apparatus.  
 Chapter 3, “Even Thomas Jefferson Owned a Quran,” presents IRO strategies as a project 
of cultural citizenship. As Flores says, cultural citizenship is about claiming space, claiming 
rights, and forging community (2003). “Cultural citizenship,” says Rosaldo, “refers to the right 
to be different and to belong in a participatory democratic sense. It claims that, in a democracy, 
social justice calls for equity among all citizens, even when such differences as race, religion, 
class, gender, or sexual orientation potentially could be used to make certain people less equal or 
inferior to others” (1994: 402). IRO's are deeply intertwined with these projects. While IRO 
members are often U.S. citizens, their cultural citizenship is in peril due to the alienating effects 
of Islamophobia. I argue here that Muslim Americans are struggling with the same issues of 
difference and marginality that several other racially marked and immigrant communities have 
experienced. Yet, the climate of the War on Terror adds a variable that distinguishes this 
particular experience. In light of Islamophobia, hypervisibility, and the War on Terror, Muslim 
American cultural citizenship takes a distinct form. IRO's use strategies such as interfaith 
dialogue, presenting Islam as uniquely “American” or compatible with “American” values, 
selecting quintessentially “American” leaders, and building strategic coalitions with other groups 
as part of this project of cultural citizenship. This process is affected by controversial political 
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decisions, including the efficacy of certain coalitions as opposed to others, the role of 
assimilation and cultural difference in this project of “Americanizing Islam,” and the possibilities 
for radical change within this project of cultural citizenship. On an official level, IRO's are 
ostensibly enmeshed in a project of mainstreaming Islam, a strategy that is expected to mitigate 
Islamophobia. Yet this mainstreaming process, my fieldwork reveals, reflects an alienation and 
ambiguity among IRO members regarding the efficacy of these projects to enact real change. 
Race and whiteness figure centrally in this chapter. 
 Chapter 4, “We Have a Dream,” examines the interplay between Islamophilia and 
Islamophobia that has dominated the representational politics of U.S. Muslims since 9/11. Given 
the immense amount of support – cultural, political, and economic - behind the Islamophobia 
machine (Lean 2012), there has arisen a defense of U.S. Muslims that often characterizes them as 
peace-loving, “just like us,” and completely separate from heinous, violent acts of terror. This 
binaristic configuration is at the center of this chapter. I examine 'organizational Islamophilia' – 
good-Muslim strategies put forth by IRO's – and the ways Muslim Americans engage with this 
limited spectrum of representational possibilities. I consider the politics of representation and the 
ramifications of these politics for economically, ideologically, and culturally diverse Muslims in 
the U.S. who relate to these organizations in varying ways. Following Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 
(2009), I agree that “although the post-9/11 backlash against Middle Eastern and Muslim 
Americans spurred them to engage in claims making, the ultimate goal was integration” (236). 
However, I consider the tradeoffs made by making 'integration' and 'legitimacy' central goals.  
 Chapter 5, “It's Just Not the Right Time to Talk about That” I explore what I consider to 
be a result of the binary “good Muslim/bad Muslim” landscape that has emerged both in the U.S. 
social imaginary as well as among IRO contingents. Throughout my time in the field, I gleaned a 
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sense of 'impossibility' among IRO leaders and members, a feeling that the position of Muslim 
Americans was precarious enough to preclude certain geopolitical discourse. I look at the 
conflicted sense of engagement among those who see themselves as navigating a limited political 
discourse. It is here that temporality and hope (Crapanzano 2003) emerge as critical factors. 
While IRO members recognize a constrained possibility of dialogue, many of them suggest that 
another future is possible, that Muslim Americans must “wait until the time is right,” as Linah 
told me at last year's ISNA convention. “Right now,” one young ISNA member and CAIR 
volunteer told me, “our concern is safety and responding to the all the negative images of 
Muslims out there. It's not the right time to talk about our foreign policy concerns. That doesn't 
mean we don't care about them. It just means we might do more damage than good by 
advocating about these issues right now.” 
 In my Conclusion, I use my fieldwork as a starting point in connecting local multicultural 
politics and racial projects to a larger context of U.S. militarism, the War on Terror, and empire. I 
argue that 'domestic' Islamophobia and racial politics must be understood in relation to U.S. 
militarism and empire.  In general, there must be an attentiveness to the ways racial difference 
and multiculturalism are connected to the U.S. role as a military superpower. Hardt and Negri 
suggest that empire works by recognizing and celebrating difference and managing difference 
(2000). By positioning themselves as allies in the War on Terror, for instance, by presenting 
images of the 'good Muslim', IRO's are not simply focused on tolerance within the United States. 
Their politics resonate in the context of a larger geopolitical order. According to Marable, “any 
expression of restraint or caution about the dangerous erosion of our civil liberties has been 





 Writing about Muslim Americans and Islamic organizations in the midst of the ongoing 
War on Terror has proved challenging on many fronts. I frequently felt overwhelmed by the 
continual change, ongoing upheavals, that would emerge in the field. It seemed that the civil and 
human rights concerns of Muslim Americans were transformed on a weekly basis, whether the 
PATRIOT Act Extension had just been signed, Osama bin Laden had been assassinated 
extrajudicially, or the NYPD's massive surveillance apparatus had just been revealed. Quite 
frequently, I found myself having to cut short investigations on a particular event and turn to the 
newest concern in U.S. Islamophobia. However, this marked instability in the field became 
constitutive of my project. Studying hypervisible subjects never yields a static moment.  
 Yet the social landscape was shifting outside my fieldsite as well, often times in ways 
seemingly unrelated to our Muslim American population. A few months into my fieldwork, 
Occupy Wall Street had commanded a national presence, coinciding with the 10 year anniversary 
of the September 11th attacks, bringing issues of neoliberalism, the concentration of wealth, and 
bank crimes into mainstream political discourse. I found myself at once enthusiastic about the 
visibility of this important movement and jaded by the marginalization within the movement -the 
silencing of people of color and queer folk. Yet I was inspired as I saw Cornel West, Noam 
Chomsky, and other public intellectuals engage with the movement. I found fuel for my fire as 
classmates and colleagues were arrested, as I saw riot police lining the city sidewalks, facing 
thousands of us head-on simply for gathering in our streets. I shifted from this activist energy to 
my inquisitive, equally politicized, role as a fieldworker. On a Sunday morning, I sat with 
Samina at a diner in midtown. She'd been introduced to me as a member of a Muslim 
professional networking organization by the group's founder. 
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 “It's not about politics. We're all doing well financially. We'll have, like, a minor 
conversation about Occupy Wall Street. But all of us were in the same boat. Like, we are not the 
people who need to be occupying Wall Street. The bankers and us, we are finance people.” She 
pauses, laughs, and continues. “I think it's just, you know, it's too similar a group of people with 
too similar backgrounds and that stuff. That's why we stay away from politics.” My heart sank. 
My recent involvement with Occupy – and my exposure to socioeconomic justice activism in 
New York city in the past – had led me to understand the issues at the core of Occupy activists as 
inherently connected to issues Muslim Americans should care about. Didn't U.S. military 
presence in the Arab and Muslim world bother this well-intentioned, highly educated young 
Muslim woman sitting across from me? 
 This sense of dejectedness and frustration crept up on me in the field time and again. I 
understood Islamophobia to be a global force, operating on institutional levels as the US waged 
war globally and domestically against an ambiguous terrorist threat and on a cultural level, as 
anxieties about President Obama's Muslim-ness and stereotypical portrayals of Arabs and 
Muslims abounded. My teaching and reading focused on issues of race and imperialism, with 
Islamophobia being the newest case of the U.S. acting as an exceptionalist empire. Naively, I 
assumed this Other at home – the Muslim American – would use her experience of Islamophobia 
to ally with undocumented immigrants, convicted felons, marginalized war veterans. I expected 
the targets of Islamophobia to share my critique of U.S. empire. 
 This is not to say that the Muslims I met in the field weren't politicized. Quite the 
contrary. Politics – electoral, cultural, and economic – subsumed many of the conversations I 
had. Yet the shape of these conversations fell back, with a few exceptions, on (to me) hackneyed 
notions of interfaith dialogue, inclusion, multiculturalism, and tolerance. In other words, my 
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frustrations in the field arose from a deep dissonance between my politics and theirs. To an 
outsider, my project seems to be autoethnography – I'm studying “my own.” Perhaps this is 
where my frustration was born. Yes, I was studying a community that my own family and 
childhood friends considered their own, individuals deeply invested in cultivating a “Muslim 
American” community. The conventions I now attended as a fieldworker, I had attended as a 
young Muslim teen in Chicago, at the time eager to sharpen my religious understanding and 
contribute to Islamic presence in the U.S. 
 Was I an insider? Was I doing autoethnography? If so, why did I feel so excluded, 
alienated, and jaded in the field? Last summer, I sat in my room in Dearborn, Michigan after 
attending ISNA's Diversity Forum and I felt despondent as I looked over my field notes. The 
same weekend this convention happened, the Allied Media Conference (AMC) was happening 
just a few miles away in Detroit. The AMC brought together many of my friends and activists, 
queer folks and people of color interested in economic and racial justice, people with a trenchant 
critique of law enforcement, immigration, and the corporate mainstream media. I wanted to be a 
part of these conversations, but instead spent the bulk of the weekend in Dearborn, talking to 
warm and welcoming Muslim Americans about the importance of unity across diversity for 
Muslims of different stripes. The whole experience felt schizophrenic. Here I was, in one of the 
largest Muslim communities in the US, feeling awkward in a headscarf I hadn't dawned (prior to 
entering the field) in years, feeling mutually alienated from the several hundred Muslim 
Americans here who, on paper, were “just like me.” 
 I had felt that way the previous summer at a large Islamic convention in Chicago, just 
beginning my fieldwork. The convention was held at the Rosemont Convention Center at 
O'Hare, and I was staying across the street in a hotel where, incidentally, the 2011 Socialism 
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Conference was being held the same weekend. I perused the socialist bookstore that was set up 
in the hotel, happy to see titles by Angela Davis, Ward Churchill, and Neil Smith. Why weren't 
the several thousand Muslims across the street, talking about “Pluralism” for Islam in America, 
stopping by and building alliances with these activists and socialists? Why were they so eager to 
invite a local assemblyman who'd hosted an iftar dinner during Ramadan, but not in the least 
interested in the panel on Palestine at the Socialism Conference? 
 I felt defeated, time and again, in the field. I couldn't do ethnography of Islamophobia 
when I spent much of my time being frustrated with what struck me as trite or elitist discourse 
being generated in the field. I couldn't do it without being disrespectful or dismissive of the 
people I'd met in the field, many of whom I had genuinely grown to respect. I certainly couldn't 
do it as a so-called 'insider,' given the extreme alienation I experienced in my 16 month 
fieldwork experience. My alienation is at the heart of my project. As I immersed myself in the 
field, traditional notions of site, informant, community, and ethnographer unraveled. Instead, I 
found myself engaged with questions of empire, our imperial homeland, and the silences it 
necessitates. The Muslim Americans who traveled to what I came to call “Islam in America” 
events – fundraisers, conferences, exhibitions, and workshops – unanimously expressed to me 
(behind closed doors) nuanced, sophisticated, at times radical notions of geopolitics, 
surveillance, and inclusion, ideas far more pithy than the ones often being generated from the 
very organizations of which they were proud members.  
 It is this gap that I explore here. This project is about the silences necessitated by empire, 
about the agentival capacity of those positioned at once inside the heart of our 'imperial 
homeland' and yet inherently alien to it. Ultimately, this is how I've come to terms with my sense 
of alienation in the field. In an age of rampant Islamophobia, unbridled xenophobia, and 
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colorblind racism within the borders of the U.S., wars and drone strikes echo our American 
























CHAPTER 2: “EVERYTHING I DO IS BEING WATCHED”: HYPERVISIBILITY AND 
THE ISLAMOSCOPIC REGIME 
 
“This is the politically visible, that horizon of actors, objects, and events that constitute the 
worldview and circumscribed reality of the political emergency zone – the gathered and linked 
components of crises.” (Feldman 1997: 28) 
 
“Repeat after me: Oh God, Ya Allah, Ya Allah, Ya Allah. Oh God, make light in my heart. Make 
light in my vision. Make light in my hearing. Make light to my right. Make light to my left. Make 
light before me. Make light behind me. Make light in my nerves, in my flesh, in my blood, in my 
hair, in my skin, on my tongue. Oh God, bless me with light. May we all be blessed with light and 
may we shine that light in our various ways in these dark and perplexing times.” 
-Imam Zaid Shakir, 9/11 ten year memorial, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 “There's no such thing as bad press,” Aadam told me as I joined him and his wife for 
lunch at an ISNA regional conference in Cincinnati. I had been conversing with the late-20s, 
South Asian American couple about the post-9/11 fascination with Muslims in U.S. culture. 
Aadam had finished describing to me how, after 9/11/2001, Qurans were sold out and 
backordered at bookstores, university classes about Islam were overenrolled, and “one news 
show or another had some segment trying to explain who Muslims were.” It was a trend that had 
been described to me by many IRO members before Aadam as well. People were keenly aware 
of the heightened interest in exactly who Muslims are, culturally, politically, ethnically. “To an 
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extent, it's like knowing Muslims – knowing Muslim culture – is a way to know why these 
terrible things happened,” he told me. His words echoed what Abu Lughod has called the 
“consistent resort to the cultural,” a peculiar sense that understanding Muslims as a cultural and 
religious group would expose the reasons behind Islamist terrorism (Abu-Lughod 2002: 784). 
IRO members were ever-aware that the public curiosity about Muslim culture has become “more 
urgent than exploring the history of the development of repressive regimes in the region and the 
U.S. role in this history” (ibid). The IRO members I met were conscious of the intensified 
interest in Muslim culture and identity, often times even celebrating elements of this interest as a 
chance to promote a positive image of Islam to the general population.  
 It has become a commonplace in scholarship to understand the experiences of Arab 
Americans and Muslims since 9/11 as markedly hypervisible (Alsultany 2006). The presence of 
Muslims in the news and entertainment media, university curricula, literature, and visual art has 
undeniably increased alongside the rise of Islamophobia. There is overarching evidence that 
Muslim Americans are hypervisible subjects, victims (or, in some cases, beneficiaries) of 
excessive scrutiny resulting from exactly the type of cultural curiosity described by Abu-Lughod. 
This cultural hypervisibility does not stand alone; the massive surveillance apparatus that often 
selectively targets Muslims through the logics of 'terrorism prevention' intensifies Muslim 
hypervisibility. In this way, we might speak of Muslim American hypervisibility as reinforced on 
two different, yet connected levels: on the level of popular culture and social imaginary, and on a 
state-based, institutional level.  
 Foucault's essay on Panopticism encapsulates a specific way in which this hypervisibility 
is experienced (Foucault 1977) . Panopticism allows a few people to discretely keep watch over 
many, much the way institutional Islamophobia has allowed surveillance of whole communities 
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by an elite cadre of viewers (in the NSA, FBI, or NYPD, for instance). Yet Panopticism alone 
does not entirely describe the nature of the hypervisibility of those thought to be Muslim in the 
U.S. Indeed, while a few have been called upon to monitor a large population of Muslims 
(described in my discussion of surveillance below), there is a concurrent sense that the many are 
watching the few. In other words, “America” at large has a watchful eye on a minority 
population of Muslims (and those thought to be Muslim). Because of the cultural curiosity 
described above, everyone is interested in Muslims. For instance, many IRO members from New 
York City repeatedly referenced the MTA campaign urging citizens to report suspicious activity 
(the infamous “If you see something, say something” posters that graced subway platforms and 
bus stops) as a way in which the general population has been called upon to exercise a form of 
surveillance, presumably over those thought to be Muslim. The abundance of mainstream 
televisions shows featuring Muslims and Arabs, such as The West Wing or Homeland speak to 
this generalized curiosity and fascination with Muslims. Thus, the hypervisibility of U.S. 
Muslims is both Panoptic and synoptic. At once monitored by those specifically tasked to 
investigate America’s Islamic presence and by those civilians who are curious or suspicious 










TABLE 2: HYPERVISIBILITES 
PANOPTIC     SYNOPTIC    
 NYPD surveillance on mosques and 
MSA’s 
 Warrantless wiretapping 
 FBI infiltration of mosques 
 
 Fiction literature about Muslims 
 Incidents of airport discrimination; “flying 
while Muslim” 
 News programs about Islam and Muslims 
 
 
 That 9/11 was the moment that ushered in – or at least intensified—this this 
hypervisibility is no small coincidence, given the magnitude of the spectacular media event that 
Tuesday morning. The events that followed 9/11 have been equally spectacular. Recalling 
Debord, this spectacle was not simply a visual presentation, but a worldview and a presentation 
of social relationships (1977). In the years that followed 9/11, skeptics’ demands that we “view” 
the body of bin Laden, the photograph of Saddam Hussein defeated, stripped down to his 
underwear, the terrifying scenes of torture on the bodies of Iraqi men in Abu Ghraib: the logics 
of the aftermath of 9/11 have been inextricable from the traffic in widely-proliferated images, 
with the racially and sexually marked Muslim body front and center (Puar 2007). What Feldman 
has called a “scopic regime” (Feldman 1997) has dominated the post-9/11 obsession with 
locating the terrorist – domestically and abroad, synoptically and panoptically. In this regime, 
“power lies in the totalizing, engorged gaze over the politically prone body, and subjugation is 
encoded as exposure to this penetration” (29).  
 I attend here to the ways visibility figures prominently in the representational strategies 
assembled by IRO's. I ask in this chapter, what is the nature of the scopic regime, both as it exists 
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on structural and institutional levels and as it is experienced in the embodied and representational 
practices of IRO members? I consider the role of hypervisibility both as it acts upon U.S. 
Muslims and the ways in which IRO's respond to this inescapable exposition. A singular focus on 
either the apparatus of surveillance of Muslims, the cultural curiosity about Muslims, or the 
reactions of Muslim Americans to their hypervisibility overlooks the important imbrications of 
each of these concerns. A scopic regime that lays bare, through a coexisting Panoptic and 
synoptic gaze over potential terrorists, is only a part of a larger picture. The modalities through 
which IRO members navigate their position by leveraging hypervisibility is in fact also part of 
the regime itself. The coexistence of the disciplinary gaze over Muslims and the responses 
assembled by Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians are part of this Islamoscopic regime.  
The hypervisibility of Muslim Americans, I argue, is not simply the context for IRO 
strategies of representation. Instead, Muslim hypervisibility is a foundational concern that has 
given rise to a representational stance that capitalizes on this 'spotlight' through a particular 
project of respectability and Islamophilia. This is an embodied process in which race and gender 
figure centrally. I consider here the interplay between the intense, Janus-faced gaze of 
Islamophobia and Islamophilia and the consequent responses to hypervisibility. I also consider 
the ways in which the xenophobic othering of Muslims in the social imaginary renders Muslims 
invisible while hypervisible: IRO messaging has repeated the claim that Muslims remain an 
'invisible' minority U.S. group, that their concerns around civil rights and exclusion do not figure 
in public discourse as prominently as those of other, more 'established' minority groups. In this 
way, IRO members shift between feeling ever-exposed, subject to academic, cultural, and 
political curiosity, and hidden, excluded from popular understandings of race and difference.  
 First, the chapter examines the interplay between the various forms of positive and 
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negative hypervisibility. Negative hypervisibility has intensified on a cultural level – that of 
media representations and social imaginary – as well as on a structural and institutional level – 
embedded into the very logics of the post-9/11 U.S. surveillance state. The chapter then looks at 
the ways positive hypervisibility has been a significant, and unexpected, consequence of the 
post-9/11 backlash. Curiosity about Islam and Muslims includes earnest, well-intentioned 
attempts to understand a group that has, through the logics of Islamophobia, been demonized. In 
this way, cultural production such as film and literature and multicultural efforts such as 
Ramadan solidarity-iftars and 'hijab-'days intensified the hypervisibility of Muslims in the 
decade following 9/11/2001. The section on positive hypervisibility also considers the ways IRO 
members seize upon the Islamophobic moment as a profound opportunity for self-representation. 
I use my fieldwork as a springboard for a discussion of the ways in which Muslim hypervisibility 
involves a constant negotiation between the Islamophobic milieu and the agentive capacity of 
those 'representatives' who use Islamophilia to enact positive hypervisibility.  
 Next, I turn to the gendered body as a specific site of Muslim hypervisibility. Because 
fear of terrorism is deployed in ways that are often deeply visual, the marked Muslim body is of 
central concern for both Islamophobes and Islamophiles. The Muslim body becomes a central 
vehicle both for marking the terrorist threat and for representing Muslim respectability and 
dignity. I consider IRO members' responses, as well as the specific ways the Muslim woman's 
body becomes an intensified locus of these embodied politics.  
 I then attend to the paradoxical nature of Muslim American hypervisibility. By 
considering the ways IRO members see themselves as outside of conventional U.S. 
understanding of race and difference, I suggest that Muslim hypervisibility exists alongside a 
tangible and enduring invisibility. The ways in which categories such as “Asian American,” 
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“African American,” or “Latino” are understood as prominent in discussions of race seemed 
often to frustrate IRO members, who do not see “South Asian,” “Arab American,” or “Muslim” 
equally integrated into mainstream racial discourse. In spite of – or perhaps because of – Muslim 
hypervisibility, IRO members articulate a feeling of exclusion from dialogues about 
multiculturalism and race.  
 The chapter ends with an exploration of the role of academia, the social sciences in 
particular, as another mechanism of surveillance of U.S. Muslims. IRO members repeatedly 
remarked that intellectual curiosity about U.S. Muslims was, even in its liberal/sympathetic 
forms, a part of the apparatus that observes, monitors, and exposes Muslims to the powers-that-
be and the population at-large. Academia, then, is part of both the Panoptic and synoptic 
experience of U.S. Muslims. My presence in the field itself was often used as a deliberate 
exemplification of the role of academic curiosity as part of an overarching structure that renders 
Muslims open to examination. Indeed, several times an IRO member would say – in the middle 
of an otherwise pleasant conversation - “Who knows, maybe even you're an FBI informant!” 
 The phrase “everything we do is being watched” was uttered with as much frequency as 
the other oft-mentioned chapter titles in this dissertation. The chapter that follows explores the 
ways in which rendering Muslim Americans 'politically visible' for the purposes of preventing 
terrorism is a multilayered process that invokes agency, racial formation, gender and sexuality, 
and the politics of the gaze. Hardly passive victims under these regimes of rendering visible, IRO 
members and leaders use the spotlight to create an image that, it is hoped, will shatter the very 
Islamophobic gaze upon which it seizes. This process is not de-politicized. I begin, in the pages 
that follow, to explore the ways in which projecting a positive image is a fraught act, much the 
way the “politics of respectability” that have been espoused for African Americans inherently 
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rest upon problematic notions of responsibility, dignity, and class. What, I ask, are the stakes of 
the representational politics that IRO members use to subvert or reclaim the Islamophobic 
spotlight? Who, if anyone, benefits from leveraging positive hypervisibility? 
 
Hypervisibilities and U.S. Muslims 
 IRO members were immediately aware of the ways the events of 9/11 would place an 
extra burden on U.S. Muslims to represent themselves favorably. The politics of Islamophilia 
described in Chapter 4 are a clear exemplification of this awareness. The IRO focus on self-
representation and respectability described below is critical. It is at the nexus of an 
overpowering, often crippling, cultural and political apparatus of Islamophobia and the agentive 
capacity of select U.S. Muslims to respond to this Islamophobia. In this section, I consider the 
ways IRO members deliberately enact a representational politics that is a response to negative 
hypervisibility and an enactment of positive hypervisibility. I reflect here upon the ways a 
singular focus on “Islamophobia” erases the vibrant interplay between positive and negative 
hypervisibility.  
By negative hypervisibility, I mean the ways in which Muslim populations have been 
thrust into physical visibility, placed under a magnifying glass, as potential terrorists and anti-
American al-Qaeda sympathizers. According to the logics of Islamophobia, to locate the Muslim 
visually is to know the enemy. To mark Muslims in this way requires a process of spectacle, a 
voyeuristic, terrified fascination with “our” Muslim population. As such, Muslim hypervisibility 
mirrors the ways in which the attacks on the Twin Towers were heavily broadcast and circulated 
– images of them dominate visual imagery in news and entertainment media and fill the U.S. 
public with a sense of terror and dread, a rising fear that their homeland is at the cusp of a 
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permanent, destructive transformation. For Aretxaga, these visual elements bring terror to life: 
they embody an otherwise abstract notion of terror on movie screens and through news 
broadcasts (Aretxaga 2002). Speaking of the media coverage of the 9/11 attacks, she says that 
“the very familiarity of the scene, already seen in popular Hollywood disaster movies, made 
reality unreal and shocking. It was not that a terrorist attack on the U.S. was unimaginable; it had 
in fact been imaged to satiety in films like Independence Day. Not only had the imaginary of a 
disaster saturated public culture with apocalyptic anxieties during the last decade, but so too had 
filled the imagination of the United States Department of State” (140). Susan Buck-Morss 
describes the events of 9/11/2001 as a spectacle different from other global events of destruction, 
as it was “a mute act, played and replayed, before a global audience” (Buck-Morss 2003):23. 
The ideological effects – perhaps the purpose – of the hypervisual rendering of 9/11 and 
its aftermath are undeniable. Color-coded terror alerts remind travelers of the potentiality of 
imminent violence, and the image of an unattended backpack on a train platform becomes a 
ubiquitous symbol for a terror plot. 9/11, says Corey Robin, has given rise to an entirely new 
mode of political fear (Corey 2004). Kumar describes the massive manipulation of public 
opinion that was enabled by rendering 9/11 one of the most-viewed spectacles in history (Kumar 
2012). The mainstream news media stands alongside Hollywood and television as part of the 
apparatus contributing to the notion that Homeland Security and law enforcement protect 
America from barbarian hordes. Thus, the heavy trafficking in images mobilizes patriotism and 
compassion for American suffering, what Achcar calls a “compassionate narcissism” that results 
from the most-ever viewed broadcast event (Achcar 2002). The 9/11 media coverage was 
“overdramatized,” says Achcar, “the result of deliberate action by media” in a spectacular world 
described by Guy Debord (24). While images of anti-American Muslims cheering at the 
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spectacle of the collapse of the Twin Towers circulated heavily, American patriots could then 
vengefully cheer at the spectacle of Afghani defeat (Achcar). This imagery is not neutral or 
objective. In addition to the 1,000 words contained in a single photo are the myriad factors that 
decide which images will be proliferated. While most Americans can easily recall images of the 
“jumpers” of 9/11 – those who desperately leapt from the flaming towers – few can conjure the 
image of a flag-draped soldier’s coffin returning from Iraq.  
A permanent state of exception summoned by terror is constructed through a violent 
spectacle, a kind of scene that is readily viewed and consumed by a captive U.S. audience. 
Aretxaga’s compelling claim speaks to the overwhelming trafficking in images – images of the 
Muslim body, specifically – that prop up both Islamophobia and Islamophilia. Ground Zero as a 
scene and the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims as archetypal characters bring to life the apocalyptic 
dread of terror using age-old media tropes as a foundation. This spotlight is distinctly politicized 
and empowers the state in its project of Islamophobia. Thus, negative hypervisibility is not a 
cultural phenomenon alone, nor is it isolated in representations in film or television. Instead, this 
hypervisibility is part of a larger apparatus of legitimizing the institutional demonization of 
Muslims. The images of Palestinian children allegedly celebrating the events of 9/11/2001 in the 
streets were broadcast on U.S. media in the days following the attacks. The result, of course, was 
a visual portrayal of the savagery and heartlessness of Palestinians (and by extension, Arabs and 
Muslims), vivid evidence of the formidable brutality of the enemy at hand. Nearly a decade after 
the images of Palestinians celebrating U.S. death had circulated widely, NPR news analyst Juan 
Williams made the following remarks while appearing on The O’Reilly Factor, “Look, Bill, I’m 
not a bigot. You know the kind of books I’ve written about the civil rights movement in this 
country. But when I get on a plane, I got to tell you, if I see people who are in Muslim garb and I 
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think, you know, they are identifying themselves first and foremost as Muslims, I get worried. I 
get nervous.” It was clear – visual cues have become central to identifying the Muslim threat.  
The politics of the gaze have been critical in locating potential threats to homeland 
security. Policing strategies since 9/11 have focused increasingly on the “homegrown” threat – 
the notion that the next major terrorist attack will come not from a foreign entity but from 
American Muslims (Aaronson 2013). Because the imagined-terrorist may be from among ‘us,’ 
the clear ideological demarcation of an identifiable enemy becomes critical. We may not know 
where the War on Terror is fought, but certainly we can picture against whom it is fought. As 
Maira points out, the state actually needs the “bad” Muslim to justify its assault on Muslim civil 
liberties and to justify foreign policy in the Muslim world. If these “bad” Muslims are “not 
visible, it [the state] must call them into being to prove the threat to national security” (Maira 
2009: 640). 
On an institutional level, the surveillance of Muslim communities has been an 
overarching dimension of negative hypervisibility. The USA PATRIOT Act, as Hing describes, 
allowed wiretaps and searches without the demonstration of probable criminal conduct if “the 
target is an agent of foreign power (Hing 2006: 198). This clause was reinforced by a 2002 ruling 
by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, which ruled that the PATRIOT Act 
granted to the Department of Justice authority to conduct wiretaps and other forms of 
surveillance on terrors suspects in the U.S. The PATRIOT Act also expanded surveillance powers 
by granting federal agents the power to clandestinely search private records, residences, and 
workplaces with minimal oversight or approval (Cainkar and Maira 2005). The “sneak and peek” 
provision of the PATRIOT Act rendered visible to intelligence agencies the private contents of 
Muslim homes. This clause allows law enforcement to clandestinely search private premises 
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without the occupant's knowledge or permission based upon 'suspicion,' a term that indicates vast 
discretion on the part of authorities. At an IRO event in Queens, a civil rights lawyer warned 
attendees that “suspicion” could include having a tapestry from Pakistan hanging on the wall or 
having recordings of Quranic recitation. In 2011, revelations that the NYPD had been 
systematically spying not only on mosques, but on Muslim bookstores, cafes, and restaurants 
caught even mainstream media attention (Kumar 2012).With training from the CIA, the NYPD 
“Demographics Unit” obtained information for a ‘human mapping program’ that was purported 
to prevent another terrorist attack.  That the NYPD had done this outside of its jurisdiction – for 
instance, in Newark, New Jersey – led to concerns about the legal limits of “anti-terrorism” 
measures. A somewhat public discussion was catalyzed nearly a decade after 9/11 about the 
systemic violations of Muslim and Arab privacy.  
The NYPD’s mapping program, revelatory though it was, was not the first such attempt 
for law enforcement to involve itself in anti-terror measures and tracking Muslim populations. 
The failed LAPD plan to physically map out Muslim enclaves epitomized the central role of the 
visibility of Muslims. A veritable Panopticon, the LAPD’s  2007 proposed mapping plan would 
help identify potentially radicalized individuals by locating where Pakistanis, Iranis, and 
Chechens lived. This plan followed the logics of much of the terrorism-prevention measures 
taken by the NYPD and FBI, identifying not current terrorists but those likely to become 
radicalized (Aaronson 2013; Kumar 2012). Yet what was key about the LAPD plan was that it 
sought to use mapping as its main method to identify these potential radical Islamic enclaves. 
The plan would locate those Muslim communities that were isolated from “greater society” and 
mark them as those potential sites of radicalization. Their isolation from the mainstream – to be 
exposed through the mapping scheme – apparently labeled them as potential terrorists. This 
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visual marking of isolation as threat, then, explains the larger strategy of mainstreaming and 
proximity that IRO’s have adopted to combat accusations of radicalization.  The above incident 
is part of a massive surveillance apparatus that has sought to mark the U.S. Muslim dissident.  
Feldman has argued that projects “of surveillance regulate movement between spaces and 
created a spatialized social life mediated by rigid and normative geographies (1997: 64). The 
LAPD example is one such way in which the politically exposed body of the suspected terrorist 
is regulated through a multilayered network of surveillance mechanisms. (It is no small 
coincidence that the notorious Islamophobe David Yerushalmi – a vocal opponent of the 
“Ground Zero mosque” – worked with David Gaubatz on a “Mapping Shari’a in America” 
campaign which has collected extensive data on U.S. mosques tying them to ‘Islamic racialism.’) 
What Kumar calls preemptive prosecution – the use of agents provocateurs to incite 
Muslims to terrorists acts they may otherwise not commit – is a dominant strategy resting on the 
assumption of an innate Muslim proclivity for violence (2012). Aaronson describes this strategy 
in great depth in his Terror Factory (2013), which claims that the FBI uses paid informants to 
create terror plots it then uncovers, claiming them as victory in the war against terrorism. It is 
this strategy of surveillance and policing, both by intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
that reminds IRO members that they are being watched. In the field, I was told time and again 
that whichever convention, conference, or fundraiser we were at had “at least one spy” present. 
Anther circulating rumor was that the FBI had an official policy of having “at least one spy at 
every jummah6 prayer in order to record the sermon.” Others told me they took clicks and 
interference on phone calls as evidence that their phones had been tapped. In a phone 
                                                 




conversation with Linah about an upcoming fundraiser by an organization called American 
Muslims for Palestine, she joked, “Oh, we said Palestine. I’m sure some recording device just 
clicked on.” The abundance of such jokes struck me as evidence of just how deeply aware of 
their surveillance IRO members are.  
While the aforementioned institutional surveillance of Muslims encapsulates the Panoptic 
experience of Muslim hypervisibility, by which those in an official capacity are granted 
unchecked access to view American Muslims, the popular surveillance and curiosity about 
Muslim Americans constitutes the synoptic monitoring of Muslim Americans. In this 
configuration, anyone can be a hero in the fight against terrorism, and all are asked to be diligent 
in detecting suspicious activity. (Most notably, the 2010 attempted car-bombing of New York 
City was intercepted by a Muslim street vendor. Muslims celebrated this as evidence that 
Muslims themselves could be diligently tasked with keeping the country safe. Law enforcement 
and official discourse hailed this as evidence that Islamophobia had nothing to do with the “see 
something, say something” campaign.) Thus tasked, the general population internalizes its cues 
of what constitutes reasonable suspicion, hardly race-neutral. Muslim (and those mistakenly 
thought to be Muslim) bodies carry cues, through their skin color, garb, stature, gender 
expression, and posture that let the synoptic apparatus know whether or not they are dangerous. 
IRO members were familiar with the results of a 2006 Gallup Poll that recorded widespread 
discomfort in the U.S. toward Muslims as neighbors and airline passengers. Juan Williams’ 
comments about anxiety over Islamic-looking airplane passengers were less an anomaly and 
more a reflection of widespread sentiment about easily-identifiable Muslims. Terms like “flying 
while brown” or “flying while Muslim” crept into my fieldwork conversations with alarming 
frequency, signaling an exceptional awareness among IRO members that they were being 
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watched by airline officials, TSA employees, and fellow travelers all at once.  
If the traffic in images is at the foundation of the Islamophobia apparatus, a similar 
leveraging of imagery guides IRO responses: Islamophilia is as spectacular as Islamophobia. 
What I call ‘positive hypervisibility’ is part of the Islamophilic response to Islamophobia and 
offers seemingly affirming representations of U.S. Muslims. The term refers to both popular 
representations, including art, news media, and entertainment, as well as Muslim cultural 
production in the context of IRO’s as well. Positive hypervisibility emanates from within Muslim 
advocacy groups and the mainstream media apparatus. To attend to negative hypervisibility of 
Muslims in the U.S. without considering the capacity of Muslims to respond overlooks a critical 
site in the contemporary multicultural landscape. The prominent display of American flags at 
mosques and at Muslim businesses and homes was one such response. “Amid all the flag-
waving, the nationalist fervor, and the growing anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and anti-immigrant 
sentiment, Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities have engaged in a strategic adaptation, a 
cultural and political accommodation. Many of them have seized the American flag as their own, 
waving it more fervently, and indeed, preemptively, embracing the flag as a shield,” says Ahmad 
of the post-9/11 politics of representation (Ahmad 2002: 110).   
In fact, IRO’s enjoy a remarkable space that has been opened up by the Islamoscopic 
regime. IRO members and leaders alike have used the cultural space that is now devoted to 
Muslims to project a positive image. This space was often described to me as a silver lining of 
Islamophobia, a chance to disrupt dominant narratives through active, deliberate self-
representation. For IRO members, the terrifying hypervisibility of Islamophobia became an 
opportunity to make Islam a prominent, welcome presence in the U.S. As one conference 
attendee told me in the field, “If the spotlight is on us, that just means it's our time to shine.” This 
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attitude has given rise to myriad Islamophilic strategies that capitalize on the synoptic reality 
faced by Muslim Americans. If they are to be placed under a microscope for the American 
public, then they had certainly better be on their best behavior. In The Muslims Are Coming! 
(2013), a group of Muslim-American comedians tour middle America. Viewers laugh both at the 
jokes told by the comedians and at the relative ignorance or hostility of Americans in the South. 
In the film, John Stewart remarks upon the experience of Muslim hypervisibility as an 
opportunity, saying “What a great moment for Muslims, because everyone’s eyes are upon you. 
When eyes are upon you, that’s when people see you as human.”   
I spoke at length with a young man who designed and silkscreened “Islamic” themed t-
shirts which he then sold at IRO events. With phrases like “Frisk me, I'm Muslim,” “Make chai, 
not war,” and “Suspicious package” in bright colors and an eye-catching design aesthetic, Hijab-
Man (the popular nickname he assumes at these conventions) told me that he felt these t-shirts 
pointed to the silliness of Islamophobia and showed the world that Muslims don't take 
themselves too seriously. Hijab-Man isn't the only one selling quirky t-shirts poking fun at 
Islamophobia or proudly (and humorously) proclaiming a Muslim identity. I saw one shirt that 
said “Jumma” (the word that denotes both Friday as well as the Muslim congregational Friday 
prayer) in the same logo as popular sportswear line “Puma” and another that said “Don’t Panic – 
I’m Muslim.” Spoofing the “keep calm and carry on” line was a “keep calm and avoid haraam” 
t-shirt. Another shirt had the letters “FBI” across the front, with the phrase “Forever a Believer in 
Islam” written underneath. One especially remarkable shirt had the image of an Israeli bulldozer 
on the front accompanied by the caption “You’d throw rocks, too.” I was struck, time and again, 
by how rapidly these shirts sold at several booths throughout the convention bazaar, especially to 
high school and college-age Muslim youth. While the expansive bazaar was always bustling, 
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there was a special energy around the successful t-shirt booths. One vendor would be taking 
orders standing atop a table yelling “Who's next? What size?”, while another (both usually young 
men) would handle the cash transactions. I talked to several customers at the t-shirt booths about 
the special appeal of these humorous or politicized t-shirts. I wondered why, in a sprawling 
bazaar selling terrific artwork, food, and apparel, the Islamic t-shirt booths seemed to always be a 
favorite, especially among young attendees. “I love wearing these t-shirts in public,” a member 
of Muslim Youth of North America7 told me. “They're hilarious and eye-catching. You see, 
everyone can already tell I'm a young Muslim woman because of my hijab. They probably are 
already looking at me extra close. Well, now at least I've given them something to laugh about.” 
Interestingly, one young Syrian woman with blonde hair and blue eyes who didn’t wear a hijab 
offered a contrary explanation. “Don’t I just look like a white girl?” she joked. “Things like this 
allow me to signal to the world that I’m Muslim. They might not be able to tell otherwise.”  
Similar sentiments prevailed about the potential for “good press” through manipulation of 
Muslim hypervisibility.  A 28-year old Pakistani-American woman at a Chicago conference 
revealed to me that her reasons for deciding to wear a hijab had less to do with any theological 
compulsion and more to do with the sociopolitical positioning of U.S. Muslims. “I started 
wearing a hijab a year after 9/11,” she told me, “and it's something I had never expected to do 
before then. But I realized that – hey, I'm a good person. I'm polite and courteous. I've got strong 
family values. I'm an educator. If I put a hijab on my head, it signals to the rest of the country 
that Muslims can be these things, too.” One of the most common, oft-repeated slogans 
encapsulating positive hypervisibility went, “You might be the only Muslim someone ever 
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meets.” Hijab-Man put it most succinctly when he said that combatting Islamophobia “is about 
the people you don’t know. The answer is engaging people, hanging out with people. Going to a 
soup kitchen. After 9/11, people started considering careers they wouldn’t have before, careers as 
filmmakers and artists. This is a chance to represent Islam favorably.”  
 At the time of this writing, Pharrell Williams' song Happy was a hit; communities were 
making viral videos and posting them on YouTube. One such video was called Happy British 
Muslims, and it featured Muslims of all stripes in England. Black, white, South Asians, men, 
women (hijab-clad and non-veiled) danced and sang along to the song. Muslims, the video 
suggested, are diverse, festive, and modern. Most importantly, they are happy.  
 The video went viral and sparked a mini-controversy among Muslims in the U.K. and the 
U.S. In a sermon, Mufti Abdur Rahman ibn Yusuf asked about the implications of this video: 
women, some of them not in hijab, dancing; dancing, which itself is deemed haram (forbidden) 
by most Islamic conventions. “They want to do something because they see a plight, they see a 
problem. They want to rectify it. But the best in action, is by who did the most correct action 
according to the shariah. It's not controversial. It's not in the grey area, and it's not haraam. And 
secondly, it's sincere...Any act that you do, that's for the sake of Islam, it needs to be sincere and 
it needs to be correct and valid. Jumping up and down, to music, how much happiness does it 
give somebody? How much happiness does it give you? Is the serious-minded really going to 
understand this as happiness? … This is what I see here. We are playing into the stereotype. The 
stereotype is that Muslims aren't happy because they don't jump around and have a good time...Is 
it like, you can't enjoy life if you don't do that haraam stuff?...It's perspective. What is this going 
to give us? What kind of beauty of Islam does this show? That we can jump around? Is this not 
the other extreme of terrorism? You've got some people going to the extreme to kill people in the 
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name of Islam? And then you have some people going to the opposite end of the spectrum to 
show the beauty of Islam? Is that just not a counter to extremism? I'm sure that's why it was 
done...There has been so much condemnation for this online. All you need is another dastardly 
act and this will all be washed out. We need to be providing positive, long-lasting dawah8. One 
of those acts [of terrorism], and you think dancing is going to make a difference? This is just to 
make us think – how can this be halal? Dancing is not permissible” (Yusuf 2014).  The sermon 
uses orthodox Islamic conventions in condemning the project of positive hypervisibility enacted 
in the video, but condemns it nevertheless.  
 “I had nothing to do with 9/11,” a middle-aged Bangladeshi American man said during a 
town-hall style “know your rights” workshop in Queens. “But the price I pay for being Muslim 
during this time is that I have to be extra polite, extra courteous. Even when I’m in a rush, you 
know, I hold the door for somebody. I offer my seat on the train. This is the price we must pay 
for being Muslim during this time.” I heard his argument time and again – that hypervisibility 
placed a burden upon Muslims to be on their best behavior, to be ambassadors for Islam. 
Speaking with Sophia in Cincinnati at an ISNA event, I was reminded that projecting a positive 
image was tiring. “You know, sometimes, because I wear a hijab and am visibly Muslim, I am 
always, always conscious of how I’m behaving. If my son is throwing a tantrum at a mall, the 
way I react to it is being monitored by all the shoppers. They’re thinking – will she spank him? 
Will she allow him to throw this tantrum? And yes, I live in a Republican, probably racist, part of 
Ohio. I’m on watch. Sometimes, you know, it starts controlling parts of my life, having to show 
non-Muslims that we’re good people.” Samina told me after an ISNA event, “Everyone has to do 
                                                 




their own PR campaign. It’s really weird. I don’t know if this happens to you. But if I’m in a 
place where I have a choice to open a door for somebody or not, I’ll err toward opening the door. 
Not because I feel courteous but because I’m like, this white person is watching me. And if I 
open the door for them, it’s like one more point for Muslims. It’s weird to have to think that way. 
And in the back of my head, there’s this mental process. Little things, hold the elevator door or 
don’t hold it. Maybe if it’s a brown, Muslim person, I’d be like whatever. But if it’s a white 
person…you may be the Muslim person they see. Little things like that.”9  
 The story of Rais Bhuiyan became ubiquitous at IRO events. Bhuiyan, a Bangladeshi-
American Muslim man, was the victim of a hate crime in the aftermath of 9/11. After his shooter, 
Mark Stroman, received a death sentence in a Texas courtroom, Bhuiyan waged a tireless 
campaign to protect his attacker from the death penalty. Before his 2011 execution, Stroman 
vocally renounced his white supremacist beliefs and commended Bhuiyan's compassionate 
Islam. In a Dallas news op-ed, Bhuiyan wrote,  
 
“I am requesting that Stroman’s death sentence be commuted to life in prison with 
no parole. There are three reasons I feel this way. The first is because of what I 
learned from my parents. They raised me with the religious principle that he is 
best who can forgive easily. The second is because of what I believe as a Muslim, 
that human lives are precious and that no one has the right to take another’s life. 
                                                 
9 Samina’s statement was curious to me, as it presumes Muslims to be non-white. Furthermore, it 
presumes that there’s a racial dimension to this hypervisibility: one must be on their best 
behavior for the watchful eyes of white Americans. Other racial groups did not figure in 
Samina’s statement, and before I could engage her on that topic, our conversation had moved on 




In my faith, forgiveness is the best policy, and Islam doesn’t allow for hate and 
killing. And, finally, I seek solace for the wives and children of Hasan and Patel 
[footnote], who are also victims in this tragedy. Executing Stroman is not what 
they want, either. They have already suffered so much; it will cause only more 
suffering if he is executed. 
The other victims in this tragedy are Stroman’s children. Not only have the Hasan 
and Patel children lost their fathers, but, if Stroman is executed, his children will 
lose their father, as well. 
I forgave Stroman many years ago. In fact, I have never hated him. I never hated 
America for what happened to me. I believe he was ignorant and not capable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong; otherwise, he wouldn’t have done what 
he did. I think about him waiting in a cell to be executed and can feel the pain of 
how ignorance can be driven by such hate and cause somebody like him to 
murder two innocent people.” (Bhuiyan 2011) 
 
Bhuiyan's campaign of forgiveness was celebrated and publicized by IRO leaders and members 
alike. “See, when you want revenge, you miss the point. We have a tremendous opportunity to 
forgive our oppressors' ignorance, like Bhuiyan did,” an IRO member told me in the bazaar in 
2012. 
 A recurrent opportunity for positive visibility was that of career choice for young 
Muslims. There was a consensus that “traditional” fields such as medicine, business, and 
engineering would do less for the American ummah than careers in journalism, the arts, social 
sciences, and entertainment. Many of the IRO members I met were first- or second-generation 
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immigrants from Asia who had benefited from 1965 immigration legislation. Because 
professionals and scientists were favored through this reform, the resulting Asian American 
professional class included many medical professionals and engineers who would then be 
referred to through problematic tropes of “model minority.” Many of these immigrants would 
encourage their children to pursue similar careers. Zareena Grewal writes, “those of us in the 
second generation were largely geared toward two career fields: medicine and engineering (even 
law school was considered risky). Anthropology and the other social sciences (“the sciences that 
don’t raise you,” as my father-in-law dubbed them) are particularly suspect because they are 
dangerously close to philosophy” (2013: 13). As a result, there was a sense of urgency around 
going to medical school among many of the Arab- and South Asian Americans I met through 
IRO’s. Ambreen, a Pakistani-American recent college graduate attending an Islamic convention, 
told me that she had not received high enough scores on the MCAT exam to be admitted to a 
U.S. medical school. She planned, instead, to study medicine in the Caribbean and later become 
accredited to practice medicine in the U.S. “I have to become a doctor. Yes, I love science and 
would love to treat people. But also, you know, this is why my parents came here. When I was 
born, my grandfather held me in his hands and told my father, ‘Ambreen will be somebody.’ For 
my dad, that meant a career in medicine. And I’m more than happy to honor my grandfather in 
that way.”  
 Yet what surfaced during my time in the field was that these traditional career choices, 
though described as ‘lucrative’ or ‘stable,’ would not help the newly-marginalized Muslim 
community. After my conversation with Ambreen, a very sarcastic Fahad asked me if I thought 
what she’d just said was ridiculous. “Ambreen will be somebody. What is that?! You’re so 
desperate to have the MD title after your name you’ll go study in the Bahamas or something? I 
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am sick of these desi people cloaking their status-based desires with some kind of noble bullshit. 
You know what I admire? What you’re doing. You’ve been probably broke, I guess, just because 
you love anthropology and studying human culture. That’s admirable.”  Later during that 
convention, I had just explained to Sajid, an Indian-American civil engineer and father of three 
young boys from New Jersey, what exactly anthropology is after he inquired about my studies. 
“Ah, anthropology! Hamza Yusuf10 talks about anthropology. He said we should encourage our 
children to become anthropologists and sociologists, not doctors, doctors, doctors. So they can be 
part of the expert population.” In a panel discussion in 2012, one speaker joked, “All you people 
want your kids to be MD’s, because that stands for Money Doctor. None of you want your kids 
to be PhD’s – Poor Hungry Doctors.”  
The popular attentiveness to Muslim comedians is one instance in which the impact of a 
non-traditional, highly visible career option became clear. The Axis of Evil Comedy Tour, for 
instance, featured two Palestinian-American, one Irani-American, and one Egyptian-American 
comedian poking fun at American Islamophobia. Taking on the special burdens of airline travel 
for Middle Easterners since 9/11, the public fascination with suicide bombing and terror alerts, 
and popular stereotypes about Arabs, the four comedians’ Comedy Central tour was a popular 
topic during my time in the field.  
Obeidallah says he never felt like a Middle Easterner until after the September 11, 
2001, attacks. Now, he says, he does his comedy "not just for me." 
                                                 
10 Hamza Yusuf is a popular Muslim American IRO speaker and founder of the Zaytuna College. 




"It's for my cousins, it's for my friends, it's for other Arabs and other people who 
get dirty looks or looked at funny because they have an accent or are viewed as 
suspicious simply because of their heritage," he says. 
"We don't want to be defined any longer by the worst examples in our community, 
and it's a very small amount of people. There are a few terrorists and they define 
all of us." 
(Dougherty 2007) 
 “Those Axis of Evil guys have done more to fight Islamophobia than any of our 
organizations – CAIR, ISNA, MPAC – than any of those organizations have done. They made 
people laugh. I thought they were funny. We need more people like that out there,” Fahad told 
me between sessions at a convention. “See, it’s like Dave Chapelle,” said Linah. “He can talk 
about white privilege and people will listen. They’ll listen even more than if, like, Cornel West 
does it. Because Dave Chapelle is using humor. That’s what the Axis of Evil folks did. They used 
humor to point at the absurdity of this all. I know this isn’t a popular thing with immigrant 
Muslims, but we need to encourage our kids to maybe go into show business. Maybe telling 
good jokes will save more lives than being a surgeon, in a weird way.”  
To this end, a noteworthy IRO-celebrity was a man named Azhar Usman, a South Asian-
American lawyer-turned-comedian who was a highly sought-after figure at IRO events. After 
several years of practicing law, the towering, boisterous Usman would begin his career as a 
stand-up comic the same year as the events of September 11th, 2001. Usman’s shows consisted of 
both poking fun at South Asians for their cultural idiosyncrasies and also pointing out the 
ludicrousness of American anti-Muslim xenophobia.  (Interestingly, Usman is also one of the co-
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founders of the Nawawi Foundation, an organization whose goal is to help Muslims foster a 
distinct “American” culture. For more on the Nawawi Foundation, see Chapter 3.)  “That Azhar 
Usman is so funny! He was at our mosque fundraiser once and he did his jokes, you know, and 
people were just in hysterics. We raised so much money that night,” said Anwar as he cradled his 
infant grandson in the convention bazaar. “And he’s just an American, you know?” chimed in his 
wife. “You see him, he has his topi and this long beard and, you know, everyone jokes that he 
looks like a terrorist. But he’s just like you. He’s an American kid. He gave up an amazing career 
as a lawyer to tell jokes to the American public and make them recognize Islam beyond media 
stereotypes.” “Okay,” Anwar added, “he took a risk leaving his career in law. But come on, I’m 
sure he’s making so much more money as a comedian. He’s a celebrity now!” 
Journalism was yet another field that held a high premium in IRO discussions about 
combatting Islamophobia. “Everyone keeps complaining that the media is anti-Muslim, that it’s 
racist, and that it portrays Muslims as fanatics. The media, the media, the media. Yet all those 
people would die if their son or daughter went into journalism, and they are all happy to pay for 
their kids to go to medical school. You know, at the end of the day you have no one to blame but 
yourself. If you hate the way the media portrays you, become part of the media and represent 
yourself,” said Saleha over lunch at an event in Queens. Her concern was echoed by several 
young people I met in the field who were studying journalism or were recent journalism 
graduates. “You know, I faced some resistance from my parents before becoming a journalist. 
They were upset with me. Okay, that’s an understatement. They were pissed. They felt that 
they’d sacrificed so much in coming to this country so that we would have opportunities, you 
know, to make money, basically. And that I was throwing that away by going into a field that was 
so uncertain, in which I’d likely spend a long time struggling. Partially, I think the reason they 
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came around – and this is tough to admit it – but they came around because I’m a girl. And they 
probably assume my main source of income will be a husband someday anyway, so to an extent 
they can worry less about what I do.” She went on to tell me that being a young adult reflecting 
on career choices in the aftermath of 9/11 led her to choose journalism. “I’m easily identifiable 
as a Muslim. Because of my name and my hijab. At the same time, you know, I went to really a 
reputable university with an amazing journalism program, I have an American accent. I think if I 
do become a broadcast journalist, which I hope to do, you know – I’ll put a different face on 
Islam for the viewing public. It’s not like I have to be reporting on Palestine or Iraq. Even a 
Muslim reporting on sports will make a difference in changing the popular perspective…Not that 
I plan to be a sportscaster or anything,” she smiled.  
During a regional conference in Cincinnati, speaker Ameena Jandali repeatedly urged 
attendees to “support Muslim media. Whether it’s Horizons or the other media for our 
community. Thankfully, we now have some young Muslim writers contributing to Huffington 
Post or Salon. We have so many talented young people who are breaking out of engineering or 
medicine…We need people on TV who can talk in soundbytes, because they will just cut and 
paste what you say…be an ambassador for Muslims wherever you go. You know, you may be the 
only Muslim the other person will ever see. What you do will leave a lasting impression on 
others.” At the same conference, ISNA President Mohamed Magid said, “I hear a lot of Muslims 
say the media is depressing, I don’t deal with TV and radio. But we have to. We have to know 
what’s going on…I want to suggest that if you do good work, be consistent. People will come to 
know about it sooner or later. You don’t have to wait until the media is there; the media will 
come.” 
Another popular calling for those concerned with self-representation was filmmaking. 
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Hijab-Man told me, “Maybe after 9/11, a lot of people started considering different careers. A lot 
of my peers have become filmmakers and artists. This is our generation.” Annual ISNA 
conventions typically include screenings of films by and about Muslims, especially U.S. 
Muslims, which gave me a chance to engage with ISNA members about the role of directors, 
producers, and actors in the age of Islamophobia. The prevalence of anti-Muslim stereotypes in 
film and on television prompted many IRO members to argue that becoming agents in this 
representational matrix was the key to eliminating these archetypes. While I discuss All 
American Muslim in Chapter 4, it is important to note here that the TLC reality show captured 
attention for portraying Muslims simply living their day-to-day lives rather than in some 
exceptional circumstances involving terrorism or homeland security. The show was a classic 
example of how positive representations of Muslims must be offered in the mainstream 
entertainment industry. 
As such, career choices were continually referred to in relation to Muslim hypervisibility. 
As described above, traditional middle-class ambitions like medicine were disparaged by those 
who favored careers in the arts, entertainment, politics, or journalism. Yet there was a notable 
backlash among those in the medical field that they were, in fact, doing noble work. “Yes, we 
want our children to be doctors because it will be good for them professionally. But think about 
it, if someone named Muhammad or Ali performs heart surgery on you, saves your life, how 
could you continue to hate Muslims?” said an Indian-American woman whose two sons were in 
medical school. “Our sons and their wives are obviously Muslim; they follow Islamic dress code 
and have Islamic names. In a hospital setting, they are sure to observe their five prayers and fast 
during Ramadan. But they are also diligent and hard-working. They will be wonderful doctors, 
and everyone will have to take note that Muslims are here in America to serve and help others.” 
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Regardless of where IRO members stood on the “MD debate”, the visibility of Muslims was 
intertwined with career choice.  
 In the field, I was reminded of multicultural initiatives – both from within Muslim 
communities and among allies and civil rights activists – that leveraged visibility in their projects 
of inclusion. The abundance of “allegiance with Muslims” events such as the “Wear a 
Hijab/Turban Day” in Fremont (Eck 2007) were a peculiar site of hypervisibility, in which 
“allies” (often times white) marked themselves in the same way Muslims are marked in a show 
of solidarity. These events, in which young women wear a hijab, for instance, to oppose anti-
Muslim sentiment, subvert the typical Islamophobic gaze reserved for Muslims. The reactions to 
these solidarity initiatives varied among IRO members, with some applauding the efforts of well-
intentioned liberals and others comparing them to a racist appropriation of a symbol of piety. 
(“Ugh, hijab solidarity. Do these people put on blackface during African American History 
Month, too?” one IRO member remarked sharply.) Many college-aged IRO members spoke to 
me about their university Muslim Student Associations (MSA’s) Islam Awareness Weeks (IAW’s) 
as a prime example of positive hypervisibility. During Islam Awareness Week, MSA’s host 
campus-wide events, including film screenings, community dinners, panel discussions, and town 
hall meetings aimed at spreading awareness about Islam. Often times, these events physically 
transform the campus space – the call to prayer may be performed over loudspeaker, a makeshift 
‘mosque’ may be constructed, or an existing MSA office decorated and opened to the campus 
community.  
 IRO members were sensitive about negotiating positive hypervisibility. This was 
exemplified in the so-called “Ground Zero mosque controversy,” discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. Overwhelmingly, IRO members thought the controversy around the proposed Islamic 
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center was evidence of Islamophobia and that Muslims certainly had every right to build the 
Islamic center in downtown Manhattan. Yet a focus on rights alone would obscure a larger issue 
that IRO members were grappling with: was it sensitive and appropriate for Muslims to build the 
Islamic center downtown? This uneasiness, most apparent in the Democracy Now! discussion 
between Tariq Ramadan and Moustafa Bayoumi, is a critical illustration of the burden of 
hypervisibility (2010). While both agree that Muslims have the right to build the Islamic center, 
Ramadan argues that Muslims ought to use the controversy to demonstrate a sensitivity to 
American culture at large and thus cancel the project.”We have to think about the symbol,” 
Ramadan says. “And my position is, if this is possible, that Muslims should think about not 
being instrumentalized in the whole process by political forces, but, say, understanding the 
collective sensitivity…” Over coffee, Samina told me something similar. “I very strongly 
disagree with the people who are saying Muslims can’t build a mosque near Ground Zero. That’s 
just straight up Islamophobia. But there were all those protests happening there, and people on 
both sides were showing up to show support or opposition. And I felt like maybe I should go but, 
I don’t know. I wear a hijab. I feel sad about the people who lost their lives there. I don’t know if 
people are ready for Muslims to be showing up en masse at these protests.” 
It is by putting into conversation with each other the Panoptic/synoptic regime that 
demonizes and marks Muslims and the responses to this regime that a revelatory social dynamic 
is revealed. What does it mean, for instance, that the Islamic center in downtown Manhattan was 
seen as a controversial space for Muslim visibility, while appearing on stage as stand-up comics 
and in programs at film festivals was unanimously celebrated and encouraged in IRO discourse? 
Indeed, in arguing that Muslim Americans should seize the opportunity for visibility requires the 
construction of a subject suitable for visibility.  
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In a conversation with Nasreen at a regional conference in Cincinnati, she pointed at her 
headscarf, which was covered in the signature Burberry print. “People love to talk about 
Muslims who decided to no longer wear their hijab after 9/11. That kind of misses the point,” she 
told me. “I’m sure there were those who decided to do that. But a lot of us, like me, well – we 
kept our hijabs on but we blinged them out! I love me a good designer hijab, you know, with the 
Fendi or Chanel logo. It tells people I’m Muslim, sure, but at the same time it lets people know 
that you know, Muslims aren’t backward or sloppy or anything.” She was right: IRO conventions 
were spectacular in their array of designer hijabs and handbags on display. The contours of class, 
respectability, and consumer power are made explicit in her statement. Nasreen’s remarks forced 
me to think about Muslim women in hijabs who do not choose, or more importantly cannot 
afford, to signal respectability in these ways. An acceptable hijabi, by this logic, necessitates 
exclusions along lines of class and aesthetics.  
At the same Cincinnati conference, speaker Ameena Jandali spoke about the ways 
visibility needs to be carefully managed. “If you are involved in the media, be real. If you cannot 
speak well in front of a camera, do yourself a favor and get somebody else who can. We have so 
many talented young people who are breaking out of engineering or medicine. Get somebody 
else! We do more harm to our cause when we get on TV with a thick accent. I respect everybody, 
but we need to put the best people forward. We have those people.” A founder of the Islamic 
Network Group, Jandali speaks to the ways leveraging positive hypervisibility is anything but 
simple. Through an aversion to “thick accents,” for instance, the implicit xenophobia of the U.S. 
public is underscored. The Muslim that is suitable for the spotlight must be hand-picked in ways 
that are in line with acceptability. The liberal space for U.S. Muslim self-representation that has 




Thus, the politics of respectability are crucial in taking advantage of the silver lining that 
hypervisibility has offered IROs. On a lunch break at an Islamic convention in 2011 in Chicago, I 
was walking through a parking garage with Sarah, a young Indian-American lawyer who was, at 
the time, on maternity leave. “See the Mercedes and BMW’s?” she said, pointing to a row of cars 
in front of us. “If anyone wants to ask what we’ve contributed here, they just need to see the 
ISNA and ICNA bumper stickers on these cars. This is what American Islam looks like.” That 
American Islam “looks like” luxury cars and designer hijabs, or that these visuals can be 
leveraged in the creation of a “good Muslim” image, is not accidental. The politics of 
legitimizing Islam (described further in my chapter on Islamophilia) is not without its own 
exclusions.  
 That class hierarchies and xenophobia figured centrally in the negotiation of 
hypervisibility is critical in understanding the Islamoscopic regime. An overdetermining focus on 
only the negative media tropes and Islamophobic surveillance projects ignores the ways in which 
liberal discourses of inclusion and tolerance have been central to representational politics. My 
fieldwork was replete with examples of how IRO members feel they should manipulate the 
Islamophobic spotlight to promote a positive public image of Islam. The question arises: does 
leveraging positive hypervisibility eliminate Islamophobia? Or does it further entrench a good 
Muslim-bad Muslim binary, and deepen the impossibility of political critique?  
 
The Gendered Body 
As I explored the interplay between positive and negative hypervisibility, I came to 
understand the body as a central vehicle in the Islamoscopic regime. “I wear awesome underwear 
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when I travel,” Runna, a Palestinian-American from Michigan, told me. “You never know, that 
might be the time I get strip-searched. I gotta represent.” Runna's comical remarks are not 
unusual. The idea of presentability recurred in the field, with IRO members emphasizing fashion, 
hygiene, and weight as critical parts of fighting Islamophobia. Hypervisibility, then, is a deeply 
embodied experience – IRO members feel distinctly aware of their physical selves as both 
victims and agents in the Islamophobic milieu. Yet, once again, this process is two-sided: the 
Islamophobic apparatus itself has zeroed in on the body as a critical site in the war against 
terrorism. Feldman claims that the scopic regime “visually fixes and reduces its victims to 
manipulatable surfaces” and thus “can effectively derealize the body and the self” (48). It is 
noteworthy that this production of the body is an age-old Orientalist trope. The photographic 
documentation of the colonized body helps colonial powers generate a diseased colonial 
phantasm of the Orient (Alloula 1986). In Debord's spectacular society (1977), this 
documentation takes on a new scale and significance. 
Specifically, as doubly ‘marked,’ the Muslim woman’s body carries an extra burden, 
functioning as an intensified locus of politics, as “women’s bodies are hyper-visual – focused on 
to be counted, battled over, and controlled” (Mohanty et al. 2008: 7). The “discourse of anti-
terrorism,” Maira argues, “targets Muslim and Arab males but is also preoccupied with women’s 
bodies” (2009 632). As Puar notes, “the body must appear improperly racialized (outside the 
norms of multiculturalism) and perversely sexualized in order to materialize as the terrorist in the 
first place” (2007: 38). Between the cultural fascination (Puar cites a South Park episode) with 
Osama bin Laden's sexuality and the overwhelming obsession with the Muslim woman's veil, the 
gendered, sexualized marking of the Muslim body is part of the political and cultural marking of 
the body of the (non) terrorist. Puar and Rai demonstrate the ways in which “sexuality is central 
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to the creation of a certain knowledge of terrorism,” with dominant media representations 
inviting an “aggressive heterosexual patriotism” (2002: 117). Hirschkind and Mahmood consider 
9/11 a turning point, after which the “burqa-clad body of the Afghan woman became the visible 
sign of an invisible enemy that threatens not only ‘us,’ citizens of the West, but our entire 
civilization” (Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002: 341). They consider the fear of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the West as embedded in images: “women wearing headscarves (now, burqas) 
the cutting off of hands and heads, massive crowds praying in unison…” (348). That the fear of 
anti-Western embodied ways of being occur at the same time that Americans are told to be on 
watch for suspicious clues of terror, Hirschkind and Mahmood argue, is revelatory.  
Hirschkind and Mahmood (2002) and Hamid Dabashi (2011) suggest that turning against 
Islam, particularly for Muslim women, fits within larger dynamics of inclusion and liberation. “A 
Muslim woman,” Hirschkind and Mahmood argue, “can either be one of two things, uncovered 
and therefore liberated, or veiled, and thus still, to some degree, subordinate” (353). Dabashi 
calls an intellectual class of former-Muslims “comprador intellectuals” and “native informers” 
who reassure the West that its project of military intervention is valid through demonstration of 
the oppression of women. Taking the place of the role formerly occupied by Western Orientalists, 
the native informers “have digested and internalized this language and now speak it with the 
authority of natives” (18).  
Ayan Hirsi Ali, Azar Nafisi, and Irshad Manji are common examples cited in the work 
critiquing the role of these Muslim women apostates amidst the politics of empire (Hirschkind 
and Mahmood 2002; Maira 2009; Dabashi 2011). Hirsi Ali, the Somali-Dutch feminist who 
openly criticizes Islam's gender dynamics and refers to Muhammad as pedophile, is vocally 
sympathetic to the Israeli occupation of Palestine and blames Islam for the backwardness of its 
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societies. In spite of having fabricated details about her life, including an alleged coercive 
arranged marriage, Ali has been celebrated in both Europe and the United States, where she now 
lives. A self-proclaimed advocate of free speech, Irshad Manji occupies a similar niche: 
critiquing traditional Islam publicly and lauding the West's progressiveness. Having appeared on 
repeatedly on HBO, CNN, Fox, and the BBC, Manji is “paraded before [her] North American 
and Western European audiences” as a voice of dissent “against the innate and enduring barbarity 
of Islam” (Dabashi 2011: 17).  “The testimonials of Muslim authors about salvation in the West 
also play a crucial, if less obvious, role in the politics of the US academy and contemporary 
culture wars” (Maira 2009: 649). The ensuing role of Muslim women in these dynamics of 
visibility rests upon notions of good and bad citizen, as Maira demonstrates, arguing that 
“classed imaginaries are often implicitly foregrounded in representations of Muslim women 
spokespersons in the media – often elite, generally elegant, and always portrayed as recognizable 
to American viewers – in contrast to the alien, sometimes bearded, often working-class Muslim 
and Arab immigrant men who speak in foreign accents and pose a threat to womanhood, there 
and here” (636).  
This formulation advances a compelling claim in the politics of good and bad Muslim, 
arguing that the “good” Muslim is likely a liberated, unveiled woman who is capable of speaking 
out against the horrors of fundamentalist Islam. There is a special place, Kumar argues, for the 
“ex Muslim” in the politics of empire (2012). Yet my fieldwork adds a shade of nuance to this 
formulation, as IRO women considered themselves pious, often even orthodox, in their 
adherence to Islam. Additionally, many of them wore a hijab. My fieldwork, then, begs the 
question: what do we make of the “good” Muslim who has not been unveiled, but invokes her 
veil and piety as part of her claim to inclusion? My work suggests that we add to the good/bad 
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Muslim formulation a Muslim woman who is, perhaps, critical of the apostasy of Manji or Hirsi 
Ali yet not excluded from the problematic “good Muslim” category. Consider the example of 
Nasreen and her Burberry hijab. Hardly an apostate, and certainly quite proud of her decision to 
wear the hijab, she complicates the unveiled-liberated/veiled-oppressed binary. Instead, she uses 
her very veil to articulate a claim to inclusion.  
What the veiled IRO member reveals is a space for a practicing Muslim woman as part of 
the U.S. landscape, an embodiment of the positive multicultural politics that exemplify U.S. 
exceptionalism. These multicultural politics must include religious diversity, giving space to the 
practicing Muslim. Given the central role of the image of the Muslim body in the Islamoscopic 
regime, IRO members leverage an equally spectacular image of a Muslim (woman's) body – 
appropriately pious and classed – in their representational politics. I was struck by the number of 
references in my field notes to impeccable dress and fashion among women at IRO events. This 
included women in hijabs (such as Nasreen) and modestly-dressed women who chose not to veil. 
At the 2011 convention in Chicago, I joined a small group of women for lunch who told me how 
much they enjoy being on a VIP shopper list at Nordstrom. Frequenting the upscale shopping 
mall in Oakbrook, Illinois, this group of women let me know that Nordstrom was the best place 
to buy “Islamic clothing” - designer scarves and tunics. Because of their loyalty as customers, 
Nordstrom invited them to special VIP events “and usually these events are overrun with Arabs 
and Muslims,” one young woman told me. In between sessions at Islamic conventions, young 
women in hijabs can be seen retouching perfect makeup in crowded restrooms. Several “hijabis” 
secure their headscarves with scarf-pins adorned with precious and semi-precious stones.  
Certainly, this attentiveness can be chalked up to aesthetics, given the often elite 
immigrant backgrounds of many IRO members. Yet the way many of them articulated the 
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reasons behind their decisions around dress code included explicit reference to positive 
hypervisibility. There was a sense that presenting oneself in this way signaled respectability and 
would stand as a challenge to Islamophobia. These well-dressed women embodied a sense that 
one could be a consumer, a practicing Muslim, and a quintessential American all at once. While 
the critiques of the discourses of salvation described above focus a turn against traditional Islam, 
IRO politics, eschewing the stances of Manji or Ali, claim legitimacy in the U.S and adhere to a 
traditional Islam.  
 
Lingering Invisibility 
 Ironically, the Islamoscopic regime exists alongside an enduring sense of difficulty 
around the classification of Muslims themselves, a difficulty Naber refers to the “politics of 
naming.” Certainly, an attempt to classify U.S. Muslims in any meaningful way will rest upon 
essentialist notions of Islam, as American Muslims include Latinos, African Americans, Arabs, 
whites, Asians, American-born and immigrant, and Shi'as and Sunnis. Yet, given the increasing 
salience of Islamophobia, some have argued that the category Muslim – in spite of the racial 
diversity of Muslim Americans – has become a racial one (Rana 2011; Clark 2011). Cainkar and 
Naber demonstrate the ways Muslim hypervisibility replaced a pre-existing “invisibility” of 
Muslims before 9/11. “No longer invisible,” as Cainkar argues, 9/11 shifted U.S. racial 
categories to accommodate a newly racialized group.  
 Yet the invisibility of Muslims lingered in interesting ways, at least in the perceptions of 
IRO members. While they certainly felt victimized by post-9/11 racial paranoia, they often 
articulated a sense that they could not access the same language of civil rights and racial equality 
that more “established” racial minorities in the U.S. could. In this way, IRO members articulated 
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a sense of racist exceptionalism – that the U.S. had an entrenched aversion to overt racism 
against black, Latino, and even Asian populations that did not extend to newly-racialized 
Muslims. In other words, in spite of their hypervisibility, Muslims were invisible in the popular 
understandings of racial difference in the U.S.  
 Frequently, when a noted Islamophobe (Ann Coulter or Pamela Geller, for instance) 
publicly said something hateful about Muslims, a common response in the field was that if the 
same remark had been made about African-Americans or another minority group, there would be 
a public outcry. Presidential candidate Herman Cain, in an interview in 2011, openly professed 
that he would never appoint a Muslim in his cabinet or as a judge. Maleeka, herself an African 
American Muslim woman and second generation African immigrant, and I discussed his remarks 
at length at an ISNA event. “This could never be said about another minority group. Can you 
imagine saying that about a black person? And oh, forget saying it about Jews! Herman Cain's 
career would screech to a halt. But for some reason, the Islamophobic climate has reached such 
fever pitch that this kind of stuff not only is acceptable, it’s preferable in a candidate.” The 
moderator at an event in D.C. on the ten-year anniversary of 9/11 remarked, “Islam-bashing has 
become a hobby for columnists, radio talk show hosts, and fundamentalist Christian leaders.” 
Newt Gingrich's assertions that government should restrict the construction of mosques and laws 
should be passed exempting Islam from American understandings of freedom of religion elicited 
similar reactions. “I don't understand this country. Some random comedian can say something 
racist against black people and he'll get attacked by all the liberals. He'll be fired, whatever. 
Nobody wants sports teams to use Native Americans as mascots. But Newt Gingrich can just be 
openly hateful of Muslims, and none of those civil rights groups will come to our defense. Why 
don't we get the same protections other minority groups get?” Naeem asked.  
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 “Islamophobia is not racism,” said Haroon Moghul during a 2011 presentation in Queens. 
“If Islamophobia were a form of racism, we would easily be able to garner the support of civil 
rights groups, the same groups who go out in large numbers for anti-Black racism.” Moghul, a 
popular speaker at IRO events, makes a controversial claim in light of recent scholarship about 
Islamophobia as part of the changing U.S. racial landscape (Aidi 2009). Yet his claim echoes the 
sense that racism is unpalatable to the mainstream U.S. social imaginary, while Islamophobia is 
“allowed” on some level.  
 Whether or not these reactions are accurate (clearly, sports teams continue to use Native 
American mascots without mainstream censure), they are revelatory about Muslim perceptions 
of Islamophobia in relation to other forms of racism. “Although not quite white, Arab Americans 
enjoy certain racial privileges not accorded to blacks in neighboring Detroit, such as the privilege 
to be able to live and work in a predominantly white suburb such as Dearborn,” writes Grewal. 
“Yet Arab Muslims lack the social citizenship that blacks enjoy in a post-civil rights America, in 
which blacks are frequently represented as quintessentially American even as they continue to 
suffer the brutalities of American racism” (2013: 10-11). While much IRO messaging built 
connections between Muslims and other historically racially marginalized groups, there was an 
on-the-ground sense that Islamophobia was not as compelling a cause for anti-racists. That 
Islamophobia is an “acceptable” form of racism while others fell into the camp of political 
incorrectness speaks volumes to the ways in which Islamophobia is experienced. This speaks to a 
larger problem of racial formation in the U.S. As DeGenova argues, there is a hegemonic polarity 
of whiteness and blackness in the U.S., limiting the parameters for understanding the experiences 
of racialization of other groups such as Latinos, Asians, or Native Americans  (DeGenova 2006). 
Lopez' work on naturalization cases suggests that the racial classification of Arabs and South 
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Asians has always been marked by ambivalence, which courts struggling to taxonomize groups 
given an enduring American black-white binary(Lopez 2006). What my fieldwork revealed is the 
palpable ambiguity of the racialization of Muslims. IRO members certainly did not feel 
recognized as a racial 'minority' in the U.S. in the way that they perceived other groups to be. As 
a result, they also did not perceive themselves as deserving of the protections that anti-racist civil 
rights discourse had afforded other groups. 
 
Conclusion 
It would be shortsighted to write a section on Muslim hypervisibility and omit the realm 
of the academic – the social sciences, specifically – as a site for the production of the Muslim 
‘image.’ My presence at IRO events as an anthropologist and social scientist served as a constant 
reminder of the burden of hypervisibility. I was constantly reminded of Said’s claim that “to 
practice anthropology in the United States is therefore not just to be doing scholarly work 
investigating otherness and difference in a large country; it is to be discussing them in an 
enormously influential and powerful state whose global role is that of a superpower” (Said 1989: 
213). As I began to conceive of this dissertation as one about the contours of U.S. imperialism 
“at home,” I struggled to situate my own project among these imperial dynamics.  
 IRO members were often quite aware of the academic construction of Muslim 
subjectivity. Indeed, at an event in Detroit, Sumaiya asked me, as if I were a representative of 
“academia” at large, “can you please tell me what is up with the academic obsession with 
Muslims? Muslim women, especially? It must be so easy for you to get funding for your project 
just because it has the word Muslim in it. Am I right?” She told me that she had toyed with the 
idea of going into academia, media studies or American studies more specifically, but had serious 
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reservations about becoming anyone’s “Muslim woman pet scholar.” “How do you resist that?” 
she asked me, turning the tables on any traditional researcher-informant relationship and bringing 
into sharp focus the problematic power dynamics of the anthropological encounter (Said 1989).  
 Sumaiya’s question makes apparent the critical role of intellectual curiosity in the larger 
context of Muslim hypervisibility. That the explosion in curiosity about Muslims has included an 
academic curiosity is critical for contextualizing my project. At an academic conference in 2013, 
I met another anthropologist, an American Muslim and IRO member with whom I spoke at 
length after each of us had presented on a panel. “You have a really interesting project,” he told 
me, “and hey, you’re airing some of our dirty laundry.” As we conversed, he and I agreed that to 
speak of a Muslim American experience in the age of Islamophobia is never depoliticized. As 
Muslim Americans studying Muslim communities, we felt aware of the conflicting, multilayered 














CHAPTER 3: “THOMAS JEFFERSON OWNED A QURAN”: CULTURAL 
CITIZENSHIP AND COUNTERNARRATIVES 
 
“To quote Scarface, 'First you get the money, then you get the power, then you get the women.' 
[laughter] … We didn't just get any woman, we got THE woman. We nabbed Miss USA. We put a 
tiara on Rimah Fakih. That was a huge success in the Muslim culture war. We have placed 
hummus and tahini in supermarkets and white hipsters eat it every day. Hipsters have also made 
the keffiyeh into a fashion statement. When hipsters fall at the feet of Muslim fashion, the world 
is next...We are now officially as American as apple pie and Snookie. To celebrate, I have 
parceled out the states. Haroon Moghul is the Caliph of New York. To show that he's not a 
misogynist, he's giving Linda Sarsour Brooklyn. And I guess I'd like to be the Caliph of 
'Caliph'ornia.”  
-Wajahat Ali, Pakistani-American humorist and lawer, Islamic Center NYU Conference, Islam in 
America, February, 2012  
* 
“These organizations always pick a convert to be the spokesperson. Usually an American, white 
woman. What are they trying to say about Islam? Is Islam acceptable if a white man is Muslim? 
A white woman? Then we can forget our fears? What is that? It seems that they're trying to 
humanize Islam by putting it in white face.” 
-Hatem Islam, oppositional blog editor, fieldwork interview 
 
 In this chapter, I consider the ways in which Islamic representative organizations (IRO's) 
and their members have responded to Islamophobic exclusion through a specific project of 
73 
 
cultural citizenship, a strategy that aims to “Americanize” Islam in order to battle the racism and 
xenophobia that U.S. Muslims face. I explore the ways cultural citizenship is a relevant analytic 
category for understanding post-9/11 U.S. Muslim experiences and the extent to which U.S. 
Muslims have been cast as “citizen outsiders.” From the Obama “birther” controversy to the 
messaging put forth by the Islamophobia industry (Lean 2012), the “Americanness” of Muslims 
is a central concern for vicious Islamophobes and concerned U.S. Muslims alike.  
 The IRO representatives I explore have taken a distinct approach to combatting this 
alienation by making strong, repeated claims that Islam is American11, what Bilici calls the 
“naturalization” of Islam in America (2012). Not only do Muslims have an enduring historical 
presence in the U.S., IRO's argue, but they continue to make positive contributions that shape the 
social landscape. Furthermore, there is a persistent claim that the very principles at the heart of 
Islam are congruent with American ideals. Islam, in other words, is quintessentially American. 
First, this chapter explores a narrative process, as IRO's are using history and storytelling to 
construct a new type of “America” that includes and highlights the presence and contributions of 
Muslims. In so doing, they hope to destroy the national social imaginary that alienates Muslims 
and replace it with one in which Muslims are not just included, but integral. Second, this chapter 
looks at a particular practice of representational politics that uses race and nativity as key factors 
in Americanizing Islam. This part of the chapter explores the way whiteness and Americanness 
are conflated in the representational politics of IRO leaders. 
 As Bhabha says, the nation is itself a narrative construction that emerges from 
                                                 
11 I use “American” to denote not a geographically bounded space or a nation-state, but rather 
an ideological formation. I use “America” throughout this writing to refer to “a multicultural 




interactions between contending cultural contingencies (1990). According to Stuart Hall, nations, 
like all proclaimed 'identities,' do not reflect a stable core, but rather a fractured, fragmented 
construction that arises from a sort of fictional narrativization (Hall 1996). Hall calls for an 
attentiveness to the histories of cultural identities and their ongoing transformations, pointing to 
official institutions as a site of these transformations (Hall 1990). For Hall, cultural identities are 
about becoming something that is constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative, and myth. In 
this sense, identity is less of an essence and more of a positioning. The nation itself is always 
contested, reformulated, and produced through the creation of what Bhatia and Ram call 
“counternarratives” (2001).  
This chapter considers narrative a transformative practice and mode of cultural 
citizenship. IRO strategies against Islamophobia and xenophobia rely heavily on recreating the 
existing national narrative, one that is often seen as steeped in racial nativism (Roediger 2005; 
Sanchez 1997). The new narrative I explore emphasizes the historically invisible Muslim 
presence. By claiming this counternarrative space to tell the true or unknown story of Islam in 
America, IRO's attempt to impact and reformulate the existing narrative construction. In the case 
of IRO strategy, this construction is Janus-faced: it intends both to remake the “master narrative” 
that has cast America as white and European-descended (Takaki 1993) in the minds of the 
general U.S. population and to remake the self-perception of Muslims in the minds of 
predominantly immigrant IRO members.  
 Within the IROs, members and leaders struggle to present U.S. Muslims as rooted in the 
U.S., utilizing politics of race, immigration, and cultural belonging to bolster this claim. This, I 
argue, is a direct response to the Islamophobic fear that there is a “Muslim agenda,” that alien 
Muslims are attempting some sort of subversive takeover of American society. This process is 
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well underway by organizations in Europe, where Muslims have a longer and more entrenched 
experience with Western Islamophobia. For instance, in England, certain Muslim organizations 
are “defining a uniquely British conception of Islam, which has allowed a new generation of 
Muslim youth to feel increasingly comfortable exerting both their national and their religious 
identities” (Aslan 2009: 154). Bakalian and Bozorgmehr follow in their study of Muslim 
American organizations that are active in making Islam one of the core religions in America, 
pushing to change America's religious heritage from “Judeo Christian” to “Abrahamic” (2009: 
2). One of the framing mechanisms they describe is demonstrating allegiance, through which 
U.S. Muslims show that they are rooted in the U.S. and committed to remaining here. For 
instance, I noticed the rise of the term “indigenous Muslim” at IRO events, used primarily in 
reference to white and black converts. The term, introduced by Sherman Jackson, is a way in 
which Americanness is being leveraged by Muslim Americans.   
 The U.S. IRO strategy, dubbed “integrationist” by Bakalian and Bozorgmehr (2009), is 
hardly seamless or uncontroversial. Instead, the appeal to Americanize Islam is fraught with 
tensions, many of which came to the surface during my time in the field. I argue that this project 
of cultural citizenship is uneven and ambiguous on controversial matters of race and whiteness, 
colorblindness, and assimilation. I suggest that the integrationist approach is partially a racial 
project in which whiteness and whitening figure centrally. Another important implication of my 
findings is that IRO’s are enmeshed in an explicitly spatial project of putting down Muslim roots 
in the U.S. While Olivier Roy suggests that global Muslim communities are deterritorialized, that 
“Islam is less and less ascribed to a specific territory and civilisational area” (2006: 18), my 
fieldwork reveals a deep territorialization of Islam as both in and of the U.S. Bowen's treatment 
of transnational Muslims suggests that Islam is the backbone of diasporic Muslims, as opposed 
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to the nation; the transnational public space of Islam is anchored not in local laws and conditions 
but in orthodox Islamic principles (2004). Both Roy and Bowen make compelling claims about 
global Islam as a diasporic condition, seeing the ummah as a social imaginary that is de-linked 
from any specific locality or region. Global Islam, they argue, is post-‘place.’ My work with 
IRO's complicates the assumptions of both Roy and Bowen and looks at the notion of rootedness 
that is at the center of activist strategies. Instead, I am inclined to agree with Grewal, that “the 
religious imagination of American Muslims is a profoundly geographic one” (2013: 33). In this 
chapter, I explore what an “American Islam” is, how IRO's are enmeshed in a process of forging 
an “American Islam,” and the complicated politics that burden this project. 
 
Part One   
Muslims: Citizen Outsiders 
 Sumaiya, a Palestinian-American 29 year-old woman, teared up as she recounted what 
happened in her Arab-American Chicagoland neighborhood after the events of 9/11/2001. We sat 
across from each other in Detroit during a winter conference in 2012 on U.S. Muslim diversity.  
 
“I don’t know if you remember this. Were you in Chicago when 9/11 happened? 
Yeah, so you know, you had mobs of people going down 95th and Harlem in 
Bridgeview. They were attacking Arab-owned stores and going to the mosque and 
yelling things. The mayor actually told all the women who wear hijab to stay 
home. My mother and I were terrified. We just stayed home. In a way you can say 
I was spared the violence of that moment. But what I do remember was a car of 
young, white men in front of my house yelling “GO HOME!” I suppose I should 
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have felt lucky that we were not injured or vandalized, that we got off easy, but all 
I could remember was being so traumatized by the fact that these people didn’t 
think I was at home here. My mother was born in the U.S., and my dad came over 
at a young age. All of us, me and my brothers, were born here. And you’re going 
to tell us to go home? This is home. That hurt me most of all.”  
 
 By and large, Sumaiya's experience was an anomaly. Most Muslims did not experience 
assaults on their homes nor rioting in their neighborhoods. What occurred in Bridgeview, Illinois 
was a remarkable event in which a historic Arab-American community experienced immediate 
physical backlash. Speaking to Al-Jazeerah, U.S.-based scholar and popular IRO speaker Sheikh 
Hamza Yusuf brackets the Islamophobic backlash in the immediate aftermath of 9/11: 
“In the United States, by and large, you have a population of civil people...I think 
the majority of American people acknowledge multiculturalism. America has 
always been a multicultural society...I think American Muslims need to 
acknowledge that there are still more hate crimes against the Jewish community, 
which is a profoundly enfranchised community in the U.S., than against the 
Muslim community. But what's troubling is a sentiment that's increasing. While 
there are not a lot of hate crimes against a community, there are [hate crimes]. 
Mosques are attacked, pigs heads left at mosques. But, by and large, Muslims 
have been protected in their houses and homes...”  
 
The skyrocketing in reported hate crimes monitored by the Council on American-Islamic 
Relations (CAIR) after 9/11 clearly suggests an increased experience of overt hostility. Certainly, 
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hate crimes against even those mistakenly taken to be Muslim (such as the Sikh man Balbir 
Singh Sodhi, who was murdered in 2001), point to a violent Islamophobic reality.  
 Yet, on a day-to-day level, most people I met in the field reported that, aside from the 
cultural and media campaign against Muslims, Islamophobia was not a significant factor in their 
lives. In other words, people told me they felt safe walking their city streets, wearing a hijab or 
long beard at work, or even setting down a prayer rug at an airport when the time for obligatory 
prayers came. “I work in a really diverse place. I have fasted openly at my office for three years 
now, and no one has said anything. I also am pretty easily able to board planes and travel 
frequently for work, so that hasn't been a problem for me,” said Naeem, a finance professional 
who was attending the 2011 ISNA Convention in Chicago. “You know, Islamophobia for me is 
really less about fearing for our safety as Muslims and more about what's being said on, you 
know, Fox News or by some fringe right wing Republicans in Congress.” This notion was 
echoed by young parents Amina and Aadam, who I lunched with at an ISNA Regional 
Conference in Cincinnati in 2011. “I think Islamophobia is real, but we experience it in different 
ways,” Amina told me. Aadam chimed in, “We don't watch Fox News. If I watch that for 5 or 10 
minutes, I'm so disgusted. You know, if you read what people post online, Islamophobia is in the 
media, on the internet. You can ignore it if you choose to. Islamophobia is, to me, rhetoric. Hate 
speech. It's in people's words, not their actions.” A speaker at the 2012 convention in 
Washington, D.C. said in a panel about voting and political engagement, “if you begin to really 
think about how accepting this country is, and not just focus on the people that are on the 
margins that attack our faith, we Muslims have flourished and prospered for 1400 years and 
continue to grow as the fastest faith in this country. Someone like a Glen Beck or Rush 
Limbaugh, they are a pimple, a pimple in the grand scheme of things.”  
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 The idea that Islamophobia is captured by an increasing sentiment, as Hamza Yusuf put it, 
rather than overt and abundant anti-Muslim action, was a general consensus in the field. It is a 
debatable point, as certainly the anti-Muslim witch-hunt is deeply intertwined with very palpable 
actions including detentions, deportations, and other sorts of structural and institutional violence, 
which I discuss in other chapters. Yet, throughout the course of my fieldwork, I became attuned 
to the puzzling nature of the experience of Islamophobia that most individuals reported to me. By 
and large, they feel safe and free to worship in this country. At the same time, they are hyper-
aware of the cultural campaign that is being mobilized against Muslims. Because of this 
formulation, I began to think of U.S. Muslims as 'citizen outsiders,' sanctioned members of the 
U.S. yet ideologically cast as Other. The presence of a 'citizen outsider' is hardly new in the U.S. 
The example of Japanese-American internment during World War 2, for instance, serves as a 
handy parallel of a historically American community being suddenly cast as hostile or alien. This 
parallel between post-9/11 Islamophobia and Japanese American internment resurfaced in 
speeches at IRO events, bringing the long U.S. history of racial nativism into the consciousness 
of IRO members. In her treatment of Arab Americans, Naber uses the term “ambiguous insider” 
to describe the paradoxical experience of Arabs (2000). Using Naber's framework, Muslims (by 
extension) in the U.S. are ambiguous in their sense of belonging; the sense of safety and 
citizenship alongside an increased anti-Muslim climate couple to create an inconclusive type of 
“Americanness.” Simmel's “Stranger” is a useful comparison, a member of a group who is a 
unlikely to leave yet experiences social distance from the group at large (1908). 
 This ideological othering process – an Islamophobic sentiment – was ever-present in the 
awareness IRO members, who were sharply attuned to anti-Muslim rhetoric, conscious of a 
social imaginary that had cast them as un-American. The gap between legal citizenship and full 
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social citizenship was widely understood; one conference attendee remarked on Malcolm X's 
claim that “sitting at the table doesn't make you a diner” (Malcolm X 1964). While some thought 
this discourse emanated from a right-wing fringe, an anomaly in an otherwise inclusive 
environment, many thought the othering of Muslims was pervasive throughout the U.S. 
Regardless, most understood American Muslims to be regarded as outsiders to some extent. IRO 
members were easily able to recall the results of surveys of the American public that 
demonstrated widespread anti-Muslim sentiment and used such data as evidence that they were 
not fully seen as belonging. The widespread sense that Muslims are welcome to pray in public 
spaces and practice their religion safely, then, coexists with an equally widespread understanding 
that Muslims are seen as outsiders. This contradictory understanding is (as I explore in other 
chapters) part of the overarching ambiguity and paradox of the experience for many U.S. 
Muslims.  
 Many felt that the controversy surrounding President Obama's religious identity was 
emblematic of a larger, underlying Islamophobia. Two college students I sat beside during a 
panel at the 2011 Chicago convention were discussing Obama's middle name and the so-called 
“birther” movement, which cast aspersions on Obama's legitimacy as president and demanded 
that he produce a birth certificate. “It's because his middle name is Muslim,” one of them joked. 
“If people didn't think he was a Muslim, they wouldn't care to imagine that he's foreign.” 
Sumaiya said to me in Washington, D.C., several months after our first meeting in Detroit. “The 
more I think about it, the more I start to think that the birth certificate scandal was really about 
fears that he was a Muslim. It wasn't about fears that Obama was an outsider, or foreign. It wasn't 
about his blackness. If he'd been from a Catholic country or somewhere in Latin America or 
something, no one would have cared. But because people were already scared that he was 
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Muslim, the birther movement was able to gather steam.” The Obama controversies underscored 
this ideological othering of Muslims to which IRO's were deeply attentive. While many race 
scholars pointed to anxieties about the President's nativity as a form of muted racism, IRO 
members and leaders regarded it as evidence of deep Islamophobia.“Well, his middle name is 
Hussein and he doesn't seem to care much for Palestine. Sounds like a Muslim world leader to 
me!” Azam joked with me at an event in Washington, D.C. A small group of us had gathered in 
the hallway after a lecture and were discussing the Obama presidency. “I wish he was Muslim. 
Maybe then he'd lighten up with all this surveillance on Muslim communities,” Saeeda said. She 
recollected the overt instances of Obama distancing himself from visibly Muslim women during 
his first presidential campaign12, suggesting that this was her primary inkling that the President 
would have to gingerly navigate his treatment of U.S. Muslims. “Every time one of these right-
wing radio jerks wants to say something anti-Obama, they have to refer to him with his middle 
name. They know that the American public will agree if, on some level, they feel he's Muslim,” 
Saeeda continued. “Dropping the “H-bomb” - that's the “Hussein-bomb,” mind you - helps do 
just that. All of a sudden he's a dangerous Muslim foreigner.” The idea that anti-Obama 
xenophobia was rooted in Islamophobia was not only prevalent among IRO members, it was 
revealing of the ways IRO members perceive Islam to be regarded as un-American, making 
explicit the “citizen-outsider” trope. 
 The result of this anti-Muslim sentiment, then, is that Muslims are ideologically cast as 
anti-American. This is evident in the rhetoric of notorious Islamophobes such as Pamela Geller 
and Robert Spencer, co-founders of the hate group Stop Islamization of America, which has been 
                                                 
12 The 2008 incident in which two women wearing hijabs were asked not to stand immediately 




vocal in its opposition to allowing shariah law in the U.S. and the construction of the Islamic 
center in downtown Manhattan. This discourse is less about terrorism or security, the assumed 
foundation of Islamophobia, and more about preservation of a pristine imagined homeland. With 
the understanding that U.S. Muslims are discursively Othered, I now turn to the agentival 
capacity of IRO members and leaders in responding to this marginalization.  
 
“Islam in America”: A Cultural Citizenship Strategy 
 In the face of Muslims being cast as un-American, IRO's have developed several 
strategies to respond. Here, I explore the ways IRO's are deliberately “Americanizing” Islam. 
This is done in myriad ways: by underscoring and publicizing the historic presence of Muslims 
in the U.S., by highlighting significant contributions of U.S. Muslims, and by emphasizing the 
ways that “true”13 Islam is compatible with “American values.”  Bakalian and Bozorgmehr in 
their study of Muslim advocacy organizations in the face of Islamophobia offer “integration” as 
the “ultimate goal” of advocacy after 9/11 (2009: 236). Yet “integration” may overlook the 
comprehensive efforts by IRO's to go well beyond integrating Muslims in the U.S. social 
landscape. My fieldwork revealed a comprehensive effort to prove – both to mainstream society 
and to U.S. Muslims – not that Islam can simply be “added on” to the U.S. social landscape, but 
that Islam is in fact constitutive of the social fabric of America. Islam, as Wajahat Ali jokes in the 
introductory quote to this chapter, is as American as apple pie.  
 Rosaldo's notion of cultural citizenship “refers to the right to be different and to belong in 
                                                 
13 While IRO messaging suggests that “true” Islam is non-violent, compatible with American 
constitutional principles, and sensitive to social justice issues, it must be kept in mind that 





a participatory democratic sense. It claims that, in a democracy, social justice calls for equity 
among all citizens, even when such differences as race, religion, class, gender, or sexual 
orientation potentially could be used to make certain people less equal or inferior to others” 
(1994: 402). Ong, on the other hand, defines cultural citizenship as “a process of self-making and 
being-made in relation to nation-states and transnational processes” (1996: 737). Ong and 
Rosaldo attend to different sides of the process of becoming ‘full’ citizens; Rosaldo is concerned 
with the agency of those diverse, marginalized subjects in articulating space for themselves, 
while Ong is attentive to the ways in which they are “subject to state power and other forms of 
regulation” (738). Race, class, religion, gender, and sexuality are some of the axes upon which 
‘full’ citizenship – not just legalistic citizenship – hinges.  
 Drawing from Ong's notion of cultural citizenship, which is a process of self-making and 
being-made (1996), IRO politics respond to the being made an outsider through these strategies 
of self-making. Following Hall's notion that dominant discourses interpellate us, putting us in 
place as particular social subjects (1990), Muslim cultural citizenship serves as a form of 
engagement that aims to shift the dominant discourse. In particular, the Islamophobic narrative 
that marginalizes and demonizes Muslims and the IRO narrative that constructs a positive U.S. 
Muslim presence are actively contentious parts of a process defining what can and cannot be 
“American.” In D'Alisera's work on Sierra Leonian Muslims in the U.S., she finds that there is an 
attempt (in spite of strong homeland ties) among Muslims to build ties with far-flung and diverse 
Muslim communities, an Americanizing process that is part of a larger global ummah's quest for 
identity (2004). Bilici names this quest “homeland insecurity,” and calls for a scholarly 
attentiveness to the “naturalization of Islam in America” (2012).  
 At an event in Washington, D.C. memorializing the 10
th
 anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, 
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Imam Zaid Shakir, an African-American convert to Islam and a leading IRO spokesperson, urged 
Muslims to see themselves as American. In his trademark oratorical style, with periodic 
crescendos interrupting a gentle and slow-paced rhythm, he spoke at length about the need for 
U.S. Muslims to embrace a sense of belonging. “We have to stop othering ourselves,” he said to 
an audience of several hundred. “Consider the convert, a person who's fully integrated in the 
society, friends, family, relatives. They become a Muslim and suddenly she's an Other. We have 
to stop that. We, as Muslims, have as many rights as anyone. We have to recognize this 
reality....We have certain rights we should not surrender. We have to stand up for who we are 
and, doing that assertively, we wouldn't be the first in U.S. history. We have to move beyond this 
and present a positive message, build alliances, strengthen ourselves spiritually. Be the truth we 
advocate for and represent that.” Shakir's remarks go on to mention the Chinese Exclusion Act 
and the internment of Japanese Americans. “This is old stuff in American politics,” he says, 
referring to racial nativism and xenophobia. “You find a weak marginal community, make them a 
scapegoat, and use it to whip up popular support for certain political groups.” After the session 
was done, I spoke with Naeem and his fiancée about Shakir's words. “I didn't know about the 
Chinese, what did he call it? Exclusion Act? I never knew that about American history. I suppose 
knowing the history of this country is really important if we're going to beat the Islamophobes. 
You can't know where you're going if you don't know where you came from.” 
 
Constructing a Muslim-American (Counter)Narrative 
 The history of Islam in the U.S. was a recurrent theme, both in official panels and in my 
conversations and interviews with IRO members. This pressing desire to trace the presence of 
Muslims in the U.S. revealed a strong urge among IRO members to illuminate the fact that 
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Muslims, in fact, are not Other. It was also a part of a larger process of self-discovery, as I was 
told repeatedly in the field that Muslim Americans are having an “identity crisis,” (a notion I 
explore further in other chapters). Naeem's claim that knowing one's history is important was 
echoed by several individuals. To this end, IRO events repeatedly revisited Muslim American 
history, communicating to IRO members a specific narrative that centers on an entrenched 
Muslim presence in the U.S. “The triumphalism behind Muslims’ narratives of 
countercitizenship – the notion that Muslim Americans are more American than Americans – 
drives mainstreaming processes for many American Muslims across ethnic and racial lines...” 
(Grewal 2013: 156-157).  
 For instance, IRO spokespeople referred repeatedly in speeches and panels to the 
likelihood of a pre-Columbian presence of Muslims in the “New World.” “This is a debatable 
point,” said Hamza Yusuf at the 2012 convention in Washington, D.C. “But when we think of the 
U.S., we have to know that we are part of a story. The Muslims are part of this narrative, and 
have been a part of this narrative from the beginning. We have, and this is a debatable point, but 
we have probably been here before Columbus.”14 I glanced around the large convention space as 
Yusuf spoke, estimating the audience at over three thousand attendees. Several sat in the front 
row, taking notes on paper or on a laptop. Throughout his talk, there were periodic bursts of 
applause when Yusuf made a particularly moving point. These audience members, immigrants 
and U.S.-born, were eagerly internalizing the narrative that Yusuf explicitly named. The sight of 
a white Californian, fluent in Arabic, able to switch between a West Coast accent and classical 
                                                 
14 Yusuf refers to the sparse scholarship on the possibility that Chinese Muslim explorers 
reached the shores of the “New World” decades before Columbus, as explored in Menzies’ 1421: 




Arabic, wearing an impeccable Nehru-collared jacket, speaking to a vast audience of IRO 
members, seemed almost surreal.  
 “Even the original inhabitants of the new world were immigrants,” Yusuf continued. 
“America is a story of immigrants, and you are part of that story. Those of you who came later, 
you must see yourselves as part of that story.” The desire to spread, among Muslims and the U.S. 
at large, an awareness that Muslims have likely been here even before European settlers has two 
significant dimensions. First, it speaks to a deliberate process of Americanizing Islam, of 
situating Muslims as anything but alien. Second, it aims to bring together far-flung, diverse 
Muslims by encouraging them to identify with this narrative. As Stuart Hall has suggested, 
creative power is at the heart of diasporic imaginaries, which “offer a way of imposing an 
imaginary coherence on the experience of dispersal and fragmentation, which is the history of all 
enforced diasporas (Hall 1990: 224). The narrative of Islam in the U.S. is meant to appeal to all 
Muslims, regardless of how deep their “American” roots go.  
 Similarly, the abundant references to Muslim presence in the U.S. through the slave trade 
served as an anchor for Islamic American history. I was surprised by just how many IRO 
members knew the detailed history of the life of Yarrow Mamout, a manumitted slave who lived 
in Georgetown and openly practiced Islam. Charles Wilson Peale's famous portrait of Mamout 
became a ubiquitous slideshow image at lectures on Muslim-American history at ISNA 
conventions. Hamza Yusuf, Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, and Zaid Shakir all made in-depth 
references to Mamout in speeches during my time in the field. “Muslims have been here,” 
Hamza Yusuf said in the speech referenced above. “Charles Wilson Peale, the same man who 
painted George Washington, painted Yarrow Mamout. This man was a Fulani who was brought 
to America as a slave and was noted for chanting Islamic prayers while walking around 
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Georgetown. And he was such a pleasant person that Peale, who had planned to paint him in a 
day, ended up spending many days with him.” Again, the image of a white convert lecturing 
about a black Muslim slave to a room largely filled with immigrant Muslim Arabs and South 
Asians struck me. The creation of an American Muslim ummah – a community of believers, 
diverse around race and national origin, with only their “American Muslimness” in common - 
was palpable. I found South Asian and Arab IRO members identifying strongly with Malcolm X, 
Muhammad Ali, and other noteworthy U.S. Muslims, often overlooking serious sectarian or 
theological differences. The allegiance I reference here does not suggest that U.S. Muslims 
identify with the revolutionary project of Malcolm X, but that rather they claim him to 
demonstrate the diversity and potential Americanness of the Muslim experience. An Islamic 
Horizons15 issue detailed the contributions of W.D. Muhammad, son of Elijah Muhammad, upon 
his death. (I speak further of interracial coalition building in another chapter.) This seemed like 
what D'Alisera described as an Americanizing of Islam, reaching across differences to forge a 
unified American ummah (2004). Bilici's tremendous work highlighting the shift of Muslim 
American organizations from “diasporic” to “American” points to the ways in which, currently, 
these organizations are calling upon their leaders and contingencies not only to speak without an 
“accent,” but to “think without an accent” (2012: 114), claiming that U.S. Muslims now see 
“America as the abode of Islam” (117).  
 Part of this counternarrative examines the lingering traces of Muslims of all origins in the 
U.S. IRO messaging underscores and emphasizes this presence; I heard repeatedly IRO speakers 
and members point to numerous cities named “Mecca” and “Medinah” in the U.S. as evidence 
                                                 




that Muslims had shaped the geography of this country. “The ice cream cone story! How many 
times have you been told the ice cream cone story?” Linah exclaimed to me in the sprawling 
bazaar at the annual convention in Chicago in 2011. I knew exactly what she meant. She was 
referencing the story of the Arab-American who rolled up a waffle to help out a nearby ice cream 
vendor, inventing the ice cream cone, at the 1904 World's Fair in St. Louis in 1904. The tale 
resurfaced time and again in speeches, panels, publications, and my own personal conversations 
with IRO members. It became a historical event with which Muslims, many of them not of Arab 
origin, identified. The ice cream stone story, as familiar to Linah as it was to me, is exemplary of 
the narrative process by which Muslims establish roots here, emphasize their contributions, and 
challenge the xenophobic othering that casts them as outsiders.  
 The title of this chapter refers to yet another soundbyte that was repeated by IRO 
speakers and members alike. That Thomas Jefferson allegedly owned a Quran was evidence that 
Islam has always been welcome and present in the U.S. Jefferson was also repeatedly credited 
for hosting the first Presidential iftar16 in 1805 when he hosted a Muslim Tunisian ambassador 
during the month of Ramadan. (Incidentally, White House iftars remain a presidential tradition, 
accompanied by a controversy I explore further in other chapters.) In a powerful speech by 
Hamza Yusuf, he reminded the audience that “Muslims fought in all of these wars in American 
history. We fought for this country in World War 2, in World War 1, in the Civil War. So this idea 
that we're alien is completely unacceptable.” The fact that IRO members were intimately familiar 
with these factoids, and that they continued to be repeated, are evidence of the transformative 
potential of these narratives. Gradually, the history of Muslims in the U.S. is being produced, 
                                                 




with institutional messaging from IRO's at the center of this process.  
 The sense that Islamic history could be used to transform, enhance, and enrich the U.S. 
was pervasive. While I address this in greater depth in my chapters on Islamophilia and positive 
hypervisibility, here I refer to the specific ways “America” as an ideological and social formation 
was invoked by IRO's in this process of Americanizing Islam. Appearing on Al-Jazeerah, Hamza 
Yusuf spoke of the “shariah scare” in which several lawmakers considered passing legislation 
that would ban shariah law. Yusuf argues that Islamic finance would have protected the U.S. 
from the predatory lending and subprime crisis that plunged the U.S. into its current recession. 
Writing about Muslim finances, Maurer argues that Islamic banking options are often labeled by 
Muslims 'ethical' or 'socially responsible' finance (2004). Thus, Islam is configured as something 
that inherently enriches the U.S.  At the Washington, D.C. event memorializing the 9/11 attacks, 
Imam Zaid Shakir said, “And it's our responsibility to our community and nation to begin to 
present a positive message, to begin to build positive alliances...We create a positive space where 
reconciliation, sharing, and compassion become the basis of our political action. Leave the 
Gingrich's of the world; let God deal with them. If we do that, there will be less who will serve 
as an audience for hatred and bigotry...because they'll say, those people gave me medical 
treatment at their free clinic. I love me some Moslems.” Laughter and applause broke out for 
Shakir's words. These instances suggest a distinct appeal to a “true” Islam, the claim that these 
fundamental Islamic principles can serve to enrich the cultural and political tapestry of the U.S.  
 Sumaiya echoed Shakir's urge for Muslims to do good here. “I remember when there was 
the earthquake in Pakistan and Kashmir several years ago, and Islamic Relief came and raised 
like $200,000 in one jumma. So, they care about that kind of stuff, but they didn't raise a similar 
amount for Katrina. You know what I'm saying? So they're still, their hearts are still home-bound, 
90 
 
which is so so dangerous. This is one of the problems in terms of the immigrant Muslim 
narrative before 9/11. Even to this day, immigrant Muslims just cannot see their story in the story 
of African Americans. Latinos. Other immigrant communities. And of the working class in the 
United States. They just cannot see their story in them.”  
Sumaiya explicitly naming the “story of U.S. Muslims” as a narrative and identifying 
9/11 as a turning point in this narrative was critical and spoke directly to my own observations in 
the field. The storytelling process I describe here not only creates a counternarrative of 
belonging, but contextualizes Muslim presence in a larger story of class struggle, migration, and 
racialization.  
 The attempt to prove that “true” Islam is in harmony with “American values” is yet 
another dimension in this project of cultural citizenship. Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf's book What's 
Right with Islam is What's Right with America (2004) stands as a perfect example of this process. 
Abdul Rauf's book claims that liberty, equality, fraternity, and social justice are foundational for 
all Abrahamic faiths, including Islam. Arguing that America best represents the values that are at 
the heart of Islam (and vice versa), Abdul Rauf's book was a favorite in my conversations in the 
field. The author, who gained notoreity as he spearheaded the so-called “Ground Zero mosque” 
project in 2010, reflected a sentiment that was ever-present in the field: that Islam is 
quintessentially American. (The use of “America” as not a geographically bounded space or 
simple nation-state, but rather an ideological formation, is abundantly clear here.) Responding to 
the anti-shariah scare, Hamza Yusuf told Al-Jazeerah that part of shariah law is being a good 
citizen and obeying the laws of one's homeland. Echoing Abdul Rauf, Yusuf points to the ways 
Islam is, at its very core, oriented around notions of respectable citizenship. 
 “America might be more true to its values if it followed the example set by the Prophet 
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Muhammad's community,” Linah reminded me during our bazaar conversation. “He valued, may 
peace be upon him, notions of democracy. If you look at the sunnah, you see him consulting with 
his wife or companions on very important issues. He believed in tolerance. The way he treated 
non-Muslims is exemplary. He believed in peace and fair business transactions. He believed in 
all of the things modern-Americans say they believe in, yet all of us, his community, are 
considered anti-American.” Linah's poignant remarks were echoed throughout my time in the 
field, reinforcing the popular IRO suggestion that Islamic values are perfectly aligned with 
American ones.   
 
Americanizing Islam: The Nawawi Foundation  
 One of the most fascinating attempts at Americanizing Islam was presented by IRO 
members who were familiar with the work of the Nawawi Foundation, whose mission is to 
“build a successful American Muslim cultural identity.” In my conversations, several IRO 
members referred to Nawawi as an admirable and significant organization in the Muslim fight 
against Islamophobia. Cloaked in language of assimilation and patriotism, the organization’s 
project opts for a cultural project of identity-formation. Nawawi has organized several 
international trips with a select group of travelers. In the past, destinations have included 
Morocco, Turkey, and China. The purpose of these trips is to explore the presence of Islam in 
these culturally varied settings in order to create understandings of the adaptability of Islam to a 
diverse range of geographic contexts. The organization also contributes more directly to 
scholarship related to its mission by sponsoring lectures and publishing articles that explore 
relevant topics.  
 Chair of the Board of Directors and Nawawi founder, as well as the main speaker at 
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Nawawi events, Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah is a white Muslim who converted to Islam in 1970 
while studying at Cornell University. (I discuss his role in greater depth later in this chapter.) In a 
2004 article entitled “Islam and the Cultural Imperative,” Dr. Abd-Allah suggests that Islam has a 
strong history of adaptability and assimilation. He says that Islam always “struck a balance 
between temporal beauty and ageless truth and fanned a brilliant peacock’s tail of unity in 
diversity from the heart of China to the shores of the Atlantic” (2004: 1). Yet Abd-Allah turns 
with disappointment to the current state of Muslims in the U.S. who are unable to maintain this 
assimilative capacity. He says that “Muslim immigrants to America remain attached to the lands 
they left behind, but hardly if ever bring with them the full pattern of the once healthy cultures of 
their past, which – if they had remained intact – would have reduced their incentive to emigrate 
in the first place” (2). Abd-Allah provides historical examples of Muslim communities in China 
and East Africa incorporating elements of local culture that did not explicitly conflict with 
Islamic principles as a sign of their strength, suggesting that American Muslims should do the 
same. He says that “our culture must address Islam’s transcendent and universal values, while 
constructing a broad national matrix that fits all like a master key, despite ethnic, class, and 
social background” (10).  
 In a travel log for the organization’s website, writer Ibrahim Abusharif documents the 
experiences of visiting Beijing, Lanzhou, and Guilen with Nawawi. In his reflections about the 
trip, he notes that the trip educated him on a vibrant cultural presence of Muslims in China. He 
distinguishes this from U.S. Muslims, who, he claims, suffer “a dearth of Muslim culture in the 
West” (Abd-Allah 2004). He notes that the reason Chinese Muslim culture survived and thrived 
was because Muslims maintained connections with the Chinese at large. In the 2004 trip to 
Turkey, nearly 200 travelers embarked on a trip of which one of the main emphases was that 
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Turks consider themselves at once Muslim and Western. In a travel log, Intisar Rabb points out 
that the trip featured a visit to a small and unobtrusive mosque. Rabb uses this example to 
encourage Muslims “to build something that seeks not to recreate Muslim pasts and foreign 
cultures, but seeks to continue Islamic tradition by building upon your own cultural foundations 
for an American skyline that will reflect present ideals build on solid, shared foundations” (Rabb 
2004). Metcalf has described the ways diasporic Muslims use the creation of “Islamic space” to 
signal their presence in a new host-land, constructing domes and minarets and performing the 
call to prayer over loudspeakers (1996). The Nawawi Foundation's mission and messaging is in 
stark contrast to Metcalf's observation, calling instead on Muslims to dissolve inconspicuously 
into their new U.S. homeland.  
 I bristled at the thought that U.S. Muslims were being encouraged to adapt and make 
Islam acceptable to the West, to shed relics of a “foreign” or “dated” culture that would clash 
with the cultural landscape in the U.S. It summoned up Fabian's suggestion that the other exists 
non-contemporaneously (2002). Furthermore, the role of culture in the formulation extended by 
Nawawi is a strikingly problematic one. As mentioned above, Muslim culture is commended by 
Nawawi as being rich and vibrant in China or Morocco, while American Muslims are said to 
suffer a putative lack of culture. Additionally, cultural factors, rather than political and economic 
ones, are deemed by Abd-Allah the cause of migration of Muslims toward the West. By isolating 
and reifying this notion of ‘culture,’ the material and political contexts of what is dubbed culture 
are dismissed by the Nawawi Foundation. Moreover, the conception of foreign cultures as 
potentially clashing with the West  reifies and freezes what comprises “American” culture. After 
hearing IRO members describe Nawawi's work, I immediately revisited Vijay Prashad's The 
Karma of Brown Folk, where he asks, “Can one merely do “cultural” work? Isn't all “cultural” 
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activity also in some ways political?” (2000: 147). That Nawawi's cultural work appealed to so 
many IRO members speaks to a larger context described by Palumbo-Liu. Palumbo-Liu critiques 
mainstream multiculturalism, and instead says multiculturalism must be critical and focus on 
historical productions of difference rather than taking culture to be a ready-made thing.  
 By encouraging Muslims to construct a “broad national matrix,” solidarity is conflated 
with cultural homogeneity. Essentially, the groundwork is laid for a unified Muslim community 
that has abandoned racial, ethnic, or homeland allegiances. Nawawi’s identity-based model is 
focused on cultural behavior and reconfiguration of the role of tradition. In Nawawi’s 2004 
publication, Abd-Allah says that “in the absence of an integrated and dynamic Muslim American 
culture, to speak of ourselves as constituting a true community – despite our immense individual 
talent and large growing numbers – our being able to someday play a role in civic life or politics 
is little more than rhetoric or wishful thinking” (2004: 3).  Such approaches are critiqued by 
Inderpal Grewal, who argues that if a notion of collective identity “is applied to those who are 
termed ‘minorities’ in the United States, specificities and differences are elided” (2005: 239). 
Grewal suggests that “it is not the resolution of identity that is necessary for political action, but 
oppositional and coalitional…practices” (251). In other words, a nebulous concept like “identity” 
is neither the cause nor the solution to anti-Muslim terrain in the U.S. What struck me about the 
Nawawi example was the eagerness with which most IRO members who mentioned it agreed 
with its mission of forging an American Muslim culture. Those who were able to formulate 
somewhat pithy critiques of imperialism and hegemony were also, interestly, enthusiastic about 
Nawawi's cultural mission. 
 
Political Engagement as Cultural Citizenship 
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 Finally, political engagement by Muslims was clearly another dimension of the project of 
cultural citizenship espoused by IRO discourse. At a 2011 workshop on political engagement, 
IRO leaders Haris Tarin and Sami al Mansour led a session on Muslim activism through 
contacting elected officials. Returning to a theological appeal, Tarin reminded the 45 or 50 
attendees that they “should be agents of change individually and socially. This is what the 
message of the Quran is. The 30th section of the Quran, yes, it's about the hereafter. But it's also 
about social issues. The Quran was revealed because of social challenges.” Tarin's appeal to 
adherence to the Quran served as a segue into the ensuing workshop on how to write effective 
letters to local representatives and how to appear on ballots. During a town-hall style discussion 
after the workshop, one attendee said he appreciated the letter-writing exercise. “This makes our 
elected officials know that people with our kinds of names – Hasan, Kausar, Muhammad – that 
we are part of their voting base. If they see our names on letters we've written to them – it doesn't 
matter whether the letter is about Palestine or about a local issue – they will know that the 
Hasans and Muhammads are also part of America.”  
 Nowhere was this sentiment about political engagement as a form of cultural citizenship 
more evident than in the year leading up to the second presidential election of Barack Obama, 
which coincided with my time in the field. Voting, of course, is most conventionally understood 
as a component of legal citizenship in a democracy. It certainly is. Yet, I understand voting as 
more than a civic duty. In a sociopolitical configuration in which Muslims are citizen outsiders, 
voting can be understood as a more subjective, engaged process rather than simply a right of 
citizenship. By configuring themselves as politically engaged voters, Muslim Americans have 
used a legal right as doubly one of cultural citizenship. As I explore here, voting becomes a way 
in which individuals assert themselves as impactful, concerned, active, and patriotic citizens. 
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 The sense that the candidate “didn’t matter” is critical to my larger point of voting as an 
act of cultural citizenship. In the 2012 elections, while overall enthusiasm around Obama's 
presidency had waned, there was still a sense that voting was a way for Muslim Americans to 
exercise an important civic duty and combat Islamophobia. (I discuss Muslim American 
ambivalence about the Obama presidency in a Chapter 5.) Political engagement was underscored 
as a critical way for Muslim Americans to have their needs met, a way to become a vital and 
contributing part of our nation, and at times, even a religious duty. In a conversation with an 
ISNA member and principal of an Islamic elementary school, I was told that voting was less a 
way to get a candidate in office and more about “Americanizing” Islam. Zahid told me, “We 
have to vote. It's not so much about who we vote for. It's about becoming active, important 
citizens. I'm visibly Muslim. I have a long beard, and my wife wears a hijab. When people see us 
at the polling place, they're going to know that we are here; we are invested in this nation. We are 
not immigrants that came here to make money, but we are Americans who are committed to 
making this the greatest nation in the world.”  
 In a panel on voting at the 2012 convention in Washington, D.C., the necessity to vote as 
a practice of cultural citizenship emerged yet again. The Executive Director of an Islamic civil 
rights group and a panelist said, “We have to embrace the society around us. We have to tell our 
own narrative by living our own narrative. We have to be engaged not only with Muslim 
organizations and mosques, but to the public around us. We have to give back. To put the human 
face of Muslims by us doing it individually. And that is the positive mark that we can leave on 
our society. The political action is important, but it is not conclusive. We have a lot to give and 




Part Two    
IRO Leadership: “Homegrown” Representatives and Whiteness 
The prominence of white IRO speakers was a peculiar topic, as the actual proportion of 
white Muslim converts is a tiny fraction of the U.S. Muslim population. Why was it that white 
converts commanded such a large following among IRO members? Why were so many of the 
most charismatic and popular IRO speakers white? How did large populations of color relate to 
these white converts as leaders and spokespeople? How does the white Muslim figure in the 
context of the increasing racialization of Muslims as a group (Rana 2011; Stubbs 2003)? What is 
the role of white leadership for various American Muslim community organizations? How is race 
talked about – and muted (Davis 2007) – in discursive representations of these leaders?  
I address these questions by examining white speakers who commanded an awesome 
presence at IRO events. In this section, I question the prominence of white leaders in relation to 
an overarching U.S. climate of post-racialism and colorblindness. This augments my assertion 
that “Americanizing” Islam has been at the center of IRO strategies, reinforcing the claim that 
whiteness is a critical dimension of Americanness.  It should be noted that these figures are not 
identical in their theological or political orientations, nor are they static in their messaging. I do 
not examine them to put forward a uniform, essentialized image of a white Muslim leader. 
Rather, my exploration considers the ways race is articulated in their roles, whether explicitly or 
(as it often is) in an unmarked fashion. 
 
The Prominence of White IRO Leaders 
On May 15th, 2009, Yusuf Islam appeared on the Colbert Show on Comedy Central. 
Yusuf Islam, the pop singer formerly known as Cat Stevens, left his mainstream musical career 
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for decades to pursue his work as a leader in the British (and international) Muslim community. 
It was in 2006 that he returned to the music world under the name “Yusuf.” The following is an 
excerpt of the transcript from the show. 
Colbert: There’s a thing that, frankly, scares me about you. Because I get my news 
from Western news sources – the best news sources in the world – and I am taught 
that Muslims are dangerous, scary people. Okay? And I, I don’t find you dangerous 
or scary. And that scares me. Is this nice guy image the latest threat? Because you 
know, you know we’re frightened of Muslims in the West. 
Yusuf: You know one of the first things I learned as a Muslim, and so many people 
don’t even know this. But it’s so simple. The first thing you learn as a Muslim is to 
say ‘peace.’ In Arabic it’s ‘salaam.’ So every Muslim is going around the world 
actually, if you actually listen to what they’re saying, they’re saying ‘peace, peace, 
peace, peace.’ You know? And the problem is, there has been obviously a, a blip… 
Colbert: A blip? A little louder than a blip! 
Yusuf: In the understanding of that great message which the religion has. And you 
know, it’s unfortunate but I’m here to educate.  (Islam, 2009) 
 
 Ingrid Mattson is a slight woman. Each time I saw her speak, she wore a patterned hijab 
and long skirts with loose-fitting tops. I learned that she is a Christian-born Canadian who 
converted to Islam in the late 1980's after reading and being inspired by the Quran. In 1999, she 
earned a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. She 
continues to be a professor of Islamic Studies and prominent IRO spokesperson. Her speeches 
always began with a supplication in Arabic before beginning a measured talk in a level tone. 
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Unlike many of the featured IRO speakers, Mattson has a trademark style that is calm, deliberate, 
and academic. By the time I began fieldwork, her term as president of ISNA had ended, but she 
remained an active ISNA spokesperson. Mattson has the ability to draw large crowds, as do 
many of the featured IRO spokespeople. I spoke with Yasmeen, an IRO member and middle-
aged mother of three, about why she admired Mattson so much. “She's got such calming effect,” 
Yasmeen told me. “She can be talking about something very intense and still bring a level head 
to the topic. She's very neutral, objective. She's also clearly very intelligent. Have you heard her 
recite  in Arabic? It puts us to shame.”  
 Shaikh Hamza Yusuf, also a white convert to Islam, has a markedly different style than 
Mattson. His speeches have an unmistakable zeal. Yusuf combines wit, pop culture references, 
theology, radical politics, and humor, coming across as a charismatic and charming leader. His 
name before his conversion to Islam was Mark Hanson, and he, like Mattson, found Islam after 
reading the Quran. Yusuf credits a near-death experience with prompting him to read the Quran. 
Having studied Islam extensively in the Middle East, Yusuf, too, speaks impeccable fus’ha 
(classical) Arabic. One of Yusuf's trademarks is his ability to take a concept or word from the 
Quran or sunnah and break down the original Arabic into its triliteral roots in order to show its 
conceptual connection to a seemingly different word. Yusuf has chiseled features and a closely-
trimmed goatee. He usually wears a suit, paired with one of his many ornate hats from across the 
Muslim world. In my opinion, Yusuf seemed to be the leader among the handful of headlining 
IRO speakers, a celebrity among celebrities. Having Hamza Yusuf on a panel guaranteed the 
success of the event; he frequently sold out shows at smaller venues. Many people told me they 
drove or flew to conventions because Yusuf was on the list. Yusuf's commitment to Islam 
manifests in an interesting engagement with political topics ranging from the War on Terror to 
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pornography and ethical food consumption. Yusuf co-founded the first liberal arts Muslim 
college in the U.S., the Zaytuna Institute. He's been described as a theological pop star; the 
description is fitting. 
 Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah, whom I discuss in greater detail below, is a white convert and 
a scholar of Islamic studies. He converted to Islam in the 1970’s (citing inspiration by The 
Autobiography of Malcolm X), and earned his doctorate at the University of Chicago. He 
founded the Nawawwi Foundation in Chicago, tasked with scholarship and travel in order to 
build a vibrant Muslim American culture. He wrote a book entitled The Story of Alexander 
Russell Webb, a biography of one of the earliest known white American converts to Islam. Webb 
became Muslim in the 1800's and closely studied the Quran and Arabic. Oft-referenced in IRO 
speeches, I consider this publication part of the counternarrative construction, reformulating the 
imagination of who the American Muslim is.  
 Suhaib Webb, born William Webb in 1973 in Oklahoma, dresses in traditional Islamic 
(Arab-style or South Asian) attire as often as he wears suits and blazers paired with a Muslim 
skull cap. Webb sports a humble, trimmed beard. He converted to Islam at the age of 20, and he 
often recalls reflecting upon the majesty and mysteries of the skies (combined with a delinquent 
gang background) as leading him ultimately to Islam. While his Arabic fluency is not at the level 
of Hamza Yusuf, Webb is fluent and his pronunciation is strong. He has an especially large 
following among IRO members who are young adults, and though he was in the Middle East 
during much of my fieldwork, I noticed his speeches were referenced and praised by young 
audiences who purchased CD's or watched the speaker on YouTube. The ISNA website 
advertises Webb, saying he “strongly advocates for an articulation of an American Islam that is 
authentic and has leaders that are acutely aware of the issues facing Muslim Americans” (ISNA 
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website). Other white converts who commonly spoke at IRO events included Susan Douglass, 
Michael Wolfe, and many more.  
 John Esposito was another white IRO speaker who commanded a great following. 
Professor of International Affairs and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University, Esposito is 
often regarded as one of the foremost “Islamic studies” scholars in the country. His accessible, 
historical, and comprehensive books are required readings in “Introduction to Islam” courses 
across the country. Interestingly, Esposito is not a Muslim; he is a practicing Catholic. Yet, he is 
frequently featured in IRO event programming and, much like Hamza Yusuf, commands a 
serious following. Because Esposito's writings have defended the diverse traditions of global 
Muslims and debunked the assumptions of Islamophobes, he is a favorite among IRO members. 
Several times, I found Esposito (often a keynote speaker or a speaker on a plenary alongside 
Mattson and Yusuf) joking about his own tendentious relationship with Islam – a staunch ally of 
IRO's, yet himself a practicing Catholic. “Aww, Espo's so cute,” Linah joked with me once in the 
minutes before one of his speeches began. “I really hope he converts already.”  
 After my fieldwork, many people I spoke to about the abundance of white IRO leaders 
expressed surprise. However for IRO members, the presence of these white leaders was a given. 
I was constantly reassured that Islam's force was powerful enough to capture the heart of anyone 
who was truly listening with an open mind. White IRO leaders were accepted, by and large, as 
validating the cultural projects of these organizations, as evidence that Islam was compatible 
with a multi-racial American population.  
 
Whiteness, Leadership, and IRO Strategy 
The age of racial colorblindness brings with it the push to look beyond racial categories, 
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arguing that racism no longer carries the significance it once did. “The color-blind or race neutral 
perspective holds that in an environment where institutional racism and discrimination have been 
replaced by equal opportunity, one’s qualifications, not one’s color or ethnicity, should be the 
mechanism by which upward mobility is achieved” (Gallagher 2003: 3). Bonilla-Silva (2010), 
Gallagher (2003), and Baker (2001), among others, have offered strong critiques of 
colorblindness, arguing that it reinforces racism by privileging or normalizing whiteness. The 
faulty assumption that we live in a post-racial world prohibits people of color, especially black 
individuals, from referring to historic and ongoing instances of racial disadvantage. Part of the 
colorblind milieu is that whiteness becomes “unmarked” (Frankenburg 2008). In imagining 
America to be post-racial, white privilege is reinforced.  
That America has historically been imagined as ‘white’ serves as a backdrop to all U.S. 
racial projects. From the one-drop rule that served to protect the purity of America’s white race 
or the naturalization laws that explicitly linked citizenship to race, whiteness has often 
institutionally been cast as foundational to Americanness. Takaki has suggested that the U.S. 
master narrative ideologically frames the nation as normatively white and European-descended 
(1993), mirroring Gilroy's suggestion that Britain is also supposedly white and Christian (1991). 
Frankenburg points to dominant discourses which have “shaped the construction of 
Americanness in the narratives as similarly normative/empty, and as excluding of communities 
of color and so-called white ethnic groups” (1994: 64).  
My struggle was to situate a multi-racial, predominantly non-white Muslim population 
into this theoretical framing of post-racialism and colorblindness. Rana argues that anti-Muslim 
“racism and Islamophobia are central to the narrative of modern nations – and modernity itself – 
because they emerged in the contact between the old world and new world” (2011: 28). Yet, the 
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white convert complicates this assumption, as she is racially unmarked. McAlister's claim that 
Islamphobia acts both within and across vectors of race is a compelling claim, as the “race” of 
Muslims is at once homogenized and rendered invisible. Ong's treatment of Asian American 
populations as a constructed racial group is compelling (2003) for my work. In order to gain 
equal citizenship, Ong argues, Asian Americans must organize under a banner of shared 
oppression. The “the politics of compulsion” allow Ong's subjects to self-script an ethnic- or 
race-based identity to both attract political recognition and regulate those citizens who attempt to 
claim Asian Americanness. Ong uses this discussion to conclude that Asian Americans are caught 
up in whitening or becoming close to white in their quest for legitimacy. Lopez's work on race 
and naturalization explicitly documents the ways Arab and Asian immigrants sought 
classification as white, as opposed to black, in their quest for full citizenship (2006).  
Given this racial backdrop, the white convert occupies an interesting position. With a 
“new racism” (Bonilla-Silva 2003) shaping the social landscape and an abundance of racist 
Islamophobic rhetoric, the role of white Muslim leaders is worthy of examination. If racialized 
and immigrant bodies are imagined as burdened with culture and tradition, while the 
essentialized West is the champion of rational modernity, where in this formulation does a white 
convert with an assumed Islamic name (and often garb) fit? What does the white leader to do 
racist anti-Muslim attitudes? 
Mattson’s role as the President of ISNA commanded much attention from Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. As a woman, a convert, a non-immigrant, and a white woman, she was the 
“first” in many regards. Mattson herself writes that “in electing a woman for the first time to 
head their bi-national religious organization, many considered ISNA members to be making a 
powerful statement about gender equality in Islam” (Mattson, 2006: 10). It is noteworthy that in 
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the aforementioned inaugural article, she focuses largely on her identity as a woman; her racial 
identity is not mentioned at all – an epitome of unmarked whiteness. In fact, in another interview, 
Mattson goes so far as to say that her election is a “symbol for something bigger” (Mattson 
2008). Mattson says that the leadership of the Muslim community should reflect the community; 
Mattson might be the right person because she is a “native English speaker.” That native tongue 
is a crucial dimension of identity, while racial representation gets no mention, is noteworthy. It 
reflects the numerous ways whiteness becomes unmarked, race is muted, and identity politics are 
configured in ways that reflect processes of articulation. According to Mattson, “we should be 
having institutions and leadership that is homegrown and that is embedded and relevant to this 
society.”  
Mattson says that American Muslims have a particularly important role because “we have 
the freedom to talk about these issues. And the reality is that most Muslims in the world live in 
environments where they don’t have that freedom because their political rights are suppressed, 
their freedom of speech is very limited. They may not have access to the resources that we have.” 
She says that American Muslims should figure out “how we can be a bridge of understanding 
between the United States, our policies, and Muslims in other countries…Muslims in other parts 
of the world look at us as Americans as well as Muslims, so they want us to do something about 
American foreign policy that…negatively impacts them. Whether they understand the intricacies 
of that policy or not is another issue.17” Here, Mattson takes a somewhat rare, apologetic stance 
on U.S. foreign policy, and makes vague statements about the role of American Muslims as a 
“bridge,” never condemning U.S. foreign policy against the Muslim world.  
                                                 
17 While I do not think Mattson is a supporter of U.S. foreign policy, her statement about global 




Newsweek points out that the role of white Muslims is pivotal in a time when extremist 
Muslims (assumed, of course, to be people of color) are terrorizing the world. Pointing to her 
presidency, one article tells us that “Mattson is the first woman, the first nonimmigrant, and the 
first Muslim convert to be elected to head the largest Islamic group for social outreach and 
education in North America. Her election comes at a critical time in the history of Islam. As 
violent extremists threaten to obliterate the voice of moderate Islam worldwide, Muslims in 
Western countries, isolated by rising discrimination, struggle to find their place”  (Childress 
2007: 71). Mattson, the article tells us, “sees herself as uniquely positioned to change the way the 
world views Muslims—and how they view themselves.” Ingrid Mattson, then, plays the role of a 
white moderator, able to lead the country’s Muslims during a time when it is threatened by 
extremists.  
 Hamza Yusuf Hanson “teaches an Islam of moderation that is the true Islam” (Perlez 
2007: 4). Newsweek Magazine describes him as follows:  
Born Mark Hanson, the son of California intellectuals, Yusuf was baptized in the Greek 
Orthodox Church and raised on a '70s diet of surfing and spiritual eclecticism. At 18, 
having narrowly survived a car crash, he started reading intently about Islamic 
spirituality. Over the next 10 years, he studied classical Islamic law and theology in 
Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco. Today he is as comfortable speaking Arabic on Al-
Jazeera as he is expounding on American TV. His dazzling dexterity with Qur'anic 
knowledge and thinkers from Aristophanes to Mark Twain has made him a great 
popularizer of the faith (Power 2002). 
The article goes on to highlight Yusuf's appeal to Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike; he serves as a bridge between both groups. He carefully condemns the terrorist 
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attacks of September 11th, 2001, while also critiquing the Afghan war and U.S. foreign 
policy. He “wants Westerners to reform their relationship with the Islamic world, and 
Muslims to reform their own society.” Much like Mattson, he speaks to and on behalf of 
both America and the Muslim world, simultaneously shifting between and combining the 
affiliations. It is quite noteworthy that this Newsweek article never once refers to him as 
white, much like Mattson’s whiteness goes unmentioned. “When an ex-surfer from the 
Bay Area can become a Muslim authority, it's a sign that the West is now part of the 
Muslim world, too” (ibid).  This statement suggests that Yusuf’s conversion can be 
thought of as symbolic of the erasure or amelioration of larger sociopolitical processes, 
such as the War on Terror, the Afghan War, or other political issues configured as the 
traditional clash of civilizations. (I quickly learned about the controversy surrounding 
Yusuf: many felt he had “sold out” after 9/11 for visiting the White House to speak with 
Bush in an amicable meeting, earning him the nickname “Hamza Useless.” 9/11 brought 
about a marked shift in Yusuf's tone; while he was still deeply critical, there was a sense 
that he had 'softened' a bit, accommodating “America” in ways he previously had not.) 
 Yusuf’s speeches are a spectacle to behold. Seats are always filled to capacity, and the 
audience is emotional and enthusiastic to hear him. Consider the excerpt from his 2006 ICNA 
talk below: 
 
“This country cannot win a war with Islam, I swear to God! [thunderous applause] I 
swear to God! We are the people that need to explain this to the American people…The 
only reason militants have come to America is that militant Americans have gone to the 
Muslim world. [applause, cheers] If militant America had not gone to the Muslim world, 
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we would not have militant Muslims coming to America…I don’t want to see militant 
Islam, I want to see the Islam of peace, but there has to be mutual respect. The Palestinian 
people have to be respected! [applause] The Kashmiri people have to be respected! 
[applause] I’m not even speaking as a Muslim right now, I’m speaking as a human 
being…There are people asking why the Muslims are angry. If you’re not angry about the 
current social condition, you’re not alive! [applause]”   
 
Though clearly a more enraged and politicized excerpt than Mattson’s interview 
and Abd-Allah’s scholarship noted above, Yusuf still occupies a role very similar to the 
others'.“As a professor at the Zaytuna Institute,” Newsweek tells us, “his San Francisco 
Bay Area madrasa, he has stressed a classical Islam, one stripped of the cultural baggage 
and prejudices that have crept in over the centuries. He wants Westerners “to reform their 
relationship with the Islamic world, and Muslims to reform their own society” (2002).  
His “culture-less” Islam resonates strongly with the cultural dearth and aspirations 
articulated by Abd-Allah's Nawawi Foundation.  
White Muslim leaders seem to occupy remarkable social spaces, spaces finely 
imbricated with U.S. racial hierarchies. It seems, from the discussion above, that race is 
muted and whiteness unmarked, both in the leaders’ own dialogues and in external 
representations of their roles. Yusuf the “surfer” and Mattson the “native English 
speaker” are muted race-speak terms for their white identity. “Homegrown” comes to 
stand in for white. To address race directly rather than use such code words might be to 
acknowledge power dynamics, a hierarchy, and disjuncture among American Muslims. 
While these speakers are addressing the need for a cohesive, unified Muslim American 
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community, to acknowledge these sensitive cleavages might be catastrophic for their 
visions.  
I was alarmed to discover that white privilege and racial hierarchies were 
irrelevant among many IRO members' reception of these leaders. “I know that Hamza 
Yusuf is partially popular because he's white,” said Linah, whose critique of racial 
politics in the U.S. was usually quite nuanced, “but part of that is because we non-white 
Muslims could learn a thing or two about being a real Muslim from him. How many of us 
sacrifice our conventional professions to instead go study classical Islam in the Middle 
East? In a way, these white converts are better than us at our own game. It's not even our 
game anymore.” “Islam is colorblind,” Sumaiya told me. “That's why I'm not concerned 
about race among these Muslim leaders. The Prophet envisioned a colorblind community 
where race didn't matter anymore. When I see an African American man like Zaid Shakir 
alongside a white man like Hamza Yusuf, and they are all working on the same issue – 
how to be a better Muslim, how to build a better America – it no longer matters to me 
what color their skin is.” An appeal to a colorblind Islam envisioned by Prophet 
Muhammad repeatedly surfaced in the field. This appeal to religion as colorblind 
imagines the ummah as truly post-racial. As a result, the speakers above can claim a 
Muslim identity by way of conversion, and along with it claim the sociopolitical realities 
of global Muslims that may or may not be experienced by white American Muslims.  
Hassan points out that John Walker Lindh, a white convert to Islam, and Yasser 
Hamdi, were both detained as footsoldiers to the Taliban (2002). Yet their disparate 
treatment, Hassan postulates, was likely due to race. Aidi points at the black and Puerto 
Rican Muslims in the U.S. who were found to have links to ‘terror plots’ (Aidi 2002). 
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Thus, while white Muslim leaders are celebrated and politically neutralized in popular 
media, dark-skinned Muslims are criminalized and serve as fodder for Islamophobia. 
While I attend to racial hierarchies in another chapter in greater depth, it is important to 
note that IRO members unproblematically accepted white IRO leaders and were 
generally enthusiastic about the “culture-less” Islam they proposed. Yet in other 
instances, the need to eradicate anti-black racism and ethnocentrism among Muslims was 
emphasized.  
Though Islam's prophetic vision may be a pristine, egalitarian one, a racially 
unequal reality forms the backdrop for U.S. Islam. A BusinessWeek article reinforces this 
separation, pointing out that “college-educated white converts whose interest in New Age 
concepts leads them to the spiritual Sufi branch of Islam do not resemble poor black 
prison inmates who embrace Muslim beliefs behind bars as a source of discipline and 
solace” (They're Muslims, and Yankees Too, 2007). The racial implication here is clear; 
white Muslims embrace Islam out of spirituality and reflection, while black Muslims seek 
a source of much-needed discipline.   
Such racialized representations build a divisive binary among Muslims. While white 
Muslims are seen as potential moderators between the danger of radical (assumed to be non-
white) Islam, the historical significance and transformative potential of black Islam in the U.S. is 
at once demonized and erased. The numerous Arab and South Asian American Muslims that are 
lauded in popular representations as ‘good’ Muslims (discussed in a different chapter), then, 
embody a version of Islam that is closer to a white and whitened Islam, an Islam compatible with 
Western power structures (unlike the revolutionary black Islam which opposed them). This, of 
course, is not to say that the work to be done by white American Muslims is apolitical. For 
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instance, Hamza Yusuf’s vocal anger about the injustice done to Palestinians is an example of the 
transformative potential enabled by leveraging of white privilege. However, in this chapter I 
have focused on the ways that whiteness is invisibilized, yet remains at work, in the fracturing of 
Muslim communities into “good” and “bad.”  
It seems apparent that white Muslim leaders are critical voices in separating out the good 
Muslims from the bad ones, in prescribing a positive, tolerable version of Islamic practice for 
American Muslims to practice in the U.S. and around the world. That white Muslims can serve 
as bridges between “us” and “them” tells us something important about racialized and 
xenophobic attitudes toward “them.” While we are quick to clamor and shout about the injustices 
done to Muslims by the West, there are important processes unfolding at the very border between 
the “West” and “Islam” (incommensurable units to begin with!) which must be examined.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has engaged with some of the most difficult components of my fieldwork, 
dealing explicitly with troubling notions of “America,” race, and culture. While talking to people 
in the field whom I often found to have profound critiques of U.S. empire, racism, and 
militarism, I discovered a simultaneous eagerness to support a project of cultural citizenship that 
relied on essentialized notions of Americanness and that reinforced the notion of America as 
white. However, what I perceived as an inconsistency is constitutive of the politics of 
Islamophilia my dissertation unearths. There is no uniform, linear orientation to IRO politics or 
strategies. At once oppositional and assimilative, they reflect an interesting ambiguity.  
 The section on white leaders proved especially difficult to write, as there is a tangible 
sense of admiration and esteem associated with this representatives among IRO members of 
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color. If race is a factor, and colorblindness is indeed as dangerous as race scholars have 
concluded, then these white leaders are hardly representatives at all, as normative whiteness and 
racial privilege set them apart. Much the way whiteness is neutralized, the white-led calls for 
Muslim Americans to abandon burdensome homeland culture also neutralizes what underlies 
assumptions about U.S. culture. It is abundantly clear that Bakalian and Bozorgmehr are correct 
in their assertion that Muslim advocacy groups embrace an integrationist approach (2009). Yet 
my work illustrates the ways this approach does work around notions of race and culture. The 
project of cultural citizenship is deeply politicized, as Prashad claims all cultural projects are 
(2000).  
 In this chapter, I have dealt with the “story” of Islam in America that is produced through 
the representational choices of IRO’s. Perhaps a counternarrative challenging racial nativism, or 
perhaps an integrationist attempt at getting Muslims a seat at the table, these narratives are 
nonetheless powerful. Narratives are concerned with ordering the world in particular ways, ways 
which are expected to be transformative. This storytelling “process illustrates how segments of a 
hegemonic worldview maybe adopted, even as they are subverted, reinterpreted, and recombined 
in unorthodox ways” (Malkki 1995:103). This chapter looks at this narrativizing process 
epistemologically: how are they being produced? What are the sociocultural contexts of this 
production? “Narratives,” writes Trouillot, “are necessarily emplotted in a way that life is not” 
(2012: 6). Here, I am asking both what the age-old nativist narrative has done by excluding 
Muslims, casting them as citizen outsiders, and how this new counternarrative emerging from an 






CHAPTER 4: “WE HAVE A DREAM”: Islamophilia and Representational Practices 
 Within a week of the attacks of September 11th, 2001, George W. Bush delivered a speech 
at a Washington mosque proclaiming the value of American Muslims in the US socioeconomic 
landscape. “America counts millions of Muslims among our citizens, and Muslims make an 
incredibly valuable contribution to our country,” he said. “Muslims are doctors, lawyers, 
shopkeepers, moms and dads, and they need to be treated with respect.” Bush’s response was 
clearly directed at the undeniable wave of Islamophobia that was ushered in almost immediately 
after the events of 9/11/2001. This speech came shortly after his infamous proclamation after the 
attacks that the world would decide whether it was with “us” or with the terrorists, establishing 
an ideological binary that would inform the political and discursive possibilities for the post-9/11 
world. It is remarkable that Bush himself, considered by many Muslims to be chief architect for 
contemporary institutional Islamophobia, publicly proclaimed sympathy for the American 
Muslims who deserved respect and inclusion. John Ashcroft declared on September 13th, 2001, 
that “any threats of violence or discrimination against Arab or Muslim Americans or Americans 
of South Asian descent are not just wrong and un-American, but also are unlawful and will be 
treated as such” (John Ashcroft, U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum 01/468, September 
13, 2001.) On September 17th, 2001, President Bush proclaimed that “Muslims love America as 
much as I do.” Several years later, Barack Obama’s “New Beginning” speech in Cairo spoke 
would continue in a similar tone the official conversation on the potential for inclusion and 
acceptance of global Muslims, even while Obama ostensibly intensified U.S. military presence in 
Muslim-majority countries.  
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 Indeed, it would be difficult to overlook the abundance of cultural and political 
messaging that has offered the public a positive view of Muslims. In the U.S., this messaging has 
suggested that Muslims are quintessentially American, deserving of sympathy, and part of a 
multicultural U.S. In a 2007 cover story entitled “American Dreamers,” Newsweek offered a 
snapshot of U.S. Muslims. Their lives embody a bold blend of Islamic tradition and assimilation 
to life in the U.S. The article presents us with Ferdous Sajedeen, the owner of a lucrative 
pharmacy business in New York, the successful cardiologist Maher Hathout, and the 
entrepreneur Fareed Siddiq. These success stories show us Muslims who are hard workers and 
potential consumers, active contributors to US capitalism.  
 In this chapter, I consider the abundance of seemingly positive representations of U.S. 
Muslims that, I argue, are inseparable from the undeniable presence of Islamophobia. These 
sympathetic representations of American Muslims since 9/11 offer a glimpse into a classificatory 
process, one that demarcates the boundary between “us” and “them.” I focus on the interplay 
between Islamophobia and Islamophilia that has dominated the representational politics of 
IRO’s. By Islamophilia, I refer to the construction of a “good Muslim” archetype – one that 
characterizes Muslims as peace-loving, patriotic, and fiercely opposed to terrorism. Rather than 
seeing Islamophilia as the opposite of Islamophobia, I consider the unique ways in which the 
good Muslim construct is part of an Islamophobic milieu. As Shryock writes, “phobic” and 
“philic” lenses are shaping Muslim American religious sensibilities (2010). The “generalized 
affection for Islam and Muslims” (9) described by Shryock is less about a pro-Muslim, inclusive, 
or multiracial structural reordering. Rather, as Bayoumi describes, it is about converting a 
treacherous, hostile, or foreign Islam into a benign and palatable Western force (Bayoumi 2010).  
 “By accepting collective responsibility for terrorism on behalf of Muslims in general and 
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Muslim Americans in particular, Muslim American leaders-turned-spokespeople affirm their 
positive identification with the US as good, flag-waving citizens, identifying Islam in terms of 
normative definitions of a good religion and claiming a space in the cultural mainstream through 
the disavowal and identification of bad Muslims and bad Islam,” says Grewal in Islam is a 
Foreign Country (2013:302). It is this process that I explore here; I ask what the contours are of a 
‘good’ Islam or ‘good’ Muslims. Who is the incommensurable ‘bad’ Muslim, and what markers 
of legitimacy are necessary for good Muslim status? After considering representational 
Islamophilia, I discuss Islamophilia as a form of neoliberal multiculturalism, one which 
“rhetorically privileges Arab Americans in order to discriminate against – and to obscure 
discrimination of – Arabs, Muslims, or South Asians in the United States who cannot or do not 
claim to be American in a nationalist or idealist sense” (Melamed 2006: 8). In other words, 
Islamophilia uses a defense of certain Muslims that ends up reinforcing Islamophobia against 
other Muslims (and non-Muslims). I then discuss the sociopolitical costs of using Islamophilic 
strategy to combat Islamophobia.  
 
Islamophilia  
 Many of my conversations in the field revolved around memories of 9/11 and the 
immediate aftermath. While a few people were able to recount horrific incidents of Islamophobia 
– ranging from their children’s Islamic schools receiving bomb threats, their mosques being 
vandalized, or hearing racial slurs in shopping malls – many recollections included gestures of 
support, such as mosques receiving flowers from church groups. One Somali-American woman 
who wears a hijab told me that white women in particular would approach her (at the grocery 
store or at the public library, for instance) and offer words of support. Another Pakistani-
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American IT professional told me that he received emails from several co-workers expressing 
solidarity in the aftermath of the attacks, that people told him to be safe, to disregard the terrible 
anti-Muslim things that were being said. Sympathy for America’s Muslims was evident in efforts 
such as “Hijab Solidarity Day,” an internationally-observed day on which non-Muslim women 
may also cover their hair to demonstrate an alliance with Muslim women. I attended a workshop 
in Queens shortly after beginning fieldwork at which a Jewish woman from New York spoke of 
the support group she formed where Muslim women could come and spend time with other 
Jewish women in an inclusive and supportive space. That these acts of solidarity and compassion 
were central in people’s memories is striking. We must begin to contemplate, given the 
overwhelming attention to Islamophobia and anti-Muslim violence, what it means that these 
sympathetic gestures have accompanied the rise of Islamophobia. It is important to understand 
that Islamophilia operates on many levels: it at once acts upon Muslim communities (as the 
example of the political speeches or the Jewish-Muslim support group) and from within them (as 
in, for example, when one IRO member told me she chose to go to business school because the 
world needed to see more successful Muslim women entrepreneurs). There are forces 
constructing the good Muslim category simultaneously from sympathetic, liberal non-Muslims 
and from Muslim individuals and advocacy groups.  
 
Islamophilia: Class and Legitimacy 
 It was my fascination with representations of “good Muslims” that had led me to my 
dissertation topic several years before. For quite some time, I had observed a remarkable number 
of popular media pieces that used class- and race-coded language to depict Muslims as achievers 
of the American Dream. Class, for instance, was an unmarked vector of legitimacy for the 
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hypervisible good Muslim. An entire BusinessWeek piece entitled “They’re Muslims and 
Yankees, Too” provides numerous examples of upwardly mobile, successful American Muslims. 
The “Yankees” featured in the article are influential lawyers, bankers, and publishing executives, 
all success stories in a meritocratic social landscape. In the “American Dreamers” piece in 
Newsweek, the comparison is made explicit: these American Muslims stand in contrast to the 
unassimilated or ghettoized European Muslims. The implication that America’s Muslims are 
faring better than Europe’s is an undeniable component of Islamophilia.  
Thus, American Muslims are less violent and less extremist than their European 
counterparts because of the success story offered by the American Dream. American Muslims, 
the media story goes, are able to assimilate, educate themselves, and secure professional 
employment, thus escaping the violent and poverty-stricken life that European Muslims have 
fallen into. The implication, of course, is that class is a key vector in predicting terror, violence, 
or extremism. Indeed, the fear of a lurking Muslim underclass highlights the central role of 
socioeconomic class in the process of legitimacy. Says Hisham Aidi, “…terrorism experts and 
columnists have been warning of the ‘Islamic threat’ in the American underclass, and alerting the 
public that the ghetto and the prison system could very well supply a fifth column to Osama bin 
Laden and his ilk” (2002: 36). Aidi writes of the sensationalized fear of an Islamic threat brewing 
in US ghettoes, focusing on the fear of Latino and black converts to Islam, the popularity of 
Islam among incarcerated populations, and Islamic influence on political hip-hop. This “urban” 
or “ghetto” Islam, says Aidi, makes for a general paranoia about an Islam that may destabilize 
America from below. It is in contrast to this fear that the “good Muslim” trope emphasizes an 
upwardly-mobile professional class of Muslim Americans.   
Part of U.S. Islamophilia, I argue, is the claim that Muslims constitute a fertile niche 
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market, that U.S. Muslims have wealth and purchasing power. This claim is evident in discourse 
produced by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The increased attention to the profitability of 
making products “Muslim-friendly” is one such example. The Economist points out, in an 
August 2007 piece entitled “Marketing to Muslims,” that the education and income level of 
American Muslims make them a worthwhile niche market. The article points to the profitability 
of selling halal Chicken McNuggets at a London McDonald’s. “The firm is treading carefully: 
the new offerings are not advertised beyond the walls of the restaurant. Yet demand is strong, 
sales are increasing, and McDonald’s is thinking about extending the experiment.” Forbes 
pointed out that Nestlé’s compliance with halal food requirements has paid off in billions for the 
corporation. “Nestlé has become the biggest food manufacturer in the halal sector, with more 
than $3 billion in annual sales in Islamic countries and with 75 of its 481 factories worldwide 
producing halal food.” Halal food is not the only profitable venture for corporations; U.S. News 
& World Report pointed out in 2007 that American businesspeople will soon be floating Islamic 
bonds to investors. In the same year, Forbes pointed out that financial institutions such as UBS, 
Deutsche Bank, and Morgan Stanley were “rushing sharia-compliant financial products to 
market.” 
In 2007, the Pew Research Center issued a report that active IRO members seemed to 
know inside and out. The report, entitled Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly 
Mainstream, opens with the statement, “A comprehensive nationwide survey of Muslim 
Americans finds them to be largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate with 
respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and Westerners around the 
world…Overwhelmingly, they believe hard work pays off in this society. This belief is reflected 
in Muslim American income and education levels, which generally mirror those of the general 
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public.” IRO members by and large hailed the Pew Report (a self-proclaimed non-partisan “fact” 
report) as a milestone study that would benefit Muslims.  
At an event in Washington, D.C., Mubarak spoke to a room of several hundred attendees. 
“Of all global Muslims,” he said, “we are in the best position to speak out. In terms of wealth, in 
terms of freedom. Especially political freedom. Let us not forget that Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala 
has bestowed us with a great ni’mah (blessing). It would be a pity to squander this blessing and 
not speak up.” In this speech, Mubarak urges American Muslims to leverage their privilege to 
make a change in the world. He uses a particular type of privilege – political freedoms and 
wealth – that he names as uniquely American, to paint a picture of an ideal Muslim type, 
summoning Grewal’s notion of the “exceptional” Muslim American ummah (2013). The idea 
that Muslims both had already made it as economic success stories and yet had enormous future 
potential for upward mobility are a critical part of the story of internalized Islamophilia. “Think 
about it,” Hasan told me as his wife attended to their toddler. “We talk about Islamophobia, but 
the Jews had it really, really bad in this country when they arrived as immigrants. I mean, 
probably much worse than Muslims have it. That might not be a popular thing to say at ISNA, 
but I've read the history. I know anti-Semitism was real. But now, look at America. Are Jews a 
disenfranchised minority group? No. They are high-up in Hollywood, in academia, in finance. 
How did they do that? They stuck together, and they made climbing up the ladder a priority. 
Who's to say Muslims can't do the same thing?” Grewal writes of the AlMaghrib institute, a 
revivalist group in the U.S. founded in the years following 9/11 (2013). Part of the Salafi 
movement, AlMaghrib is committed to a “traditionalist” pedagogical method. The organization’s 
founders have named Orthodox Jews as embodying a model for U.S. Muslims. AlMaghrib 
commends Hasidic Americans as embodying “commensurable American difference” (332) – 
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adhering to an orthodox faith, yet squarely “American.” AlMaghrib’s orientation is decidedly 
more rigid in its theological orientation than the IRO events I attended, but the unique 
relationship to Jewish Americans is remarkable among both.  
“You find Muslims complaining about how powerless we are to deal with the issue of 
Palestine in this country,” Hasan continued. (For more on IRO members’ relationship to pro-
Palestine activism, see Chapter 5.) “But why are we powerless? It’s because there’s such a 
powerful Israeli and Jewish lobby in Washington. Those are the people who shape policy. And 
how do the lobbies get all this power? Wealth, money. Well Muslims have money, too. I know a 
Syrian physician. He’s a remarkable man. His labs are very successful. You must know him; he’s 
very active in the community. Were you at the health fair? He had a bunch of his doctors doing 
free health screenings, blood pressure and cholesterol, et cetera. But see, with all his 
philanthropy and all his donations to mosques, why isn’t he forming some kind of coalition with 
other wealthy Muslims about Palestine? He cares about the issue, but not enough to influence 
policy. Why is that? We have the power here to use our wealth to bring about the change we 
desire. If Jewish Americans could defeat anti-Semitism, then Muslim Americans can defeat 
Islamophobia.” Haris Tarin, a key IRO spokesperson, spoke in a similar vein at an event in 
Queens in 2011. “All I could hear about from Muslims a couple years ago was the attack on 
Gaza. You know, Muslims were outraged, and rightfully so; they should have been. But I had a 
meeting with some elected officials, Congresspeople. And you know what I found? They got 
over 1500 calls that were pro-Israeli. Very, very few people called in from a pro-Palestinian 
perspective.” It was remarkable how often Jewish Americans were invoked as the minority group 
to emulate.  
I observed IRO members engaging with the class-specific element of the “good” Muslim 
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trope in interesting ways. They repeated with pride statistics that revealed US Muslims to have 
higher per-capita income and higher levels of education than the population at large. This was 
presented in defense of Muslim communities; their class status and educational attainment were 
credentials in their quest for legitimacy. Yet, at the same time, IRO leaders and members took 
pride in the fact that Islam could bring “structure” and “discipline” to the lives of poor or 
incarcerated Americans of color. The Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN) is a well-
regarded IRO that works around issues of social justice in urban communities. Responding 
largely to issues of inner-city poverty and urban blight, IMAN is a group of Muslim organizers 
and volunteers who strive to “foster a dynamic and vibrant space for Muslims in Urban America 
by inspiring the larger community toward critical civic engagement exemplifying prophetic 
compassion in the work for social justice and human dignity” (IMAN website). Every summer, 
IMAN sponsors a huge concert called “Takin' It to the Streets,” in which major hip-hop artists 
(i.e. Talib Kweli, Mos Def/Yasin Bey, or Lupe Fiasco) perform in free concerts in inner-city 
Chicago. Interestingly, ISNA members – many of them finance professionals, bankers, 
physicians, and lawyers who live in gentrified neighborhoods of Chicago or suburbia – eagerly 
attend Takin' It to the Streets, arguing that Islam can have a positive influence on the lives of 
urban people of color. One attendee told me, “This is the best way to show America what Islam 
has to offer. For ages, policymakers have been trying to solve the problems of the inner cities: 
drugs, gangs. But no one will do it the way Muslims do.”  
The engagement of IRO members with Takin' it To The Streets revealed a tension around 
politics of race and class. It seemed, at times, that IRO members, who were enthusiastic about 
IMAN's work, wanted less to engage with inner-city residents to bring about an alliance that 
would transform a deeply stratified society and more that they were engaged in a project of 
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salvation, by which Islam could uplift the socioeconomic troubles of the inner-city. While event 
organizers revealed a deep understanding of structural racism and stratification, many Takin’ It to 
the Streets attendees celebrated the ways in which exposure to Islamic principles would be able 
to save those in the throes or urban poverty. Many of these IRO members were second-
generation immigrants, Arabs and South Asians, whose parents had entered the U.S. as a result of 
1965 immigration legislation that favored immigration by a particular, technical and highly 
educated Asian workforce. Socioeconomically, they have little in common with an urban 
underclass – which includes Muslims and non-Muslims – they identify as the beneficiary of 
IMAN's work.  
This work points once again to the impossibility of speaking of a Muslim ummah or 
community; rather, the demographic “Muslim American” may conceal more than it reveals. 
Take, for instance, Hammad, a 27 year-old Pakistani American man in New York City, where he 
moved in 2001 after graduating from an Ivy League university. He lives in midtown Manhattan 
and works long hours at a hedge fund. Hammad is a member of an organization called Muslim 
Urban Professionals, composed of Muslim Americans employed mainly in finance or law. 
Hammad identifies very strongly as a Muslim, observing his daily prayers even when he is at 
work. Is Hammad the Muslim we think of when we imagine the oppression faced by American 
Muslims? Try to insert an individual like Hammad into the Jihad vs. McWorld framework 
Benjamin Barber proposes (1995). According to Barber, the “narrowly conceived” faith of Islam 
stands in stark contrast to the homogenizing force of capital. Barber’s framework gained 
prominence over the past 20 years, contributing to the popular sense that Islam (“jihad,” for 
Barber) is tribalistic and opposed to the globalizing universality of capitalism. Yet for Hammad, 
a self-proclaimed “firm believer in capitalism,” there is no conflict between his identity as a 
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global (and pious) Muslim and a hedge fund employee. Indeed, in our conversation he mentioned 
that success in finance capital might be one way that Muslims can integrate themselves into 
American society. American Muslims are considered “good” Muslims, worthy of incorporation 
in the social fabric of the nation, based upon their compatibility with capitalism. In this sense, it 
is a type of corporate multiculturalism that is invoked in these efforts to positively represent U.S. 
Muslims. 
Speaking critically of this brand of multiculturalism, the Chicago Cultural Studies group 
points out that “Multiculturalism may … prove to be a poor slogan. Those who use it … seem to 
think that it intrinsically challenges established cultural norms. But multiculturalism is proving to 
be fluid enough to describe very different styles of cultural relations, and corporate 
multiculturalism is proving that the concept need not have any critical content” (1992).  What 
corporate multiculturalism offers, then, is a depoliticized picture of diversity. “Instead of 
emphasizing moral and legal imperatives, the proponents of diversity argue that the management 
of diversity is an important business issue affecting white America and its corporations in their 
struggle to gain and maintain competitive advantage in a changing domestic and global 
marketplace” (Baker: 140). Diversity and multiculturalism become profitable ventures, in which 
structural and material inequalities are ignored, overlooked, or deemed irrelevant. The historical 
and ongoing creation of inequality and the very role of capital in this process are ultimately 
ignored by corporate multiculturalism. As Angela Davis says, “a multiculturalism that does not 
acknowledge the political character of culture will not, I am sure, lead toward the dismantling of 
racist, sexist, homophobic, and economically exploitative institutions” (1996: 47).  
That IRO’s are at once the spokespeople for a fabricated “Muslim community” and 
comprised of a socioeconomically elite subset of the U.S. Muslim population produces peculiar 
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results. The pro-Muslim, anti-Islamophobia messaging from these organizations reflects the 
privilege and upward mobility of a select group, yet simultaneously claims to represent a 
quintessential Muslim American aspiration. At IRO events, I very rarely heard the issues of 
undocumented immigration, poverty, labor exploitation in the service sector, or increased use of 
police force in communities of color. Yet I frequently attended panels on workplace diversity, 
electoral politics, and representation in media. Certainly, the former set of concerns are critical 
for U.S. Muslims, given the burgeoning working-class and undocumented Muslim population 
and the concentration of Islam among inner-city communities of color (Aidi). Islamophilia, I 
argue, eschews (or at best, marginalizes) these concerns in favor of these representational 
strategies of inclusion and legitimacy.  
The irony of class serving as a marker of good Muslim status in the age of Islamophobia 
becomes apparent after a historical analysis of the roots of terror. Osama bin Laden is the 
emblem of terror and anti-Americanism, yet himself hails from a background of both 
considerable wealth and political legitimacy. In fact, one of the biggest inaccuracies in public 
discourse about terror is that Islamism is anti-modern and a product of poverty. On the contrary, 
the work of Deepa Kumar (2012), John Esposito (2003), and Reza Aslan (2010) shows the ways 
in which political Islam is a quintessentially modern condition – the exceptional by-product of a 
complex configuration of Cold War politics, the oil industry, and post-colonialism. In Kumar’s 
work, we see how Islamism is the product of a failure of secular nationalism, a destabilized Left, 
and crises of capitalism (2013).  
The major figures in the story of Islamism have not been sheltered, uneducated, 
impoverished Third Worlders, nor have they been the parochial tribalists described by Benjamin 
Barber. Quite the contrary: individuals with engineering degrees from western institutions and 
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urban middle class backgrounds populate the field of notorious “bad” Muslims. The “typical” 
Islamist has an engineering degree, strong Western educational credentials, and a solid middle 
class background (Kumar 2012; Achcar 2002). For example, Ayman al Zawahiri was a skilled 
surgeon who, disillusioned by the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, joined Islamic Jihad (Esposito 2003). 
Sayyid Qutb called for holy war against the West after a visit to the United States demonstrated 
American racism and sexual immorality. Most notoriously, Anwar al-Awlaki was the son of a 
Fulbright Scholar and was educated in Colorado and San Diego before his return to Yemen and 
subsequent turn to political Islam (Scahill 2013). Deepa Kumar documents the history of 
Western finance capital and support for Islamist movements, highlighting support by prominent 
financial institutions and banks for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (2012). 
Given this genealogy, it is significant that IRO members regard high educational status as 
an indicator of good Muslim status. This speaks to a larger process of the social imaginary about 
terror, Americanism, and minority status. IRO members understand the consequence of claiming 
high levels of education or wealth as a form of social capital. The same claim is deployed in 
defense of Asian Americans as a so-called “model minority,” a trope that paints Asian 
immigrants in this country as uniquely upwardly mobile, highly educated, and unaffected by the 
racism, criminalization, and ghettoization that other groups of color face. The model minority 
stereotype has been used both to flatten and homogenize the radical socioeconomic diversity that 
actually exists among Asian American populations and to castigate black and Latino Americans 
in comparison to the “success” experienced by Asian Americans. It is used to prove the 
meritocratic potential of the American Dream. What the model minority trope ignores, however, 
is the geopolitical history of the Asian American professional class. Post-1965 immigration 
policy favored technically skilled workers from places like India and China as part of the 
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competition between the US and the Soviet Union. This professional class of immigrants – many 
of them Muslim – came to study and work in the US, some intending to return to their home 
countries after acquiring a U.S. education. This history is erased through the seemingly positive 
model minority trope, one that individualizes the successes and failures of groups of color rather 
than situating them in their larger historical contexts. Certainly, for Muslim populations in the 
U.S., there is a segment – doctors, engineers, and finance professionals – who comply with the 
demographics of the model minority stereotype. At the same time, we see the decades after doors 
were open to highly-educated professional Muslim class leading to a bifurcated Muslim 
population through chain migration and undocumented immigration. Taking Islamophilia as a 
close parallel to the model minority stereotype, we can see the “good Muslim” trope 
invisibilizing the bifurcation of the US Muslim population. Indeed, the use of the term “Muslim” 
again loses any analytic coherence; speaking of a ‘well educated’ population of Muslim 
Americans with ‘above-average per capita incomes’ has distinct ramifications for inner city 
Muslim converts, many black and Latino, who are not represented by this success story.  
The eagerness to lay claim to model minority status betrays an understanding among IRO 
members that the model minority myth carries neoliberal aspirational undertones that applaud 
those who succeeded at the American Dream. Certainly, claiming this type of privilege reflects a 
larger politics of alignment among Asian immigrants, a process that is played out in the context 
of overaching racial dynamics (Prashad 2000). When it comes to representing Muslim 
Americans, the politics of naming (Naber) become especially critical. IRO’s are caught in the 
tricky act of representing a group that does not have socioeconomic, racial, or geographical 
unity. For believing Muslims, the concept of the “ummah” – a community of people who believe 
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in the Quran and the sunnah18 - is expected to be free of divisions along lines of race and class. 
Yet when transposed to the racial context of the U.S., invoking the concept of “ummah” takes on 
many of the features of colorblindness or racialism that preclude earnest engagement with 
stratification.  
 
Islamophilia and Production of the Moderate Muslim 
 At a regional IRO event in Dearborn, Michigan, Sumaiya spoke to me at length about the 
recent abundance of “positive” media representations of US Muslims. She referenced MOOZ-
lum, the 2010 film starring Danny Glover about an African American Muslim man’s experience 
of 9/11. We also discussed All-American Muslim, a reality show on TLC that featured a number 
of Muslim families (interestingly, also living in Dearborn). “Wasn’t that show terrible?” Sumaiya 
laughed, her eyes sparkling. Sumaiya was one of my closest contacts among IRO members. She 
and I were seated in the lobby area of a large mosque where the ISNA event was being held. She 
frequently made me laugh; when she started poking fun at these Muslim American cultural 
pieces it was no exception. “See, here’s the problem. These works are not concerned with telling 
a story…it seems they’re more concerned with telling the story. The story of being Muslim in 
America. Well, there is no such thing! That story doesn’t exist! So why are they trying to do this? 
It’s all part of these, I guess what you’re studying, “Good Muslim” politics. Muslim cultural 
production is so focused on portraying Muslims as good, instead of producing good works of 
literature or film.” 
 The controversy that surrounded All-American Muslim was revelatory of the logic of 
                                                 




Islamphobia. The show ran for one season on TLC, following a handful of Arab-American 
families in Michigan and exposing the day-to-day lives of moderate Muslims. David Caton, the 
born-again Christian founder of the Florida Family Association, began reaching out to sponsors 
and encouraging them to withdraw support for the program. The home-improvement store 
Lowe’s (along with a handful of other sponsors) notoriously pulled their sponsorship for the 
show, leading to a boycott of Lowe’s and accusations of Islamophobia. With Russell Simmons, 
Kal Penn, and Mia Farrow all speaking out on the issue, All-American Muslim gained more 
publicity through the surrounding controversy than for the dynamics of the show itself, which 
was canceled after one season due to low ratings. Upon its cancelation, cast member Suehaila 
Amen remarked that the show had paved the way for representation of moderate Muslims in the 
mainstream media (Stelter 2012). “The reason the Islamophobes didn’t like the show was 
because it showed Muslims as moderate. Actually, if you watch the show, you see a diversity of 
Muslims,” Linah told me at a convention in Washington, D.C. “The whole line of the 
Islamophobia industry is that there is no moderate Muslim, that we are all given to extremism. 
And what bugged them about this show is that it painted a very different picture. It’s important to 
know that it’s not the representation of Muslims that bothered the Islamophobies, it’s the 
portrayal of moderate Muslims.” IRO spokesperson Wajahat Ali wrote in an op-ed about the 
controversy surrounding the show. “Pamela Geller, founder of the shrill Atlas Shrugs blog and 
co-founder with blogger Robert Spencer of Stop Islamization of America, is convinced that the 
show ‘is an attempt to manipulate Americans into ignoring the threat of jihad.’” Ali points to the 
ways in which the show disturbed Islamophobes in its attempt to normalize something, Islam, 
that is akin to Nazism. In other words, what bothered the Islamophobes about the show was the 
façade that Muslims could be moderate. “If Geller, Spencer, and Horowitz were producing their 
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version of American Muslim reality,” Ali writes, “the episodes would focus on the families’ 
radical stealth jihad plots. Through eight episodes, they would attempt to turn McDonald’s 
golden arches into minarets, transform California into Caliph-ornia, place a burqa over the Statue 
of Liberty, creep sharia into the Denny’s breakfast menu and spike the elementary school eggnog 
with sumac and lentils.”  
 IRO members expressed have mixed feelings about Islamophilic cultural production and 
the “moderate” Muslim trope. The Kite Runner, for instance, served as a point of contention in its 
transformative potential. The acclaimed novel is the story of a man who leaves Afghanistan to 
live in the United States, fleeing an exceptionally racist and fundamentalist environment for the 
security and success offered in the West. He shudders to think of the atrocities committed by the 
Taliban and stands apart from the brutality, sexism, and racism of a radical Islamic regime, using 
his moderate Islamic affiliations to tell a story that is palatable to its supposedly Western 
audience. Some IRO members adored the novel, suggesting that stories like this would help 
Americans understand that Muslims are not all aligned with extremism and fundamentalism. Yet 
others felt that the protagonist made orthodox Muslims look bad; his “moderate” version of 
Islam, indicated by his consumption of alcohol, equated pious Muslims with political violence.  
 The moderate Muslim occupies a unique niche in Islamophilic representational politics. 
Grewal writes that American journalists “have offered various kinds of good Muslim citizens as 
solutions to Islam’s crises: Sufi intellectuals, feminists, blacks, and even ultraconservative (but 
pacifist) ‘fundamentalists.’ These diverse American Muslim spokespeople have initiated 
energetic programs to found Islamic pedagogical institutions in the US, promoting an emergent 
Muslim American moral geography with the US at its core…” (2013: 305). Extremism, 
orthodoxy, and violence are equated in the logics of both Islamophobia and Islamophilia. The 
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“moderate” Muslim embodies the palatable type of Muslim who is incorporated into a 
multicultural United States as evidence of its pluralism.  
The 2007 attempt in Los Angeles to map Muslim communities, for instance, was 
officially represented as an issue of moderate versus extreme Islam. The Los Angeles Times 
provided coverage of the mapping plan to better deal with local terror threats. Comparing them 
to their European counterparts, the article revealed American Muslims’ relative religious 
moderation. “American Muslims differ from their European co-religionists in several other 
respects. A Pew survey of 1,050 adult American Muslims nationwide found them to be "largely 
assimilated, happy with their lives and moderate." Although two-thirds are immigrants, most 
respondents said Muslims should integrate into U.S. society rather than isolate themselves. 
California resident Mohammed Abdul Aleem, quoted in the article, opposes the LAPD’s plan to 
map the city’s Muslim communities, saying “It’s making it harder and harder for moderate 
Muslims.” This incident highlights the critical role of the so-called ‘moderate’ Muslim. Moderate 
Muslims are not just seen as the less dangerous alternative to the extremist Muslim; they are in 
fact key allies in the fight against extremist Islam. The Washington Times reported in October 
2002 that “because the need for moderate Muslim voices is more important today than ever 
before, we should be pulling in moderate Arabic speakers to assist our intelligence community at 
home and abroad.”  
 The binary of being with “us” or with the terrorist, then, invokes notions of moderation in 
religious practice. The moderate Muslim is a sympathetic figure in liberal imaginaries, 
threatened on the one side by extremist Islam and on the other by anti-Muslim right wing 
Islamophobia. This sympathetic figure is in contrast to the (often) foreign-born, pious extremist. 
In “American Dreamers,” the article expresses concern over the importing of foreign imams to 
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mosques in the US. Favoring homegrown, “American” imams, the article shuns those who bring 
with them a “warped version” of “extremist ideology” which they would then transfer to 
American Muslim teenagers. Consider a Time article that tells a story of a U.S. imam who is 
“fighting his own war against radicals trying to hijack his religion” (Waller 2005: 61). Quite 
literally, the “good” and “bad” Muslim are pitted against one another.  
When Forbes tells the story of halal-compliant Nestle products, the executive that 
spearheaded the initiative in Malaysia is referred to as “clean shaven.” The article tells us that 
“for centuries the men who decided whether food was halal were bearded and worked in 
mosques.” The clean-shaven Othman Yusoff, then, uses his “clean shaven” Islam to bridge 
corporate interests with multicultural inclusion of Muslims. Newsweek points out that the role of 
white Muslims is pivotal in a time when extremist Muslims (assumed, of course, to be people of 
color) are terrorizing the world. Pointing to the then-president of the Islamic Society of North 
America, an article tells us that “Mattson is the first woman, the first nonimmigrant, and the first 
Muslim convert to be elected to head the largest Islamic group for social outreach and education 
in North America. Her election comes at a critical time in the history of Islam. As violent 
extremists threaten to obliterate the voice of moderate Islam worldwide, Muslims in Western 
countries, isolated by rising discrimination, struggle to find their place” (Childress, 2007: 71). 
Mattson, the article tells us, “sees herself as uniquely positioned to change the way the world 
views Muslims—and how they view themselves.” Ingrid Mattson, then, plays the role of a white 
moderator, able to lead the country’s Muslims during a time when it is threatened by extremists. 
Yet is she a moderate Muslim? Her hijabs and floor-length, loose-fitting dresses betray a piety 
and orthodoxy that we do not typically associate with “moderation.” In listening to Mattson’s 
speeches during my time in the field, it was clear that she was hardly waving a banner of reform 
131 
 
and she certainly espoused adherence to fundamental Islamic principles. In labeling her 
‘moderate,’ it seems that religious practice is of less concern than a sort of national palatability – 
in this case, inflected by racial and ethnic markers.  
It was a fear of lack of moderation among U.S. Muslims that lay beneath the screening of 
the controversial NYPD training video, The Third Jihad: Radical Islam’s Vision for America. The 
film promoted the idea that there is an inherent radicalization of most – or all – Muslim 
communities, raising concern among civil rights activists about strained relations between the 
NYPD and New York City’s Muslims. In spite of an attempted cover-up by NYPD officials, 
Freedom of Information Requests revealed that the film had been shown repeatedly to a startling 
number of new recruits. The film claims that Muslims of all stripes are waging a modern jihad in 
the US and that the notion that American Muslims are moderate is a deceptive propaganda tactic. 
Clearly, this incident reveals that there are policy-level stakes in the concept of ‘moderation,’ a 
term that itself has shifting and inconsistent significations. What, exactly, is a “moderate” 
Muslim? Does it mean one who only loosely identifies with the faith? Can a moderate Muslim 
wear a hijab, or practice gender segregation? Do moderate Muslims believe in gay marriage? 
Must a moderate Muslim eschew anti-Americanism or political violence? Does “moderate” refer 
to a level of religiosity, a level of cultural assimilation, or both?  
The question of the ‘moderate’ good Muslim is especially complicated given the data I 
collected in my work with IRO members. I struggled with the assumption that IRO members, 
representing that professional class of highly-assimilated American Muslims that the Pew Report 
describes, are “moderate.” Indeed, many of them eschew distinctions between orthodoxy and 
moderation. In critiques of liberal modalities of multiculturalism, it has become somewhat of a 
commonplace to acknowledge secularism and moderation as hallmarks of the “good” Muslim. 
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Yet the IRO members include hafiz19 of the Quran, women who wear hijabs (and even some who 
wear a naqab – the face covering), and many who believe that the Quran and sunnah must be 
interpreted and applied as literally as possible. These are individuals who are also enmeshed in 
the project of legitimacy for U.S. Muslims. They are not the uniformly secularized, clean-shaven, 
assimilated subjects presented by liberal discourse on Muslim Americans. Indeed, a remarkable 
range of pieties is on display among those Muslims seeking inclusion and legitimacy.  
 What my work reveals is the way IRO members are calling themselves at once orthodox 
and proper U.S. citizens. Like Grewal’s case study on Al Maghrib (2013), the IRO members I 
study use the concept of orthodoxy in interesting and non-linear ways, perhaps due to the 
incommensurability of concepts such as moderation, orthodoxy, or secularism to begin with. For 
IRO members, their piety is not counter to their American Dream success story, but an integral 
part of it. I sat with three college students for lunch during an Islamic convention in Chicago. 
The young women were talking to me about their various choices to wear hijab. While Amina 
donned the hijab largely because of family tradition and expectation (“All the women in my 
family wear a hijab”), Samina started wearing it after a protracted argument with her father, who 
opposed her decision to observe Islamic dress code. Regardless, all three women expressed to me 
their firm observance of hijab – one of them described in detail the ways she at once manages to 
run in marathons in hot weather and still observe Islamic dress code. In another conversation, 
Amina’s sister would describe to me the ways she is careful to avoid any type of financial 
                                                 
19 A person who has memorized the entire Quran, word for word. These are highly-respected 
individuals who devote intensive study to both learning and retaining the Quran. Because 
Muslims believe that the Quran is the direct and literal word of Allah, its preservation is of prime 
importance. As one Hafiza (female Hafiz) told me in the field, “Even if our enemies were to burn 





transactions that involve interest, indicating a level of literalism in her interpretation of Quranic 
prohibitions on usury. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of IRO members carefully observe 
the month of Ramadan, avoid alcohol and pork, and many do not miss a single one of the five 
daily prayers. Clearly, the invocation of “moderate” Islam conceals more than it reveals; if these 
very pious Muslims lay claim to moderation in self-defense against Islamophobia, the puzzling 
nature of the term moderate itself becomes clear. My discussion of the concept of the moderate 
Muslim is meant to reveal the (il)logics behind the Islamophilic milieu. If Islamophilia names the 
“good Muslim” allies against terrorism and extremism, then the criteria by which one is 
designated a “good Muslim” is tremendously unclear.  
 
Neoliberal Multiculturalism and New Forms of Privilege 
 The remarkable condemnation of bigotry against Muslims from both sides of the political 
aisle stands in stark contrast to an intense, “fringe” Islamophobia from key players in cultural 
and political life. In the field, IRO speakers were quick to remind members that Islamophobia 
was an extremist pocket of America, not at all representative of the majority of Americans, who 
espoused ideals of inclusion and tolerance. A handful of individuals like Daniel Pipes, David 
Yerushalmi, and Robert Spencer comprise what IRO’s call an Islamophobia “network,” a small 
group of right-wing spokespeople that generates an abundance information about Islam. A 
documentary called Fear, Inc. reveals the astonishing amount of funding this relatively small 
network uses to disseminate its messaging about a Muslim takeover of American society and the 
idea that mosques harbor future terrorists. Tens of millions of dollars have been spent by this 
network in order to influence media coverage and key elected officials on matters relating to 
Islam in the U.S. Most notoriously, these crucial players in the Islamophobia network were cited 
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in the ‘manifesto’ left behind by Anders Breivik, the Norwegian nativist who engaged in a lethal 
act of terror in 2011.  
 IRO’s credited the Islamophobia network with the public outcry about the construction of 
an Islamic center in lower Manhattan near the Ground Zero site. “Initially, when the plans were 
announced, there was relatively little opposition. Officials in New York City and general public 
took to it quite well. Really, it was a non-issue,” Sumaiya told me as we spoke at a convention in 
Detroit. “But then, all of a sudden, there was this explosion of debate – is this appropriate, is this 
sensitive, whatever. Even Muslims were chiming in saying maybe we shouldn’t build this 
mosque – or Islamic center, whatever they were calling it. How did that debate happen all of a 
sudden where there had been no controversy before? What sparked it? Well, if you look closely, 
you see these Pamela Gellers and Robert Spencers suddenly mobilizing, and all of their blogs 
and foundations popularizing what was actually really a radical right-wing sentiment. Then all of 
a sudden it became a mainstream issue for people to chime in on. This is an Islamophobia 
cottage industry. They’re dedicated to…well, I don’t know what their end goal is, to be honest. I 
think it’s to silence Muslims and cut short Muslim advancement in America. And by 
advancement, you know, I mean just the development of a community, a community that is a 
driving force in morality, ethics, innovation. This small little industry is working against 
Muslims.” 
 Alongside the awareness of the powerful, wealthy anti-Muslim fringe was an 
understanding among IRO members that multiculturalism and diversity are hallmarks of 
Americanism. At a 2012 Islamic convention, IRO speaker Hamza Yusuf spoke at length to 
several thousand attendees about the history of multiculturalism in the U.S. “Muslims fought in 
all of these wars in American history. Fought for this country. In World War 2, in World War 1, in 
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the Civil War. So this idea that we're alien is completely unacceptable. … America has always 
had accents. There is no part of American history where Americans don't have accents. When 
Tammany Hall was at its height, many politicians spoke with an Irish drawl. And they were part 
of America. They were embraced sometimes, and other times they were not. And they had to 
duke it out in the streets, until they had their place at the table.” At another panel at the same 
convention, one speaker remarked, “in a state like Louisiana, which is a difficult state for any 
minority to win a seat, Bobby Jindal won. I don't agree with any of Bobby Jindal's political 
views, but they elected him in the most right-wing state in the country. So if you begin to really 
think about how accepting this country is, and not just focus in on the narrow people that are on 
the margins that attack our faith, we have flourished and prospered for 1400 years and continue 
to grow as the fastest faith in this country. Someone like a Glen Beck or Rush Limbaugh – they 
are a pimple, a pimple in the grand scheme of things.” 
 Pluralism, diversity, and inclusion dominated the themes at the conventions I attended. 
Convention titles themselves explicitly referenced pluralism across difference, unity through 
diversity, and multiculturalism. One panel I attended in Washington, D.C., “We Have a Dream,” 
assessed Martin Luther King, Jr.’s mission of unity in relation to the current struggles faced by 
American Muslims. Several conventions featured inter-faith panels, usually limited to Jewish and 
Christian speakers (though at times “interfaith” included Hindus or Sikhs). The theme of racial 
diversity within Muslim communities was of paramount concern, especially the topic of anti-
black racism among immigrant Muslim communities.  
 That the contours of representational IRO politics depended heavily on the celebration of 
a historically multicultural America is remarkable for the post-9/11 environment. In the past, 
multiculturalism has been heralded as one of the prime reasons for America’s exceptionalism. 
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The convergence of the Cold War and Civil Rights movement held the U.S. accountable on a 
global stage for its treatment of people of color domestically. In the collection of post-9/11 
apocalyptic Hollywood films, for instance, presidents and leads are routinely played by people of 
color, a subtle nod to US supremacy in matters of race relations. In the logics of the War on 
Terror, multiculturalism has become a banner under which U.S. exceptionalism is conveyed 
(Grewal 2005; Engle 2004). In the War on Terror, intolerance and bigotry are their problem, not 
ours. This is why the figure of the ‘good’ Muslim is so critical. “…individuals thought to occupy 
the category of Muslim or Arab are not automatically placed into the bad category. United States 
policy recognizes that citizens of nation states it considers its friends are not always safe, Muslim 
aliens are not always unassimilable, and Muslim citizens are not always un-American. Thus, the 
war on terrorism is not simply a war on Muslims, and it is not a holy war. To the contrary, it 
largely attains legitimacy by presuming and relying on the existence of a category of good 
Muslims, both within the United States and abroad. The United States of the twenty-first century 
maintains an identity as a multicultural, (neo)liberal and tolerant state…Perhaps more 
importantly, the good Muslim category provides a means for Muslims both inside and outside of 
the United States to support the United States’ internal as well as external attempts to fight the 
war on terrorism, thus reinforcing the war’s legitimacy” (Engle 2004: 62).  
 An American exceptionalism was critical in creating consent for the War on Terror, an 
exceptionalism that required imagining the American nation as inclusive and diverse. Much the 
way the Cold War required the U.S. to contend with the Civil Rights movement domestically in 
order to preserve its image abroad, and the Nazi Holocaust during WWII corresponded with the 
demise of the U.S. eugenics movement, the War on Terror requires painting the enemies as 
intolerant, parochial, and narrow. In contrast, the U.S. is portrayed as commendable in its 
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integrated, multi-racial, multiethnic national body. This exceptionalism suggests that the U.S. is a 
world leader in feminism (Abu Lughod 2002), gay rights (Puar 2007), and race relations. In this 
way, multiculturalism becomes an ally of the War on Terror. “It is revulsion for anti-Muslim 
sentiment that allows us to be horrified by the torture scandals at Abu Ghraib and yet relatively 
unmoved by the horrors resulting from our involvement in Iraq” (Puar 2005). 
 This use of multiculturalism draws our attention to the strategic deployment of racial and 
ethnic difference in a geopolitical context, a concern I focus on more in my chapter on empire 
and race. Žižek is also interested in how “multiculturalist ideological poetry” is built into global 
capitalism (1997). Globalization, according to Žižek, “involves its own hegemonic fiction (or 
even ideal) of multiculturalist tolerance, respect, and protection of human rights, democracy, and 
so forth…” (41). In America, our very Americanness is predicated upon our ethnic difference, 
and the fact that we can be American without dropping our specific ethnic roots. Žižek asserts 
that “…the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism is multiculturalism, the attitude 
which, from a kind of empty global position, treats each local culture the way the colonizer treats 
the colonized people…” (44). For the purpose of this discussion, I point to the concept of 
‘neoliberal multiculturalism,’ a type of multiculturalism that does not aim to subvert or challenge 
practices of capital accumulation or white privilege. Instead, neoliberal multiculturalism 
resonates with existing structural hierarchies, both domestically and globally. Certainly, the 
“good” Muslim is as important as the “bad” Muslim in maintaining the U.S. reputation as 
inclusive and tolerant; the bigotry of the “Islamophobia network” is less desirable for American 
exceptionalism. This is precisely the work that Islamophilia – from both Muslims and non-
Muslims – performs: proving that Islamic identity is irrelevant to being a good American 
consumer, worker, and patriot.  
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 Melamed notes that neoliberal multiculturalism means new types of privilege are 
activated. “Privileged and stigmatized racial formations no longer mesh perfectly with a color 
line. Instead, new categories of privilege and stigma determined by ideological, economic, and 
cultural criteria overlay older, conventional racial categories, so that traditionally recognized 
racial identities – black, Asian, white, or Arab/Muslim – can now occupy both sides of the 
privilege/stigma position” (2-3). “The PATRIOT Act is another example of neoliberal 
multiculturalism’s revision of racialized privilege and stigma,” Melamed continues. “It 
rhetorically privileges Arab Americans in order to discriminate against – and to obscure 
discrimination of – Arabs, Muslims, or South Asians in the United States who cannot or do not 
claim to be American in a nationalist or idealist sense. The act begins with a lengthy section 
titled “Sense of Congress Condemning Discrimination against Arab and Muslim Americans.” 
This multiculturalist gesture of protection for patriotic “Arab Americans,” “Muslim Americans,” 
and “Americans from South Asia” rhetorically excuses the racializing violence that the act 
enables – namely, the stripping of civil and human rights from non-patriotic or non-American 
Arabs, Muslims and South Asians” (Melamed 2006: 8) 
 
Conclusion 
 The tendency to applaud any effort that combats Islamophobia by favorably portraying 
Muslims in the U.S. is complicated by my discussion of Islamophilia. By understanding the 
“good Muslim” as a key player in current geopolitics, positive representations of Muslims seem 
a facile solution to the problem of Islamophobia. This was exemplified best in the recent Gap 
advertisement featuring a Sikh man. In late 2013, the apparel company Gap featured actor and 
jeweler Waris Ahluwalia, a Sikh man with a full beard and a turban, in a series of multiracial 
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billboard ads. One billboard was defaced with racial slurs, calling the model a terrorist and taxi 
driver. The response was remarkable: there was public outcry against the bigoted defacing of the 
Gap ad, with commentators remarking on the sad state of affairs in which advertisers are not free 
to feature diverse models in their ads. In response to the vandalism, Gap changed its profile 
picture on Twitter to the image of Ahluwalia and released a statement that claimed “Gap is a 
brand that celebrates inclusion and diversity.” Several IRO leaders and members celebrated this 
move. A Twitter hashtag “ThankYouGap” appeared in which people applauded the apparel 
company.  
 One piece of journalism, however, caught my eye during the Gap maelstrom. In a piece 
in The Islamic Monthly, Waleed Shahid wrote, “Gap’s inclusion of a Sikh South Asian American 
man in the company’s winter marketing campaign comes at a time when the company faces 
massive global criticism for its labor practices, especially in Bangladesh. By drawing our 
attention toward a single advertisement, Gap has brownwashed their own labor practices, 
obscuring the brown people and places from where their clothing originates… if solidarity 
simply means changing a Twitter background, then we have not only failed in some fundamental 
way in understanding the politics of that term, but we have also relegated our identity to merely 
that of a consumer” (Shahid 2014). Shahid highlights exactly those contours of neoliberal 
multiculturalism that Islamophilia encapsulates: the relative freedom of expression and diversity, 
while underlying socioeconomic process remain unaffected.  
 I can recall the celebratory reaction among IRO members during the first Obama 
campaign in 2008 when he carefully pronounced the word “Pakistan.” “Yes, no more butchering 
the names of our countries,” an enthusiastic Obama supporter told me. Another woman 
interjected, “Who cares how he pronounces it? How is he going to treat Pakistan is the question, 
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not how is he going to pronounce it. You can say ‘nu-cu-ler’ all you want as long as you don’t 
use nuclear power.” This celebration of cosmopolitanism is a critical site of neoliberalism, and 























CHAPTER 5: “IT’S JUST NOT THE RIGHT TIME TO TALK ABOUT THAT”: Silence, 
Hope, and Imaginative Possibilities 
  
 Just a few months into fieldwork in the summer of 2011, I attended a large Islamic 
convention in Chicago. In an unexpected coincidence, the Socialism 2011 Conference was being 
held that very weekend, also in Chicago. In fact, the Socialism conference was just across the 
street from, which was being held in the expansive Rosemont Convention Center. As I browsed 
their bookstore and program in the lobby shortly after my arrival in Chicago before heading to 
the convention, I noticed several volumes for sale on the topics of Islamophobia, the War on 
Terror, the use of espionage against Muslim communities, the unconstitutionality of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, and more. The program featured speakers addressing US warfare in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands, and the curtailment of US civil rights 
during the “terror decade” (the ten years following 9/11). In short, the Socialism conference 
featured a number of issues I already knew (from my initial time spent in the field) to be of 
central concern to many IRO members.  
 After registering for the convention moments later, I sat down with the thick program and 
noticed that the roster featured a US Congresswoman, a few prominent national and local 
journalists, law enforcement officials, and the usual list of “celebrity” IRO spokespeople such as 
Hamza Yusuf and Zaid Shakir. There were some sections devoted to foreign policy and the War 
on Terror, but by and large the conference program remained faithful to the agreeable theme, 
“Loving God, Loving Neighbor, Living in Harmony.” Panels at the conference had such titles as 
“Islam, Pluralism, and Social Harmony,” “Creating a Wholesome Community,” “The 
Entrepreneurial Mindset,” and “Inclusive Mosques in the 21st Century.” Yet over the course of 
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my weekend in Chicago, I would discover that many attendees would reveal concerns that were 
hardly as mild as the printed program would suggest. The very highly-charged, deeply politicized 
themes that were central to the Socialists across the street seemed equally important to the 
Muslims across the street. Palestine, the loss of civil rights during the terror decade, and US 
military presence in the Muslim world were inescapable topics of conversation at this and other 
IRO events.  
 A month before attending the 2011 convention, I had spoken with Hatem, an editor of the 
oppositional blog Ikhras. At Ikhras, Arab-American contributors write pieces holding 
accountable Muslim and Arab spokespeople who, as Hatem says, “kowtow to the US 
establishment.” Ikhras “throws the proverbial shoe” at “House Arabs and Muslims.” Hatem, in 
his reference to shoe-throwing, summons the memory of the notorious 2007 incident in which 
Iraqi journalist Muntadhar al-Zaidi threw his shoe at President George W. Bush during a press 
conference in Baghdad. The difference between al-Zaidi and the Ikhras contributors, Hatem 
explained to me, is that Ikhras “honors” (in its presentation of a sarcastic “Shoe Thrower 
Award”) a “House” Arab or Muslim who has distinguished herself in pandering, referencing the 
distinction Malcolm X famously made between the House Negro and the Field Negro.  
There were two kinds of slaves. There was the house Negro and the field Negro. The 
house Negroes – they lived in the house with master, they dressed pretty good, they 
ate good ’cause they ate his food — what he left. They lived in the attic or the 
basement, but still they lived near the master; and they loved their master more than 
the master loved himself. They would give their life to save the master’s house 
quicker than the master would. The house Negro, if the master said, “We got a good 
house here,” the house Negro would say, “Yeah, we got a good house here.” 
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Whenever the master said “we,” he said “we.” That’s how you can tell a house 
Negro. 
If the master’s house caught on fire, the house Negro would fight harder to put the 
blaze out than the master would. If the master got sick, the house Negro would say, 
“What’s the matter, boss, we sick?” We sick! He identified himself with his master 
more than his master identified with himself. And if you came to the house Negro 
and said, “Let’s run away, let’s escape, let’s separate,” the house Negro would look at 
you and say, “Man, you crazy. What you mean, separate? Where is there a better 
house than this? Where can I wear better clothes than this? Where can I eat better 
food than this?” That was that house Negro… 
On that same plantation, there was the field Negro. The field Negro — those were 
the masses. There were always more Negroes in the field than there was Negroes in 
the house. The Negro in the field caught hell. He ate leftovers. In the house they ate 
high up on the hog. The Negro in the field didn’t get nothing but what was left of the 
insides of the hog…The field Negro was beaten from morning to night. He lived in a 
shack, in a hut; He wore old, castoff clothes. He hated his master. I say he hated his 
master. He was intelligent. That house Negro loved his master. But that field Negro 
— remember, they were in the majority, and they hated the master. When the house 
caught on fire, he didn’t try and put it out; that field Negro prayed for a wind, for a 
breeze. When the master got sick, the field Negro prayed that he’d die. If someone 
come to the field Negro and said, “Let’s separate, let’s run,” he didn’t say “Where we 
going?” He’d say, “Any place is better than here.”  
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Just as the slavemaster of that day used Tom, the house Negro, to keep the field 
Negroes in check, the same old slavemaster today has Negroes who are nothing but 
modern Uncle Toms, 20th century Uncle Toms, to keep you and me in check, keep 
us under control, keep us passive and peaceful and nonviolent.  
 
Evoking Malcolm X for the purpose of critiquing Arab- and Muslim-American multicultural 
strategy, Hatem and his co-bloggers highlight the tension and resentment reserved for IRO 
leaders who use mainstreaming rather than critique and activism as central strategies. Of course, 
I would come to find that the very IRO members against whom Hatem leveled his biting critique 
also claiming the legacy of Malcolm X, a concern I explore further in other chapters.  
 In my conversation with Hatem, just a month before I found myself at the convention in 
Chicago, I told him about my plans to attend the annual convention. “We are very disturbed by 
these groups,” he told me. “Again, they are trying to prove that they are the good Muslim. They 
had this program whereby they were advocating creating field trips for Palestinian Muslims to go 
visit the Holocaust museum. Why do they want Muslims to visit the Holocaust museum? 
Because the Zionist lobby and US media is saying that Muslims are anti-Semitic who want to kill 
all the Jews. So these Muslims groups come along and wants to combat this stereotype and they 
want to get together high school kids to prove they're not anti-Semitic. They will never talk about 
what's happening to the Palestinians. What happened in Gaza. What the U.S. is doing in 
Afghanistan. Ask them,” he told me, “ask them when you’re there next month. Ask them why 
they can, in good conscience, invite George W. Bush to a mosque event. He’s slaughtering 
Muslims in Iraq. Ask them! The people you’ll be interviewing now have a stake in America, they 
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have their house in the suburbs and cars and vacations. Kids in private schools. So why should 
they be concerned about American drone attacks in Pakistan?” 
 My conversation with Hatem replayed itself time and again in the back of my mind in 
Chicago as I walked past the socialists in my hotel to my destination across the street. In a 
conversation with Linah, a Palestinian-American mother of two and convention volunteer, I took 
Hatem’s advice and “asked her” about the silences Ikhras critiqued. “You know, Linah, I spoke 
with Hatem a few weeks back and he feels that here, the hard-hitting, deeply political issues are 
sidestepped. What do you make of this?” A self-identified feminist, Linah’s is married to a top 
orthopedic surgeon and they live in a large suburban home. Their children attend a private 
Islamic school. From my conversations with Linah, I understood her to be deeply committed to 
certain social justice issues, especially regarding the right to return for Palestinians and the end 
of Israeli apartheid. Her passion for justice in Palestine had more recently led her to discover 
connections between US racism and Israeli state-sanctioned violence against Palestinians. Linah 
and I would form an enduring friendship, and I’ve noticed her growing politicization over the 
years since we first met.  
 “You know, I think he’s kind of right. I think most of us here, we do want to be more 
vocal, to use stronger language. But look, Obama says he’s not Muslim every chance he gets. He 
does photo-ops at churches, and the crazy right wingers still want to say he’s a Muslim. So I 
think if we use stronger language, make bigger critiques, you know...We would be seen as 
supporting something extremist. I’m aware of his criticism. I know that people would like to see 
this change, you know, for us to be more representative of what we feel behind closed doors. But 
this is not the time. When will it ever be time? Maybe never… Maybe we have to go forward and 
not worry about the repercussions, just say what we believe, or maybe we do have to wait it out. 
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I myself don't know what I think is the better way to go.” This, notably, was one of the few times 
I noticed Linah waver or express uncertainty about a course of action.  
 I told her about the Socialist Conference happening across the street. She told me she 
knew about it, that she’d seen enough “kids with tattoo sleeves” and figured it out. “Yeah, the 
socialists are always at the rallies I attend for Palestine, Libya, Syria. There are always socialists 
there. It’s just too taboo, you know, to talk to them, to associate with them. We are still afraid to 




 This impulse to deliberately remain silent on certain issues carries an implicit hope that 
these silences will bear fruit for Muslims seeking full cultural citizenship. Linah's utterance that 
it's “not the right time to talk about this” was a sentiment that was articulated to me many times 
in the field. IRO members echoed Linah's understanding of Muslim Americans' position as 
precarious enough to preclude earnest geopolitical critique. In this chapter, I reveal IRO 
members' perception of the narrowly demarcated field of political possibilities, and the ways 
temporality, waiting, and hope are central to their discursive choices. IRO members suggest that 
caution and silence are necessary for their political project of inclusion. At once, they reveal a 
deep faith in the political process and a simultaneous cynicism about transformative potential in 
the US. Here, I explore what exactly it is IRO members aspire to: do they aim to be included in 
an existing system through gaining legitimacy and recognition, or do they seek to reconfigure, 
through counter-hegemonic practices, what they deem an inherently unjust social order? Second, 
I consider the realm of possibilities – and the realm of the ‘impossible’ – expressed by IRO 
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members. By making only what they call “reasonable demands,” Muslim Americans point to a 
narrowly defined spectrum of engagement. To expect certain outcomes is considered at once 
idealistic and a threat to the project of inclusion. At the same time, these deliberate silences are 
expected to give way to a different type of future for Muslims in the U.S. Is the hopefulness – the 
faith that a better time will come – expressed by IRO members a by-product of the paralysis they 
feel due to the inevitability and permanence of an unequal structure? Do they truly believe 
another future is imminent, or is it necessary to believe that in order to continue living in an age 
of Islamophobia? If it is “just not the right time to talk about that,” when will the right time 
come, and what will it look like?  
 
Deliberate Silences 
 While I have no comprehensive data on the political affiliations of IRO members, most re 
allied with the Democratic Party, several are Republicans, and a very small number officially 
reject both parties, voting independently or with the Green Party. Yet, in spite of this spread, a 
consistent sentiment among the IRO members I spoke with was a fierce condemnation of U.S. 
foreign policy and the role of anti-terrorism measures in homeland security in the years 
following 9/11. By and large, IRO members revealed a nuanced awareness of US foreign policy, 
especially in Muslim-majority countries, and regarded such policy as excessively militarized and 
imperialistic. The fact that Afghanistan had been a site of so-called low-intensity conflict for the 
US during the Cold War, that the Reagan administration had regarded the mujahideen as 
“freedom fighters” just decades before those very mujahideen would top the list of US enemies 
(Mamdani 2005), was commonplace to IRO members. That atrocities against Muslims continued 
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unabated at Guantanamo Bay, regardless of the party affiliation of the current US president, was 
seen as a contemporary component to enduring global Islamophobia.  
There was a strong, repeated sense at IRO events that Muslim terrorism must have some 
connections to violence perpetrated by the US and Israel. Palestine was undoubtedly the most 
distressing global concern for IRO members, above and beyond the drone program or military 
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. “There remains today no more potent symbol of injustice in 
the Muslim imagination than the suffering of Palestinians under Israeli occupation,” argues Aslan 
(2010). Indeed, regardless of the “mainstreaming” (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009) approach 
advocated by most IRO members, the issue of Palestine was non-negotiable. Marable writes that 
“millions of moderate and progressive Muslims who sincerely denounce terrorism are 
nevertheless frustrated by the extensive clientage relationship between the United States and 
Israel, financed by more than $3 billion in annual subsidies” (Marable 2003: 13). IRO members 
– and at times, prominent speakers – were unapologetic in their condemnation of the military, 
cultural, and media campaign against Palestinians. The ire reserved for Ariel Sharon and 
Benjamin Netanyahu was matched only by the criticism of the immense power of lobbies such as 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, which was regarded by many as 
exercising massive control over US Middle East policy. Otherwise removed from protest 
movements and rallies, a handful of college students I met in the field had recently made a trip 
from Chicago to Washington, D.C. to attend a rally in protest of AIPAC. They told me they 
frequently attend such rallies across the country.   
I spoke with Saeed early in my fieldwork. Currently an anesthesiologist in Rhode Island, 
he had been closely involved with the Muslim Student Association (MSA, the group that 
eventually led to the creation of ISNA – I discuss MSA in greater depth in my introduction) 
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during his years as an undergraduate at Columbia University. In fact, Saeed was at Columbia 
while I was working on a Master’s there, and I recalled vividly the events he described. “I was 
there when the Joseph Massad controversy broke, when the Columbia Unbecoming film came 
out. Have you seen it? Were you around then?” “Yeah, I was,” I told him. (Saeed refers to the 
2004 controversy when several students produced a documentary accusing professors in the 
Department of Middle Eastern and Asian Languages and Cultures – MEALAC – of 
delegitimizing Israel. The film was a catalyst for a wide-reaching debate regarding the limits of 
academic freedom, hinging on the assumption that MEALAC professors made the classroom 
inhospitable for pro-Israel students.) “So, you know, the whole thing had a really chilling effect. 
People weren’t comfortable talking about it. The MSA didn’t want to do anything. We wanted to 
avoid the subject altogether. Mostly it was MEALAC students and SIPA students, not any 
organization representing Muslims, that took a stand. There was a sense among the MSA that 
nothing could be done about it. If you took a wrong stand, you’d get smashed. It was an 800 
pound gorilla looking to smash things. The MSA didn’t want to cause trouble.” Saeed poignantly 
summed up the dilemma faced by IRO leaders: to take a stand, especially on the issue of 
Palestine, is to jeopardize the already-delicate position of Muslim Americans.   
Yet the conversation with Saeed then turned to the moment the MSA did decide to take 
action on the issue of Palestine, with the MEALAC controversy pushing them to speak up. 
“Some people in the MSA eventually decided that the silence needed to be broken, and that we’d 
hold an event on Palestine. So basically, we invited Norman Finkelstein to campus.” Finkelstein, 
a Jewish American political scientist, controversially has written on the exploitation of the 
concept of “Jewish suffering” to leverage support for Israel, calling the Holocaust (which his 
parents survived) an ideological tool. Finkelstein has been branded an anti-Semite and accused of 
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being a Holocaust denier, but drew quite a following from pro-Palestine groups (until his 2012 
critique of the BDS20 movement) for his bold accusations of Israeli state-sanctioned violence. 
 “We got a lot of shit for that,” Saeed continued. “From all sides. You know, within the 
MSA there was this thought that inviting him was aggressive, counterproductive, that it would 
alienate our Jewish student allies and we shouldn’t have handled it. You were at the event?” I 
nodded. “So we were literally sitting in a room watching the Chomsky-Dershowitz debate, and 
Chomsky gave a nod to Finkelstein. We knew Finkelstein was from New York. Maybe he could 
come here and break the silence. So some of the MSA leadership was like, we need you to come 
to Columbia and fix this. The event, wow, was much bigger than anticipated…A lot of groups 
co-sponsored: the Organization of Pakistani Students, the United Students of Color Council. We 
convinced them that this was a student of color issue. The Socialists, the campus anti-war group. 
But then, you know, there was a member of the socialist organization who was a Zionist, and she 
leaked it to the other side. They found out about it, you know, and the College Democrats and 
College Republicans wrote a piece criticizing us for planning this event. It ran in the Spectator 
and all hell broke loose. The University even got involved, telling us we couldn’t have the event 
for reasons of security being understaffed. But we agreed, we got donations, and said we’d pay 
for the security ourselves. Part of this was that the Zionist protesters were going to cause trouble 
and the University needed more security to work the event. But part of it, I suspect, was an 
intimidation tactic – the University pressuring us to cancel this controversial event…Because of 
the Zionists, you know, this event got really hyped up. We didn’t even have to advertise the 
event,” he said, and both of us laughed. “They did the PR for us. 400 or 600 people who were 
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protesting the event showed up! But we did our thing – we had a guest list, we met every concern 
that University Security had. The speech itself was not controversial. He said that Palestinians 
deserve their own state, and that Hezbollah is a native resistance force, not a bunch of terrorists. 
Nothing he hasn’t said before; he’s said more wrathful stuff elsewhere. Their problem was that 
Finkelstein was there, period. But the event, the way it was written up, was cited as one of the 
most divisive events ever on campus. Since the event, I think MSA has pulled out of that scene 
altogether.” 
 Indeed, the bi-lateral op-ed in the Columbia Spectator skewered the event planners in a 
piece entitled “Hate Comes to Columbia.” Finkelstein was labeled anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, and a 
terrorist sympathizer. Within months of the Finkelstein event, Jewish student groups invited Alan 
Dershowitz to a speaking engagement on campus. These reactions indicate that the climate 
experienced by those who attempt to speak out about Palestine in earnest is a hostile one. The 
event at Columbia University epitomizes the difficulties faced by Arab and Muslim Americans 
who attempt to be vocal about their objections to U.S. support of Israel. An overwhelming 
feeling that the media is immensely biased against Palestinians, that critique of Israeli policy is 
equated with anti-Semitism, and that the Israel issue is an exceptional violation of principles of 
free speech were commonly-held assumptions by IRO members, even those with scant 
knowledge of the history of Palestine and Israel. In Cincinnati, Amina remarked to me that even 
otherwise “liberal” media such as the New York Times unabashedly took the side of Israel, 
uniformly casting Palestinians as terrorists or militants. IRO members were readily aware of the 
David Project or Campus Watch, both of which monitor and censure universities’ pro-Palestine 
professors in an attempt to improve campus opinions on Israel.  
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 Because of this landscape, a broad-based organization like ISNA treads carefully. In 
2010, ISNA encouraged a delegation of Palestinian youth visiting the US from the occupied 
Gaza Strip to visit the US Holocaust Museum, as  “this museum, in particular, has tremendous 
educational value and helps visitors appreciate the historical result of unbridled hate and human 
manipulation” (Shamir 2010).  The endorsement of the visit met with tense responses from many 
I spoke with, several of them ISNA members. While many members applauded the decision both 
as a strategic move for improving the image of Muslims in the US, most asserted that it was 
simply “the right thing to do” from the point of view of understanding various histories of 
oppression. Yet a few conversations were especially revelatory. “This is a defensive move,” one 
ISNA volunteer told me in 2011. “It anticipates all the accusations Muslims get of being anti-
Semitic. See, in America, to speak about the rights of Palestinians is basically the same as anti-
Semitism. So to fight off these accusations, our organizations have to do things like this 
Holocaust Museum visit. It makes me sad. With all the freedom of speech we celebrate, we 
really are only so free to speak when it comes to certain things.”  
 A similar tension between the official, organizational messaging and intimate, “behind-
closed-doors” sentiments surfaced regarding the assassination of Osama bin Laden. His 
assassination took place just after I had begun my fieldwork in 2011. Because he was killed on 
the spot in spite of being unarmed, legal groups (such as Amnesty International) took issue with 
the extrajudicial nature of this assassination. While it was met with general support and 
celebration by the American public, many legal scholars questioned the use of vengeance as a 
proxy for justice. Yet unanimously, IRO’s applauded the assassination in their official 
communications. Below, in its entirety, is the ISNA press release following the assassination.  
The Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) joins all Americans in thanking 
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President Obama for fulfilling his promise to bring Osama Bin Laden, leader of 
al-Qaeda, and perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks, to justice. 
We hope his death will bring some relief to all the families, of every faith and 
walk of life, who lost loved ones on 9/11 and in every other terrorist attack 
orchestrated at the hands of Osama Bin Laden.  
Over the past decade, ISNA has stood firm on our stance that ISNA and Muslims 
in America condemn the actions of Bin Laden on 9/11 and all acts of terror at the 
hands of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and all others who spread fear and hate through 
violence.  We have repeatedly condemned the calls of Bin Laden and others like 
him for mass bloodshed and the attacking of innocent lives across the world.  
As the President pointed out in his address to the nation, the ideology of Bin 
Laden is incompatible with Islam:  "Bin Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a 
mass murderer of Muslims.  Indeed, al Qaeda has slaughtered scores of Muslims 
in many countries, including our own.  So his demise should be welcomed by all 
who believe in peace and human dignity." 
President Obama marked his hope that today, Americans will "think back to the 
sense of unity that prevailed on 9/11" and remember that "on that day, no matter 
what God we prayed to, we were united as one American family."  
"ISNA joins President Obama and prays that as the nation continues to heal from 
the devastation inflicted upon them at the hands of Bin Laden, we will turn to 
each other today, united, and emerge tomorrow with an even stronger resolve to 
take every action necessary to protect the precious ideals of our nation that Bin 
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Laden attempted to destroy on 9/11: peace, tolerance, respect, and freedom for 
all," said ISNA President Imam Magid. 
 I spoke at length with Linah about this press release. She had posted remarks on 
Facebook immediately after the assassination that she worried about the extrajudicial 
nature of the killing, arguing that it intensified the role of the U.S. as a superpower, above 
the jurisdiction of international law. How, I asked, did Linah feel about this press release? 
“I know for a fact that 99% of the people behind these press releases want to be more 
vocal, use strong language, condemn the US’s actions. But I don’t think we can do that 
without being seen as supporting terror. You know, people do want to see us being more 
representative of what we are like behind closed doors. But it’s not the right time,” she 
said (a phrase that surfaced repeatedly in our conversation.) “As an individual, yes, you 
can say these things. But as an organization that represents so many people, you are 
endangering more than just yourself by saying these things. Is it worth it? You know, 
when we took a stand on the Peter King hearings21, ISNA was positioned as too radical, 
not pandering to the mainstream. So what are we to do?” Interestingly, Peter King 
notoriously claimed that most US mosques have extremist leadership and most US 
Muslims are unwilling to cooperate with law enforcement “after hearing Muslims 
criticize the imbalance in US foreign policy” (Bayoumi 2004: 39). If speaking earnestly 
means a congressional anti-Muslim witch hunt, the politics of speaking and silencing take 
on an urgency of a different scale altogether.  
                                                 
21 In 2011, as head of the House Homeland Security Committee, Rep. King spearheaded 
hearings on the radicalization of US Muslims, alleging that mosques in the country were 




 Linah captured a sense of being discursively trapped that points to a disciplinary practice 
of regulation at work among Muslim Americans. The disconnect between the political feelings of 
individuals and the messaging from “representative” organizations points to the “eclipse of 
internal differences through the representation of the whole population by a hegemonic group, 
race, or class,” write Hardt and Negri (2000:1 104). “Disciplinary power,” they claim, “rules in 
effect by structuring the parameters and limits of thought and practice, sanctioning and 
prescribing normal and/or deviant behaviors” (23). The “behind closed doors” reactions to 
organizational responses around issues of Palestine or the bin Laden assassination make clear 
that these parameters are clearly demarcated in the minds of IRO members who understand that, 
as individuals vying for complete social citizenship [see chapter on citizenship], silences are 
imperative. While they hold on earnestly to their geopolitical critiques, articulating them would 
jeopardize this effort. 
 The deliberate caution and silences I highlight here illuminate the tense landscape IRO 
members navigate. Demonized in a xenophobic Islamic milieu, they must carefully oppose this 
Islamophobia in ways that will not intensify this demonization. In his discussion of race politics 
in Race Rebels, Robin Kelly considers the ways in which wearing a mask creates an “inner pain 
generated by having to choke back one’s feelings” (1996: 7). This IRO “masking” strategy is a 
deliberate means to an end: full inclusion for U.S. Muslims asks individuals to choke back 
righteous indignation, to be ever-aware of what is at stake in the project of legitimacy.  
 
Uncertain Aspirations 
 The sense that something is at stake for Muslims who speak up begs the question: what 
exactly are the aspirations and hopes of IRO members? Do they strive for inclusion and 
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legitimacy in a multicultural America, or do they wish to dismantle what many described to me 
as violent US hegemony and empire? I struggled to articulate what “type” of politics I 
discovered, as both goals were expressed to me without a sense of contradiction. I discovered an 
abundance of radical politics and hard-hitting critique. At the same time, I also came across with 
great frequency hackneyed notions of inclusion, tolerance, and the American Dream. Hamza 
Yusuf and Zaid Shakir, both American converts to Islam (the former white American, the latter 
black) and celebrity IRO spokespeople, encapsulate this tension.  
 In Washington D.C., several thousand attendees listened as Zaid Shakir spoke. “This 
issue of the othering of Muslims…We have to move beyond this and present a positive image, 
build alliances to strengthen ourselves. Be the truth we advocate for and represent that truth. It’s 
our responsibility to our community and our nation to present a positive image, to begin to 
envision politics not based on race-baiting and xenophobia. Where reconciliation and 
compassion are the basis of our political action. In the Prophet SAW’s time, he said leave those 
people – let God deal with them. Let us leave the Gingrich’s of the world. Let God deal with 
them. If we do that, there will be less who serve as an audience for bigotry. Instead, they’ll say – 
hey, those people gave me free medical treatment. [puts on a fake ‘white-rural’ accent] ‘Ah love 
me some Moslems,’ they’ll say.” While Shakir himself does not pull any punches – I document 
in other chapters his vociferous critiques of US foreign policy, settler colonialism, and an 
enduring history of racism – here, he puts forth the suggestion that modeling good citizenship is 
the key to political transformation for Muslims.  
 Consider the following speech by Hamza Yusuf. Within minutes of an impassioned plea 
for justice in Palestine, Hamza Yusuf reminded a sprawling audience that “You don’t get angry, 
you get even. We need more Muslims righting wrongs. And you don’t write a wrong far away. 
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Emerson said, I was tired of my neighbor going on about the slaves in Barbados while he was 
beating his wife. Change your local community. Alleviate suffering around you and your state 
will change…Muslims are engaged in pointing their finger, the blame game. But the devil is the 
one who loves to blame. The devil is the blamer in the Qur’an. Aadam22 is one of our exemplars, 
and he said, ‘I wronged myself.’ Aadam was willing to look into himself and not blame others.” 
In another speech, Hamza Yusuf had just finished talking about the magnitude of the U.S. 
economic crisis when he appealed to his audience to commit to social service. “Muslims have 
over 30,000 doctors in the United States. If each one of those doctors gave one day of the week 
to serve the poor people, we would solve a great deal of the problems in medicine in this country. 
Maybe it’s asking too much, but I don’t think it is... We can do this.” This is the same Hamza 
Yusuf, perhaps the most popular IRO spokesperson, who reminded an audience that “we have 
allowed certain aspects in the Muslim world to continue for so long: the promotion of despotic 
governments to sustain the national interests of Britain, the US, France. And now, changing 
horses, suddenly the Arabs are being told –we’re going to bring you democracy. Well, Native 
Americans have a saying: “White man speaks with forked tongue.” And this is part of the 
problem. The hypocrisy has been so great in the past that people have lost any sense of 
credibility. This is how the Muslim world views us. The West has failed to appreciate the degree 
to which Muslims feel the West is responsible for so many of their problems.” 
 Does “white man” speak with forked tongue, as Hamza Yusuf suggests?  Has the US 
acted hypocritically toward the Muslim world? Is the problem an oppressive and violent history 
of imperialism, militarism, and anti-democratic engagement by the U.S. hegemon? Or is the 
                                                 




problem that Muslims are not doing enough to model good citizenship, and hence allowing 
Islamophobia to continue unabated? My fieldwork revealed a simultaneous engagement with 
radical geopolitical critique and mainstream multicultural politics of inclusion and tolerance, a 
difficult coexistence that reveals the troubled representational politics at work.  
 At times, IRO members seemed committed to gaining legitimacy by accepting the US as 
a tolerant, multicultural nation. Social citizenship could be achieved by being model citizens, 
carefully crafting self-representations, and articulating an inherent harmony between Islam and 
America (as I describe in another chapter). In Backlash 9/11, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr argue 
that Muslim advocacy groups have been focused on civic engagement, political integration, and 
reinforcement of the fact that Islam is an Abrahamic faith. They call this a process of 
mainstreaming, a “determination to sink deep roots in America” (2009: 2). What I refer to here as 
the careful crafting of discourse that involves deliberate silences, Bakalian and Bozorgmehr call 
“framing” in such a way that the mainstream will grant the group approval. The “integrationist” 
strategy they describe was certainly evident in my work with IRO’s, as claiming a rightful space 
in the existing social landscape surfaced as a primary concern.  
As Zaid Shakir said, “This is nothing new in American politics. It happened with the 
Irish. With the Japanese during World War 2.” As it passed for those groups, I assumed, Muslims 
could expect it to pass for them. Returning to Linah’s aforementioned statement that “the time 
was not right” to speak about certain issues, I found myself repeatedly jotting notes to myself 
about whether the Muslims I was speaking with genuinely understood another/better US to be 
possible or imminent, as much as they articulated that as an ends to their representational 
strategies. Given their dejected acceptance of a two-party system that was restricted on matters 
of militarism and terror, their resignation to the U.S. clientage with Israel, and their growing 
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understanding of US racist settler colonialism, did IRO members genuinely believe that a more 
equitable US could emerge?  
Zareena Grewal argues that after 9/11, “ummah institutions led primarily by professional 
immigrants, such as ISNA, began to replicate explicitly patriotic religious rhetoric, abandoning 
countercitizenship narratives and their ambivalence about the American mainstream in order to 
promote a national rather than transnational moral geography” (2013: 151). Grewal’s claims 
were validated by my fieldwork, as I noticed the themes at IRO events often focused on 
harmony, pluralism, or assimilation. Certainly, this type of patriotism – mirrored in the fervent 
flying of flags by Muslims after 9/11 – was undeniable. I spoke with Imran, who has lived in 
Chicago suburbs for 20 years since emigrating from India. His son, now a medical student, had 
taken 2 years off during high school to attend a full-time hifz program – a learning academy 
where students complete the arduous task of memorizing the entire Qur’an verbatim. “Imagine 
this, my son is now a hafiz,” Imran beamed with pride. “And in a few years, he will be a 
physician. This is impossible in India, and probably in much of the Muslim world too. Back 
home, you’re either a hafiz or a doctor. In America, you can have both, deen and duniya.23” 
Imran’s words encapsulate Grewal’s notion of the exceptional American Muslim ummah: the 
sense that the unique blend of Islam and Americanism give rise to something truly phenomenal, 
superior to the Islam of the Muslim world. Taking Imran’s words seriously, I began to question 
the suggestion that Muslim patriotism since 9/11 was a simple defensive strategy. Sure, Muslim 
Americans put up their flags as shields in the face of Islamophobia. Yet, were they simply 
shields? Or was there a deep, internalized love of nation at the heart of these patriotic strategies?  
                                                 
23 The word “deen,” meaning “way of life,” usually is meant to refer to ‘religion’ or Islam. 




 At a Washington, D.C. event memorializing the 10 years since the 9/11 attacks, I listed to 
Dr. Kavakci, a Turkish American woman and professor at George Washington University, speak 
about the nation which has been her home for decades. In the late 1990s, Kavakci was prevented 
from taking her oath in the Turkish parliament because she wore a headscarf, and ultimately had 
her citizenship revoked for this reason.  
 
I'm a person who cannot take for granted what this very country offered me and 
my family. I cannot take for granted how god, Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala, blessed 
me through the means of this country. The day I landed here, Dallas, Texas, I had 
the shock of my life. Nobody was staring at me. Nobody was taking a second 
gaze at me, noting the difference in my attire at the time. In my home country, 
was that the case? No. Is that the case now? No. Islamophobia reigned then, in a 
Muslim country. And I know Turkey is not alone in that, there's Egypt, Jordan. I 
shall not continue. Growing up in a cosmopolitan Ankara, it was part of the 
everyday to be stared at, if not verbally attacked. With your religious covering, 
you'd be only fitting in or expected to fit in the periphery, outskirts of the city 
where the abject untouchables lived. History repeated itself in my mother and me 
in the name of Westernization, a Muslim country was ostracizing women 
who were committed to their religion through their attire. We needed to go, my 
father said, somewhere else. It's part of the Muslim tradition. We're not foreign to 
Hijra, moving from one place to another. You're persecuted, and there's a place to 
go, then you should go. Education was not optional in my family, based on 
Islamic tradition. It is a sine qua non. In order to find a way to be educated for me 
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and my two younger sisters, we needed to go. On a hot summer day...we landed in 
Texas, the place which has been my parents’ home for the past 24 years. In the 
meantime, my 2nd attempt to find my niche in the Turkish republic was a futile 
one with a high price. Becoming the first female parliamentarian with a Islamic 
headscarf was still unacceptable. It is still unacceptable....persecutions resulting in 
the process that lead me to the European Court of Human Rights. Here I was for 
the second time leaving the place I was born, the one I thought I belonged to, for 
the place I was valued despite my appearance. And not harassed and not attacked. 
On the contrary, I was embraced.  
 
The U S of A, my home. How could I have taken this for granted? The kind of 
freedom of expression this country values, prioritizes, cherishes. When in Turkey, 
Muslim women can be denied from healthcare because they wear a headscarf. 
They can be denied from presence in courtrooms to give testimony, or as most of 
you know, denied from education or receiving driver’s license....3 generations: 
My mother, an academic, a professor of German literature, and I a politician, had 
to pay the price, and now my daughters who are grad students in the US. Who 
take the US as their home, the place that they were born, the place that embraced 
them and their mother. The place where we found solace. We call this freedom of 
expression, a place where you're not judged based on your expression. There is a 
lesson for Turkey to learn from the United States, for Tunisia, that will hopefully 
be built anew in the months to come. For Egypt, for Algeria to learn from the U S 




Kavakci’s tale contrasts the relative freedom of the United States with the constraints of her 
native Turkey. Unlike the “native informants” described by Dabashi and Abu-Lughod, who use 
American secularism to pit Islam against the West, Kavakci uses religious freedoms – the ability 
to be a pious Muslim – as evidence of US superiority. Dr. Kavakci and Imran both point to an 
exceptional America that has done right by them, a far cry from a patriotism that is brandished 
defensively in the face of an anti-Muslim racism. Quite the contrary, both Imran, an IRO 
member, and Kavakci, a popular public figure and spokesperson profess a deeply internalized 
love for and indebtedness to the unique possibilities for Muslim Americans.  
Yet this sentiment does not stand alone; the counterhegemonic or “countercitizenship 
narratives” (Grewal 2013) made by IRO’s often suggest a deep cynicism and cutting critique of 
sociopolitical possibilities in the US. I listened to Zaid Shakir during an ISNA speech connect 
Islamophobic rhetoric to the Draconian anti-immigrant laws that had been passed in Arizona, and 
Hamza Yusuf and Suhaib Webb repeatedly lambasted US foreign policy in their speeches. Many 
of the crafts being sold in the ISNA bazaar, a sprawling marketplace that drew many attendees 
who would otherwise not attend ISNA, were focused on the issue of Palestine. I met one 
Palestinian woman selling Handala24 key chains and embroideries that said “Free Palestine.” The 
t-shirts I describe in my chapter on hypervisibility also carried explicitly political themes. 
 Hamza Yusuf reached fever pitch during a speech about Islam in America, exclaiming, 
“The only reason militants have come to America is that militant Americans have gone to the 
Muslim world.” Thunderous applause broke out throughout his crescendo. “If militant America 
                                                 




had not gone to the Muslim world, we would not have militant Muslims coming to America. I 
don’t want to see militant Islam. I want to see the Islam of peace. But there has to be mutual 
respect. The Palestinian people have to be respected. ...This is the truth. I’m not even speaking as 
a Muslim right now – I’m speaking as a human being. When you use an F16 against an armless 
people that have no means to defend themselves, that is…that is simply wrong. It is wrong. It 
needs to be condemned. When you create an apartheid system that was denounced in South 
Africa as evil, when you create the same system in another place, it too has to be denounced as 
evil. That’s all we’re asking for. An even playing field. There are people who are asking why 
Muslims are angry. If you’re not angry about the current social condition, you’re not alive.” 
Yusuf both reflects and inspires a righteous indignation among his audience members. With the 
occupation of Palestine at the center of IRO members’ indignation about US foreign policy, there 
is an inescapable element of radicalism in IRO politics. Certainly, this radicalism is not to be 
conflated with far-left political mobilizing in the US, as IRO members are uneven in their 
engagement with issues around class stratification, mass incarceration, immigration, or LGBT 
rights. Yet with Palestine as an emblem of Muslim oppression, an interesting wrench is thrown 
into the otherwise “mainstreaming” efforts of IRO’s.  
 The recurring appeal to the legacy of Malcolm X by IRO members similarly pointed to a 
counterhegemonic stance. Many of the young IRO attendees I met – college students or recent 
graduates – referenced the Autobiography of Malcolm X as a critical stepping stone in their 
politicization. While Hatem at Ikhras uses Malcolm’s legacy to lambast the mainstreaming IRO 
politics, I found an uneven identification with Black Nationalist politics and radical organizing 
among IRO members. (Grewal’s book, Islam is a Foreign Country, contains a more exhaustive 
review of the relationship between Muslim Americans and the legacy of Malcolm X.) I struggled 
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to name the relationship with Malcolm’s legacy, given the optimistic picture painted by people 
like Kavakci or Imran. Imran’s daughter, Rehana, had become a close contact of mine in the 
field, and I knew from my conversations with her that her father harbored deep moral objections 
to the US on political and social grounds. While the statements that appear above belie a fierce 
patriotism, his stance on “America” is actually far more uncertain. “My dad had me watch Roots 
when I was a young girl,” Rehana said, referencing the miniseries inspired by the book written 
by Alex Haley. Haley was moved to write Roots after writing the Autobiography of Malcolm X. 
“My dad knows that the radical black movements of the 1960s and 1970s had really good points 
– they called out America for being a big superpower bully, for all the racism and violence that’s 
happened toward minorities.” I had numerous conversations in the field with IRO members 
about the racism of mass incarceration, corporate crimes and Wall Street corruption, and the 
historic violation of the basic rights of people of color. There was a remarkable awareness that 
the Columbian expedition was a genocidal one and that the US strategically opposed democratic 
uprisings that destabilized US economic interests in Latin America.  
 On the one hand, the counterhegemonic, transformative logics of radical black organizing 
appealed to IRO members. Yet it coexisted with the aforementioned American exceptionalism. 
Imran being inspired by Alex Haley’s work and the legacy of Malcolm did not, to him, conflict 
with his suggestion that America is the best place to be a Muslim. In this way, there was no 
uniform sense of whether social injustice, racism, and xenophobia were foundational hallmarks 
of Americanism or anomalies. This unevenness leaves the question of what it is the IRO 
members aspire to, unanswerable. As an ethnographer, it remained unclear whether IRO’s sought 
to overhaul a system they saw as inherently violent, stratified, and unjust or whether they sought 
inclusion within a somewhat flawed social order.  
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Amidst validating the righteous indignation of U.S. Muslims and advocating civic duty 
and model citizenship as an antidote to Islamophobia, there exists the social imaginary of IRO 
members who conceptualize the United States in varying, ambivalent, seemingly contradictory 
ways. At once, the US is lauded as the land of opportunity, praised for its commitment to 
freedom and pluralism, the space for an “exceptional ummah” (Grewal 2013), and also the 
purveyor of unparalleled violence and injustice. Hardly a contradiction, this ambivalence is 
constitutive of uncertain IRO politics. What emerged throughout my fieldwork was an 
indecisiveness about whether the U.S.’s current Islamophobia machine was an anomaly – a blip 
in the greater story of U.S. opportunity, democracy, and social justice – or emblematic of a larger 
foundation of inherent inequality, imperialism, and racism that is as American as apple pie. This 
ambivalent social imaginary is at the heart of advocacy attempts that at once ask Muslim 
Americans to be exemplary and hope for a change in the U.S. sociopolitical landscape.  
 
Between Hope and Impossibility 
 According to Islamic tradition, the Prophet Muhammad visited the town of Ta’if to bring 
them the religion of Islam, but was violently rejected and pelted with stones. He left the town 
injured and near-death when the Angel Gabriel approached him. Gabriel relayed God’s message: 
Allah could crush the wretched people of Ta’if with the mountains as punishment for their 
rejection of Islam and mistreatment of Muhammad. Muhammad declined the request, expressing 
hope that perhaps the descendants of the infidels of Ta’if would be righteous and accept Islam. 
Muhammad’s demonstration of mercy and forgiveness after Ta’if was cited to me in numerous 
conversations about how Muslims should navigate their current demonization in the US. “The 
only way we can beat the anti-Muslim machine,” Romana told me, “is by modeling ourselves 
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after the Prophet Muhammad, peace upon him. Always merciful. Always forgiving. If the 
greatest human ever could forgive the woman who threw trash on him every morning – do you 
know this story? This woman would throw trash on him every day, until one day she didn’t. The 
Prophet, peace be upon him, noticed that the woman wasn’t abusing him that day. You know 
what he did? Subhanallah, he went to check on her because he was worried she was sick. She 
accepted Islam immediately when she saw his merciful example. That’s all we have, his 
example.” Time and again, the appeal to patience and sabr25 was highlighted as a key strategy in 
the face of Islamophobia. For Muslims, obeying the sunnah (the example set by the Prophet 
Muhammad) is a large element of practicing Islam. By emphasizing his forbearance and 
patience, a religious imperative is constructed for Muslims in the U.S. to wait patiently.  
 Waiting, patience, and hope were thus intertwined in the IRO expectation of a better 
future. While members expressed to me a sense that patient forbearance would hasten the arrival 
of a better world for Muslim Americans, the coexisting sense of defeatedness and allegations that 
the US was an unjust social formation at its core made me wonder just what this hopefulness 
revealed. Hope, as Crapanzano writes, is not as agentive as desire: one who desires something 
acts to bring about fulfillment of these desires (2003). Hope, on the other hand, requires an 
individual to wait and, as a passive state of waiting, is a type of paralysis. For Muslim Americans 
who waver between faith in their nation’s principles and cynicism of its hypocrisy, this hope is 
indeed “so indefinite as not to have an identifiable object” (18). For IRO members, I wondered 
whether the immense value of hope reflected a lack of imaginative possibilities as described by 
Buck-Morss (2000), an overarching sense that there is an inevitable and unbreakable momentum 
                                                 




of the political order. In her writing on Asian American immigrants, Lisa Lowe describes a 
mirage of political freedom, arguing that consent-based forms of hegemony coalesce to produce 
the racialization of Asian immigrants (1996). This is connected to the paralysis described above: 
while IRO members understand their constitutionally-protected right to free expression, the 
murkier representational politics I describe reflect deep discursive limitations. The understanding 
that certain things “are not to be spoken of” during these delicate times is part of an overarching 
strategy that makes apparent the mirage described by Lowe.  
 IRO members were unequivocally in opposition to Draconian components of the War on 
Terror such as the establishment of the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay, a site that 
“exemplifies the strange new geographies of empire in the twenty-first century” (Bayoumi 2004: 
36). They understood this component of the War on Terror as being established by George W. 
Bush, but continued under the presidency of Barack Obama. For many, the unfulfilled promise 
by Obama to immediately shut down the detention center was evidence that transformative 
politics were just out of reach. While Obama’s promise initially inspired a great response by 
Muslim voters, defaulting on the promise reminded IRO members about the limits of 
institutional change.  
Indeed, the Obama presidency and the two-party system in general was a locus of 
impossibility for IRO members. The recent voting history of Muslim Americans is critical in this 
regard. In 2000, Muslim organizations took comprehensive steps to assemble the bloc vote and 
systematic efforts to ensure a maximum number of Muslims voted. The attempt to unify Muslim 
voters behind a single candidate was largely successful: in his first election, Bush received over 
70% of the Muslim vote in the 2000 election. At the time, many Muslims looked favorably upon 
Bush because he met with Muslim American community leaders during his campaign. Upon the 
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selection of Joseph Lieberman as the running mate for presidential candidate Al Gore in the 2000 
election, there was a palpable sense of anxiety among many Muslim voters about the Democratic 
ticket. Many feared President Clinton's friendly stance toward Israel would only be intensified by 
a Gore/Lieberman administration. Others felt a Republican candidate was closer to the orthodox 
teachings of Islam, especially around issues such as family values and sexuality. Yet by the end 
of Bush’s first term, “Islamophobia” had become an unfortunate staple of the Muslim American 
lexicon. One of my contacts in the field told me that his “biggest regret was throwing away my 
vote on George Bush. Since I was naturalized in this country, I have always proudly voted for the 
Democratic candidate. But the Muslim organizations all pressured me to vote as a bloc. Truly, it 
was my biggest regret to elect Bush.”  
 After what an IRO member called “two Islamophobia terms”, Barack Obama’s campaign 
had energized many Muslim voters. He received an overwhelming proportion of the Muslim vote 
in 2008, with nearly 89% of Muslim Americans casting a vote for the Democratic candidate 
(CAIR). In fact, just as Muslim voters had switched party affiliations for the 2000 bloc vote, 
many long-time Republican Muslims cast a Democratic vote for the first time in the 2008 
election. One Pakistani-American couple revealed to me that Obama’s 2008 campaign was the 
first time they had ever made a campaign donation since immigrating to the US in the 1970s. In 
fact, their donation to the Obama campaign marked not only their first donation, but also the first 
time they voted along Democratic lines since their naturalization in the 1970’s. I heard several 
such anecdotes of long-standing Republicans who, for the first time, enthusiastically supported a 
Democratic candidate once Obama's candidacy was announced. On the flipside, I gleaned an “I-
told-you-so” sense of vindication from Muslim Democrats who had reluctantly joined the voting 
bloc for Bush in 2000. In fact, otherwise cordial conversations at times became heated as 
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Republicans and Democrats discussed the outcome of the Bush presidency. 
Yet Obama's first term saw very little in the way of a reversal of the entrenched 
Islamophobia that had become, for many, emblematic of the Bush era. Indeed, some of the 
harshest elements of the USA PATRIOT Act were renewed by Obama, U.S. ties with Israel 
remained strong, and Obama quickly earned a reputation as a military hawk for his ongoing 
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. He inaugurated the notorious drone program and did not, 
as promised, close the prison at Guantánamo Bay. Certainly, there seemed to be a strong anti-
Bush sentiment and Democratic Party affiliation among most of the people I met in the field. Yet, 
at the same time, in-depth conversations revealed a deep ambivalence about electoral politics, 
Barack Obama's relationship to Muslim Americans and the War on Terror, and the two-party 
system in general. 
 While it has become somewhat of a commonplace to understand Muslim Americans as 
truly energized and optimistic about Obama in 2008, it is noteworthy that even at that time, there 
were whispers of discontent and suspicion regarding Obama’s true intentions with the Muslim 
world. In a conversation with a Muslim Democrat shortly after Obama’s first presidential 
election victory I was told that Obama’s actions during his campaign foreshadowed much of 
what his term would look like. “See what he did with Reverend Wright?” Azam said, referencing 
the Jeremiah Wright controversy in which Obama distanced himself from the pastor. He went on 
to say, “I think Reverend Wright said some very smart and brave things about the U.S. military, 
about the U.S. support for Israel. And Obama used to agree with that. But as soon as he got 
involved with politics, see what happened? Obama had to renounce Rev. Wright. He’s going to 
do that as long as he’s in office.”Azam was cut off by his friend, Nasir. “But what else did you 
expect him to do?” Nasir said. “He can’t get elected if he speaks out against U.S. foreign policy. 
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That’s just how politics work. Obama’s heart is in the right place. He may not be a revolutionary, 
but he’s going to do the right thing for the Muslim world.” What ensued was a mild debate 
between the two about Obama’s transformative potential, a debate that foreshadowed the larger 
climate that surrounded Obama’s second presidential campaign.  
 After having been “cheated” by George W. Bush after giving him the bloc vote and then 
disappointed by Obama, many Muslims felt that there was no transformative direction for their 
activism. They were alienated from what they considered “fringe” or “grassroots” movements 
such as anarchist politics, socialists, or (as Sumaiya referred to them) “people who throw their 
votes away on a third party that will never, ever be elected.” Recognizing the futility of the two-
party system and de-legitimizing the potential of viable grassroots movements, IRO members 
reflect the limitations for earnest engagement.  
I was speaking with Azam at a regional conference in Cincinnati about the issue of 
Palestine – he was wearing an eye-catching “Free Palestine” t-shirt that sparked the discussion. 
He remarked that most IRO’s were strongly against the violations of human rights and 
international law carried out by Israel and supported by the United States. “This injustice will 
end. If not in this life, then in the hereafter. We know from our Prophetic example that this kind 
of injustice only increases the reward for the victim in the afterlife. And Islam is not like 
Christianity – we are not taught to be passive in the face of oppression. We’re supposed to speak, 
act out, fight exploitation. But really, what do we do when speaking out will do more harm than 
good? Is there any purpose to speaking out when it means you lose a hard-earned professorship? 
When it means being blacklisted in the media? Even Jewish people – the Chomsky’s and 
Finkelstein’s – are accused of anti-Semitism and un-Americanism. What chance does my brown 
skin and beard stand?” 
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Azam’s defeated sense of “standing no chance” mirrors Linah’s assessment that now is 
not the time to speak of certain things. These unspoken rules about what can and cannot be 
spoken of guide the representational politics of IRO’s and contribute to a larger logic of the field 
of possibilities in the US. In his 2008 campaign, Barack Obama spoke at a rally in Detroit where 
a few women in hijab were asked not to sit directly behind the candidate. Campaign volunteers 
understood Obama’s own religious identity as a central concern to voters and thus asked the 
Muslim women to remain outside of the shot. I spoke about this with Linah, who told me that she 
was outraged by the event, but understood. “Yeah, it would be nice if Obama could have stood 
by what I think he really believes, which his that it doesn’t matter whether his supporters wear a 
hijab or are Muslim. It would be nice if instead of saying “Oh, I’m not Muslim, I’m a Christian,” 
Obama could say “why the heck does it even matter? But you can’t say those things. You have to 
be reasonable. So, while I’m upset that we live in a country that two-thirds of the people would 
freak out if they saw hijabi women standing behind Obama, the fact is that we do live in that 
country, so we have to be realistic.”  
IRO representational politics and members’ aspirations reflect the fact that dire 
consequences would result from making “unreasonable” demands. IRO members claimed that 
discourse must fall within a reasonable, acceptable spectrum, that some battles were 
“impossible” to fight – especially now, perhaps ever. Hatem from the Ikhras blog was quick to 
dismiss ISNA’s representational politics as pandering, “House Negro” strategies that “kowtow to 
the establishment.” Considering the at-times contradictory sentiments of Dr. Kavakci, Imran, 
Linah, and Azam, a certain ambivalence about Muslims’ discursive possibilities becomes 
apparent. The question then arises – what exactly is at stake in speaking earnestly? We have seen 
IRO’s posit that violating the unspoken discursive rules jeopardizes the victory of a preferred 
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candidate and the loss of a professorship. In essence, though, IRO members expressed a fear that 
the project of cultural citizenship was at stake.  
At times, it seemed crystal-clear to IRO members that there was a long, enduring history 
of dissent being deemed un-American. While Kavakci can celebrate her freedom to wear a hijab 
in public spaces in the US, there remained a pervasive sense that “any expression of restraint or 
caution about the dangerous erosion of our civil liberties has been equated with treason” 
(Marable 8). In Maira’s work, we see the ways in which dissent has been deemed unpatriotic, 
supporessing “radical movements, such as the American Indian Movement and Black Panthers, 
which were considered enemies of ‘American values’” (Maira 2009: 634). In the not-too-distant 
past, communist, socialist, and civil rights organizations were the target of covert activities of the 
FBI’s COINTELPRO program.  
As I discuss above, IRO members and leaders alike are aware of this history. In a post-
9/11 climate, “to refer even obliquely” to such matters as the U.S. government’s relationship to 
‘some of the villains of the tragedy of 9/11”…is “tantamount to acting as an apologist for the 
assailants, and for terrorism generally” (Khalidi 2007: xiv-xv). Thus, IRO activity, which is 
aimed at Americanization (described in another chapter), treads carefully. Muslim Americans are 
“free” to speak in liberal spaces about mosque-building and hijabs, but this freedom comes at the 
expense of challenging foreign policy, allying with radical movements, or questioning the 
structure at its very core. Those challenges to entrenched structures of US empire are relegated to 
appropriate, private, or limited spaces. Whether or not IRO members literally anticipate a more 
just United States is less relevant than the fact that hopefulness underpins their strategies. Hope, 
as a structure of waiting, is revelatory of a deeper paralysis and ensnarement in US empire. 
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Waiting and hope provide a sort of refuge for the Muslims privileged enough to craft public 
responses to Islamophobia.  
 
Conclusion 
 The ethnography in this chapter suggests that it would be erroneous to attribute any type 
of uniformly political orientation – radical, conservative, progressive, or liberal – to Muslim 
American IRO members. Within a decade, Muslim voters went from overwhelming support for 
George W. Bush to cautious backing for Barack Obama. Socially conservative IRO members 
level hard-hitting critiques in informal conversations about the treacherous role of US foreign 
policy, and at the same time offer platitudes about the US as inherently equitable and just. It is 
important to note that the fluidness of these political allegiances is specific to Muslim Americans 
who are IRO members: these are generally documented, highly educated immigrants of a 
professional class. In my chapter on Islamophilia, I consider the ways in which various shades of 
privilege enable a certain type of multicultural engagement from this particular subset of US 
Muslims.  
 For this specific group of engaged, relatively privileged Muslim Americans, it is clear 
that this privileged status is perceived as being in peril. Invoking a well-understood history of US 
racism and a strong understanding of the contours of contemporary US imperialism, IRO 
members cautiously walk a tightrope on their path to social citizenship. Their agentive capacity 
in this process is unclear. If vocal critique of US foreign policy means Congressional hearings on 
the radicalization of Muslims – a veritable witch-hunt – then IRO members’ caution is 
understandable. At the same time, the aversion to building allegiances with those social 
movements that are deemed too radical or fringe reveals underlying mainstreaming aspirations. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: ISLAMOPHILIA AND THE NEW IMPERIAL 
HOMELAND 
  
As this work has shown, Muslim Americans tread uneven, constantly shifting terrain. 
Within a matter of weeks, advocacy groups’ concerns may shift from extrajudicial surveillance 
within the U.S. to the targeted assassination of U.S. citizens on foreign soil to an incident of 
mosque vandalism in a small town. Given the unstable topography and diverse scales of Muslim 
American representational politics, I found it difficult to find a conclusive end date for my 
research. Nevertheless, after conversations with my advisor, I decided the 2012 presidential 
election served as a fitting end to my fieldwork. I knew more contemporary concerns would 
continue to surface after I completed fieldwork, but the election itself represented the major 
themes in my research. IRO’s relations to the 2012 elections encapsulated all the ambiguity, 
disappointments, silences, and hypervisibility that are central subjects in my dissertation.  
In this dissertation, I have illuminated the ways in which multicultural politics and racial 
formation are central concerns in the War on Terror. I have attempted to answer the question 
posed by Nikhil Pal Singh, “How are socially consequential forms of intranational and 
supranational identity constituted in relation to the normative political structures and 
presumptive universals of Euroamerican modernity: the nation-state, democratic citizenship, and 
the public sphere?” (1998:472). The category of “Muslim American,” upon closer inspection, 
unravels as we explore the deep-seated divisions within the far-flung populations the category 
includes. Yet as an analytic unit, “Muslims in America” is summoned by those with both 
Islamophobic and Islamophilic intensions. As such, “Muslim American” glosses over core 
differences: differences in class, national background, religious piety, and (perhaps most 
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important for my work) political engagement. Groups that claim to represent Muslim Americans 
are burdened with representing a “community” that does not, as a unified whole, exist. The 
practice of representation becomes saddled with deciding who to speak for, who to select as 
spokespeople, and in what register to speak.  
I was speaking with a Muslim comedian who has attained some popularity in both 
Muslim and non-Muslim media about the difficulties of being a ‘representative.’ “See, we have 
this crisis of authority in Islam. I can sit in suburbia and read Quran and the community will 
think I’m an expert on Islam. It’s just a small minority of Muslims who are actually affiliated 
with a mosque. And when it comes to scholarship, well, there’s no real way it works. You might 
have some Pakistani uncle at the mosque saying “I want to be imam” and then you could have 
Hamza Yusuf who is classically trained in the Islamic tradition. And they would both be taken as 
“Muslim representatives.” And a lot of these representatives want to speak as if “Islam says…” 
as if there’s one opinion. When you think about it, that’s what the media does, too. They paint 
Islam as one thing, Muslims as one type of person. Whatever small type of representative I am, 
my goal is not to do that. It’s to say ‘Islam is many things. Muslims are many people.’”  
I observed with great interest IRO members reacting to the Trayvon Martin-George 
Zimmerman verdict in the summer of 2013, at which point I had completed my fieldwork. By 
and large, active IRO members were horrified by the verdict that left Zimmerman a free man on 
the basis that he had “stood his ground” in shooting the 17 year-old boy. The sense of anguish 
and defeatedness among IRO communities mirrored that of liberal Americans, anti-racists, and 
civil rights activists across the country. The Islamic Society of North America immediately 
issued a press release condemning gun violence and opposing legislation that permitted people 
from states like Florida to carry concealed weapons. White convert and IRO spokesperson Imam 
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Suhaib Webb wore a hoodie during his Friday sermon in solidarity with Martin, and the Council 
on American-Islamic Relations supported an investigation into the verdict.  
Yet African American Muslim leaders were at the forefront of this outcry. Dr. Aminah 
McCloud, an African American woman and IRO spokesperson, accused mainstream Islamic 
organizations of not being vocal enough in their opposition to the verdict. She leveled harsh 
criticism against Muslim organizations that, she stated, “claim Americanness regularly when 
their own self interests are involved” (2013). McCloud’s criticism highlights the divisions and 
difficulties of IRO representational politics. Even though unity around racial difference was a 
valued principle at IRO events, McCloud was apt in holding these organizations accountable for 
their relative silence. Furthermore, anti-black racism among Muslims was a recurrent theme 
among IRO members. A Palestinian American woman, Reem, told me that people in her family 
“still call black Muslims 'abeed. This is the Arabic word for slave! I think that is such a horrible 
word to use. It's so racist. But my cousin tries to justify it; he says 'abeed has a different cultural 
context in the Arab world; ‘it only sounds this bad in the U.S.’ But to me, it's straight up racism, 
and it's counter to everything our Prophet believed.” These tensions within Muslim communities 
are at the center of my dissertation, as their connection to representational politics is especially 
revelatory. As my chapter on hypervisibility demonstrates, leveraging positive hypervisibility 
requires constructing a “good” Muslim persona who can capitalize upon the Islamoscopic 
regime. Inevitably, race, class, orthodoxy, or immigration status all become crucial filters through 
which this visibility takes shape. Positive hypervisibility requires selective invisibility of certain 
subjects, being vocal about permissible topics and silent about others.  
 A brief discussion of the role of the Nation of Islam and historic black communities is 
useful for this discussion. The original teachings of the Nation of Islam are likely anathema to 
177 
 
most IRO members. Born in the early 20th century in Detroit, the central tenets (such as the belief 
that Allah had manifest himself in the person of preacher W.D. Fard) are in fact blasphemous to 
most Sunni and Shi'ite American Muslims, who also regard the central role of Elijah Muhammad 
in the Nation of Islam as blasphemous. In spite of these differences, there was a sense of 
allegiance with the NOI that surfaced inconsistently throughout my time in the field. For 
instance, the Autobiography of Malcolm X (X and Haley, 1964) was a cornerstone piece of 
literature for many IRO members; many of them marked it as having strengthened or solidified 
their belief in Islam. Indeed, several people told me that Malcolm's journey from the NOI to 
what they called “mainstream” Islam (which I took to mean Sunni Islam) was a form of 
validation for their own beliefs. I met one IRO member in Chicago, an African-American woman 
in her mid-20's, who spoke to me of her parents' journey to “mainstream” Islam from the Nation 
of Islam. She recounted the ways in which the NOI “laid the blueprint” for their ultimate arrival 
at Sunni Islam. “Say what you will about NOI philosophy; it definitely helped many black 
Muslims ultimately arrive at the true Islam.”  
 Just as fighting Islamophobia has been a concern for IRO's that was intensified by 9/11, it 
seemed that unity with African American Muslims also intensified as an institutional concern. 
While IRO's are primarily populated by immigrant (first- and second-generation) Muslims from 
South Asia and the Arab world, I noticed a concerted effort to reach out to African American 
Muslims during my fieldwork. An entire IRO weekend conference was devoted to the topic of 
Muslim-American diversity. Fittingly, the event was held near Detroit, at a Shi'ite mosque, no 
less (the issue of sectarian tension between Shi'ites and Sunnis was another such point of 
deliberate unity-building). The event featured an exhibit of African American Muslim presence 
in the US and, being in Dearborn, drew several black and Arab attendees.  
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I wondered about the deliberate attempt to unify black and non-black Muslims by IRO's 
(that predominantly serve non-black Muslims). It certainly was a cohesive effort: IRO members 
used these events, along with social media and publications, to assert that the entrenched anti-
black racism of immigrant Muslim communities was detrimental, un-American, and morally 
reprehensible. The racial harmony and pluralism of the times of Muhammad were frequently 
cited as examples for current Muslims. Thus, there was even a theological basis for the abolition 
of anti-black racism. At the aforementioned diversity conference, the example of Bilal was given 
in many official speeches and informal conversations. Attendees of all races seemed aware that 
the very first call to prayer during the Prophet's time was given by a freed black slave, Bilal. If 
the Prophet's community had entrusted such a critical, fundamental role to a black man, clearly 
there was no sanctioning of anti-black racism in Muslim American communities. IRO speeches 
urged immigrant parents to “allow” their children to marry Muslims of other races, to abandon 
nationalist ties and instead embrace a “Muslim first” identity, echoing the work of Naber (2005). 
This attempt seemed earnest enough, and I did notice IRO members regarding their 
multiracial social circles and acceptance of interracial marriages as a sign of progress. Yet I also 
wondered if the institutional push for racial harmony and diversity was tied in to the goal of 
legitimacy for IRO's. In other words, given the hypervisibility I have explored, anti-black racism 
would hardly get any favor from the “mainstream” for Muslims facing Islamophobia. Also, with 
America configuring itself as diverse and tolerant, a key part of the justification for its own 
imperialist actions, American Muslims eager to claim legitimacy in the American social 
landscape must comply with the rules of multiculturalism and diversity. This, of course, means 
combatting anti-black racism on the level of discourse and representation. (This does not 
necessarily mean combatting anti-black racism through material measures, such as the 
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redistribution of wealth or the abolition of the New Jim Crow carceral state. Indeed, on such 
matters, I found the IRO community to be genuinely averse, or ambivalent at best. Rather than 
embracing a race-radical approach, as Melamed (2006) calls it, by and large a neoliberal 
multiculturalism guided the discussions of race.) The sense that eliminating racism was a 
dimension of “good Muslim” politics is a critical way of understanding that there are liberal 
mechanisms at work in the quest for legitimacy, too.  
My work has highlighted the representational “trap” faced by IRO’s. Unable to be 
anything other than peace-loving patriots, dissent is relegated to the realm of the traitorous. In 
this way, radical critique that may exist among IRO members and leaders is either watered down 
or stamped out completely. As As’ad AbuKhalil has said, “Muslim and Arab-American 
organizations compound the problem by continuously issuing condemnations of all terrorist 
attacks, thereby putting themselves and their faith on the defensive, as if their citizenship is 
conditional on certain political declarations, and as if the obvious abhorrence of violence is a 
non-Muslim, non-Arab trait” (2002: 26). Second, by engaging in a politics of “Islamophilia,” 
IRO’s exclude those Muslims who are not compatible with the characteristics ‘good Muslim.’ 
My work explores the transformative potential of these practices. In other words, I ask whether 
the ‘good’ Muslim stands as a shield against accusations of bigotry or racism or a reinforcement 
of it. My writing asks what function the ‘good’ Muslim plays in the possibilities for anti-
Islamophobia advocacy or civil rights work in the U.S. as well as de-escalating U.S. militarism 
abroad.  
 IRO politics reveal peculiar contemporary features of U.S. multiculturalism. One of the 
central questions my research begs is whether Muslim American spokesmanship and the 
Islamophilia syndrome is an age-old process that has been similarly enacted by other racialized 
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minority groups. Is the story of Islamophilia a uniquely Muslim American phenomenon, or is it a 
continuation in a long story of U.S. racial nativism? Are Islamophobia and Islamophilia simply 
the newest incarnation of quests for legitimacy in America? In this chapter, I explore the ways in 
which IRO representational politics are at once exceptional and the ways in which they mirror 
experiences of other marginalized groups struggling for legitimacy.  
Next, I turn to what Maskovsky and Susser call “the new imperial homeland” (2009), in 
which I reflect upon how Muslim representational practices are connected to various aspects of 
U.S. militarism and both the domestic and international War on Terror. I take seriously Grewal's 
call to consider American history as inextricable from the context of imperialism and war. Since 
Said’s critique of the inattentiveness to U.S. imperialism in anthropology (1989), there has been 
an increase in the work on U.S. militarism, global capitalism, and the geopolitics of 
neoliberalism by anthropologists (Lutz 2006; Gill 2004). Yet by anthropologists “of” North 
America, there is a dearth of attention to U.S. imperialism, perhaps a disastrous by-product of the 
lingering area studies paradigm, in which the appropriate focus of an “Americanist” 
anthropologist is narrowly defined. This was certainly one of the challenges in my writing, given 
its multi-sitedness and transnational underpinnings. As Naber writes in Jadaliyya, ““While 
teaching courses in Women of Color Feminisms and American Studies on the one hand and 
Middle East Women’s Studies on the other, I have run up against the limitations of area-studies 
divisions that continue to predominate within Middle East Women’s Studies—such as the 
framing of American Studies (including US Women of Color and Native American Feminist 
Studies) and Middle East Studies (including Middle East Women’s Studies) as separate fields 
and the United States and the Middle East as geographically bounded regions. Such divisions 
obstruct the possibilities for engagement with important questions such as whether and to what 
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extent racist/classist/heterosexist US prison structures have anything to do with the US War on 
Terror”  (Naber 2013).  
 This concluding chapter attends to the stubborn inheritances of a discipline borne by 
colonialism, shaped by “areas,” but currently defining itself in stark opposition to both. By 
situating American Islamophobia and Islamophilia in a global and historical context, I aim to 
illuminate the ways in which America is a transnational, ideological concept, not a 
geographically bounded space. I also suggest that liberal politics of inclusion and racial diversity 
are part of the construction of America in the social imaginary as an inherently diverse space, 
and that this self-proclaimed multiculturalism is high on the list of justifications for American 
exceptionalism. The specific type of multiculturalism I explore here, then, often lacks any critical 
content or progressive transformative potential. Instead, it is a strategic tool in a war against 
which many Muslim Americans themselves have deep objections. 
 
Islamophobia and Islamophilia: Foundational, or Anomaly? 
 “This is old stuff in American politics,” Imam Zaid Shakir said in a speech at a large 
Islamic convention. In his incredible presentation, Shakir draw raucous applause every few 
minutes, even a standing ovation, for his diatribes against U.S. racism and militarism, as well as 
an aside against gender- and sexuality-based reform movements among U.S. Muslims. His 
speech referenced SB 1070, the Draconian anti-immigration legislation that would ostensibly 
criminalize those thought to be undocumented immigrants in the state of Arizona. I heard Shakir, 
Hamza Yusuf, and other IRO speakers reference the horrors of the slave trade, the genocide of 
Native Americans, the internment of Japanese American Nisei during World War 2, and other 
acts of U.S. racism with great regularity. I noted that IRO spokespeople returned to themes of 
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U.S. racism, militarism, and injustice as they worked toward a counternarrative that had space 
for America’s Muslims. At times, IRO speeches rang with echoes of Zinn’s A People’s History of 
the United States: I heard the Haymarket massacre, the Chinese Exclusion Act, and the Trail of 
Tears all referenced in speeches by key IRO spokespeople. These injustices were relevant for 
American Muslims struggling to place themselves in the story of this country and attempting to 
come to terms with the post-9/11 anti-Muslim environment, as I have discussed in further depth 
in Chapter 3.   
 That this coexisted with a fierce type of patriotism and pro-Americanism is hardly a 
contradiction; indeed, it seemed that knowledge of this brutal history could coincide with a sense 
that the U.S. was a meritocratic, egalitarian land of opportunity without conflict. (For more on 
this, see Chapter 5).  I struggled to pigeonhole the politics of IRO members and leaders, finding 
them incommensurable with conventional categories of political leanings: Democrat, 
Republican, liberal, conservative, progressive, left-wing, right-wing. As investment bankers told 
me that the Quran was compatible with ferocious capitalism, Hamza Yusuf railed against the 
excesses of the United States’ financial industry and Dr. Umar Faruq Abd-Allah lamented and 
warned against the ideological trappings of “leftist” movements. The active distancing of IRO’s 
from socialist and anarchist movements did not stop IRO members from proclaiming their 
admiration for Chomsky’s political writings. In fact, I found IRO members acquainted with the 
works of notable “leftists,” ranging from Paul Krugman to Howard Zinn to Cornel West. I heard 
IRO members proclaim allegiance with individuals ranging from Pat Buchanan to WEB DuBois, 
Malcolm X to Elizabeth Warren. As such, IRO members understood Islamophobia in varying 
ways, at times seeing it as the next step in a long history of U.S. imperialism, militarism, and 
white supremacy, and at other times as an anomaly, a blip emanating from a fringe right-wing 
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movement. I couldn’t figure out whether IRO members saw Islamophobia as essentially un-
American, or as American as apple pie.  
While I could not find an easy answer to whether IRO members consider U.S. racism an 
anomaly or foundational, my work has begun to consider the ways these representational politics 
echo and diverge from other racial projects and multicultural efforts in the country. In some 
ways, IRO’s “integrationist” (Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009) measures are simply another 
incarnation of respectability politics, having the same tenor as Tyler Perry or Bill Cosby 
encouraging black Americans to self-uplift as the sole route to eliminating racism. For people of 
color, “respectability politics” continue to surface (not without controversy), most prominently 
among African Americans. In 2013, seven year-old Tiana Parker’s Oklahoma school sent her 
home for wearing her hair in dreadlocks, deeming the hairstyle contrary to a respectful learning 
environment. This was not long after the Zimmerman verdict had sparked public debate about 
whether wearing a hoodie on a dark night meant, for a young black male, an admission of guilt.  
This commonplace acceptance that the onus for respectability falls upon black bodies is 
part of the economy of these respectability politics, in which “the virtues of self-care and self-
correction are framed as strategies to lift the black poor out of their condition by preparing them 
for the market economy” (Harris 2014: 33). Harris highlights the ways ‘ghetto’ went from a term 
describing a poor, segregated neighborhood to a descriptor for inappropriate, racialized cultural 
expression, shifting the focus from structure to behavior. “Respectability politics can have the 
effect of steering “unrespectables” away from making demands on the state to intervene on their 
behalf and toward self-correction and the false belief that the market economy alone will lift 
them out of their plight” (35). The parallel between black respectability politics and my 
discussion of Islamophilia is clear: in a sense, the “good Muslim” is called upon to self-correct 
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those behaviors that are incompatible with Americanism in the “terror age.”  
Islamophilia most closely merged with black respectability politics, as I discuss in 
Chapter 4, in the sense that Islam inherently provides a mechanism for uplift and self-
determination. In other words, IRO members understood Islam as at its very core a tool for social 
justice. Mechanisms of self-respect and good citizenship, they argued, were essential Islamic 
principles, albeit ones that had been corrupted by those who did not appreciate Islam’s nature. 
Thus, this “essential” Islam had dual tasks: first, it could uplift a ghettoized underclass (my 
fieldwork was replete with appeals to the stories of black Muslims like Malcolm X in this 
regard), and second, it could reform the image of the incommensurable Muslim immigrant 
through the propagation of the ‘good Muslim’ trope.  
Certainly, though, the lens of respectability politics cannot neatly be transposed to IRO 
representations. As I discuss in Chapter 4, Islamophilia rests upon a deeply problematic trope of 
the model minority, in which Muslims are presented as an already-existing professional class of 
contributing citizens. Yes, IRO’s emphasize the need for self-reform in the face of the 
Islamoscopic regime; at the same time, in their construction of the Muslim American 
counternarrative, they argue that Muslims have been model citizens all along. Aidi speaks of the 
cultural forces of Islam in America, including black nationalism and hip-hop Islam (Aidi 2004).  
He argues that these forces have created an oppositional counterculture, evidence of America's 
failure to integrate marginalized voices and deliver social welfare benefits. This is what we see in 
the critique above offered by Zaid Shakir, and the oppositional stance taken at times by Hamza 
Yusuf (see chapter 3). My work adds to Aidi the dimension of a more elite type of cultural 
Muslim force: not the Islamic counternarrative created in inner-cities by entrenched, poor 
populations of color, but the counternarrative being crafted by an immigrant and American-born, 
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highly educated, professional class.  
 
IRO’s in the New Imperial Homeland 
Returning to the 2013 Zimmerman verdict, I was mesmerized by a Friday khutbah 
(sermon) given by Imam Zaid after the verdict had been issued. I quote him here at length.  
 
“Allah tells us in a hadith qudsi26, ‘Oh my servants, I have made oppression forbidden for myself 
and among you. Therefore, do not oppress one another.’ This is an integral part of our religion. 
Our quest for justice does not allow us to kill indiscriminately and justify it as a quest for justice. 
But this is what governments argue: Our quest for security allows us to murder indiscriminately. 
What does that mean as a principle? Our quest for whose security? Have you been consulted? I’d 
rather be insecure before someone had to die for my security. And I’m sure most of you would 
agree with me. I would take my chances before I would allow anyone to indiscriminately murder 
someone so that I can allegedly be safe. This is not just. Islam argues otherwise…The Quran tells 
us ‘Don’t take the soul, the life that Allah has sanctified, except for a just cause: retribution for 
murder or for spreading sedition in the land.’  
 
‘Just cause’ isn’t being between the age of 16 and 64 in Waziristan. Or Yemen. Or Somalia. 
Where you’re killed now, questioned later. Our president said in the aftermath of the Zimmerman 
trial, 'we are a nation of laws.' Well, he should start following those laws when he commissions 
these drone attacks that murder people and then they go to the body, and if he’s between 16 and 
                                                 
26 A hadith qudsi is a saying related by the Prophet Muhammad that is understood to be direct 




64, he’s a militant. If he never picked up a gun in his life, if he doesn’t even know where 
America is, can’t locate it on a map, never heard of 9/11. Just some shepherd minding his sheep 
on a hillside in Afghanistan or Pakistan or Yemen, then is murdered. And if he’s between 16 and 
64, his murder is justified. What kind of law is that? The law of the jungle. The law of might 
makes right. Allah tells us don’t kill the soul Allah has sanctified. We have no right to kill that 
person. There was no right to kill Trayvon Martin” 
(Zaid Shakir 2013). 
 What Shakir does in this khutbah is take on the issue of American (in)justice, weaving 
seamlessly between the United States and the Middle East, connecting drone policy and the not-
guilty verdict for Zimmerman. Thus, Shakir here (and in many other speeches I heard during my 
time in the field) connects domestic racial politics and legal codes to the international workings 
of the War on Terror. As such, Muslim American representational politics cannot be separated 
from their transnational dimensions.  
 It is difficult, given the disciplinary separations and entrenchment of stubborn “area” 
paradigms, to discuss IRO politics without falling victim to the trappings of “Americanist 
anthropology” or “an anthropology of Islam.” Yet this diligence is critical, not just for 
anthropology but for an epistemological investigation into what we know about empire, Islam, 
and difference. According to Naber, “Researching and teaching beyond one-directional feminist 
analyses that focus on either the extreme devastation resulting from US imperialism and war in 
the MENA27 region or racial-classist-heteropatriarchal violence in the United States means 
taking seriously how US “domestic” politics and US “foreign” politics exist within a similar 
                                                 




historical and political frame. The points whereby the U.S. “domestic” and “foreign” conjoin—
and are made and re-made through one another—are also crucial axes for alliance building and 
accountability across disciplines and borders. Yet while framing the domestic and foreign 
structures of U.S. imperialism as relational and mutually constitutive, I also want to avoid 
assuming shared experiences, or that people hailed into US imperialism (and its racial and 
heteropatriarchal foundations) from varying locations share equal struggles. Rather, we might 
ask how the histories of people from different political locations within the US and the MENA 
region (and beyond) rub up against each other when they are hailed into similar imperialist 
structures—in different ways and to different degrees” (Naber 2013).  
 American ‘imperialism’ is a fundamental concern for IRO members; by and large, they 
are inclined to agree with the claim that the United States behaves as an empire. If imperialism is 
understood as projecting political power over disparate territories, IRO members saw U.S. 
empire as indisputable fact. They identified everything from the hardly-representative two-party 
system (and the general consensus between the two parties about U.S. militarism) to the 
immense military budget as evidence of such. Aadam, for instance, casually used the word 
“blowback” when talking about Muslim terrorists. I was not sure if he was specifically citing 
Johnson’s 2001 book of the same title, in which he argues that the United States functions as an 
empire, doing so “well below the sight lines of the American public” (2001: 65), something he 
calls “stealth imperialism”. In his oft-cited New York Times piece, Ignatieff argues vociferously 
that the U.S. is an empire, but “our grace notes are free markets, human rights, and democracy, 
enforced by the most awesome military power the world has ever known. It is the imperialism of 
a people who remember that their country secured its independence by revolt against an empire, 
and who like to think of themselves as the friend of freedom everywhere. It is an empire without 
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consciousness of itself as such, constantly shocked that its good intentions arouse resentment 
abroad. But that does not make it any less of an empire…” (2003). 
Engseng Ho agrees about the remarkable inconspicuousness of U.S. empire, claiming that 
we live in the time of invisible American imperialism. For Ho, what is unique about American 
imperialism is that it is fiercely anti-colonial, yet undeniably imperialistic. While there is no (or 
little) formal colonization, there is “maximal projection of military power through sea and air 
space, a system of subordinate sovereign states, and multilateral institutions” (228). For Ho, the 
anti-colonial element bolsters the popular notion that America’s empire is somehow exceptional 
and preferable, allows its dominance to hide in plain sight. “While previous empires dominated 
their colonies with pomp and ceremony, the American invention of ‘extraterritoriality’ formalizes 
the idea that Americans are not really present” (232). “Damned if you do and damned if you 
don’t, flip-flopping between isolationism and nation-building abroad, two priorities at least are 
clear for the U.S. government: internal securitization of the U.S. population itself, and an 
increased investment in methodologies of invisibility abroad. Remote control bombers fly ever 
higher out of sight, while military advisors disappear into the Filipino jungles, Yemeni 
mountains, and Georgian gorges. As well, security, military, and colonial functions are farmed 
out to private companies, removing them from political oversight” (239). This is in line with 
what Junaid Rana describes as “an American empire that, via its chameleon-like characteristics, 
is able to hide elements of its domination in plain sight” (2011: 77).  
 Race politics in the U.S. have always been inextricable from its geopolitical quest for 
supremacy. David Harvey shows how the age of Clinton was certainly an imperial moment, with 
the use of so-called “soft power” and multicultural tolerance as its keys to validation. “The only 
difference between the Clinton years and now [the Bush era] is that the mask has come off and 
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bellicosity has displaced a certain reticence, in part because of the post-9/11 atmosphere within 
the US that makes overt and unilateral military action more politically acceptable” (2003: 22). 
Deepa Kumar writes about the imperialism of the Obama age, remarking upon the central role of 
diplomacy and markets (2012). In this era, Obama himself speaks publicly of civilization’s debt 
to Islam, fiercely rejecting the Huntingtonian argument and emphasizing the presence of a ‘good’ 
Muslim – domestically and abroad – with whom diplomatic relations are possible. (“Yet despite 
this multilateral strategy, the Obama administration still resorted to unilateral actions when 
needed – the assassination of Osama bin Laden, for example…” (Kumar: 134).) 
As Nikhil Pal Singh writes, questions of multiculturalism “developed in the United States 
in a very particular time and place, and in a specific relationship to the question of world order” 
(1998: 473). Gunnar Myrdal’s pivotal An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern 
Democracy (1944) critically looks at the puzzling coexistence of American white liberals and 
oppression of black Americans, always orbiting around the notion of an essentially inclusive, 
democratic, egalitarian American ethos on the world stage. At the end of Malcolm X’s life, his 
focus had shifted radically from American racism to the role of global racism and white 
supremacy in colonialism and empire. During the Cold War, domestic racial politics in the U.S. 
dovetailed with concerns about the defeat of Communism. The Black Panther Party, while 
popularly associated with domestic liberation struggles for African Americans, actually 
positioned itself as primarily opposed to American imperialism (Bloom and Martin 2013).   
 Mahmood's work does a terrific job of connecting American feminist politics to the 
resurgence of the global “clash of civilizations” (2008). In fact, U.S. feminism is a rallying cry 
for American liberals and conservatives alike in justifying American militarism in the 'Muslim 
world' (Mahmood 2008; abu Lughod 2002). Just as women's rights (or as Puar argues, “gay 
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rights” 2007) lend legitimacy to U.S. militarism, so do Islamophilic projects of inclusion among 
both Muslims and non-Muslims.  
During the convergence of the Cold War and the civil rights movement, the question 
arose: Could the U.S. speak with any authority or righteousness on the global stage if it 
perpetuated horrific human and civil rights abuses domestically? Several decades later, the same 
questions surface. Can American militarism be taken seriously if LGBT rights are not 
acknowledged by the military? Can American intervention on behalf of democracy and equality 
be justified if women's rights are not assured at home? And, as my writing has shown, can the 
Global War against Terrorism hold any water if anti-Muslim bigotry is the order of the day?  
 As Grewal argues, colonialism, hegemony, and governmentality all intersect in ways that 
allow racialized and gendered subjects to emerge in relation to state power, all the while being 
created by state power (2005). The category “Middle Eastern man,” for instance, has had shifting 
significance based upon the historical moment. As comedian Dean Obeidallah jokes in The 
Muslims Are Coming, “Ten years ago, I used to be white. Now I'm Arab” (2013). The shifting 
racial categorizations of Arabs, South Asians, East Asians, and others – as white and non-white – 
has received appropriate attention in a range of literature on race (Lopez 2006; Naber 2000) 
challenging popular conceptions of the U.S. as a black-white racial binary (de Genova 2006). 
Empire is especially sensitive to racial difference. “…imperialism has always been plural with 
respect to places and parties involved. An appreciation of its plural nature is crucial to 
understanding unauthorized ideological cross-currents, such as communism and pan-
Islamism…”(Ho 2004: 240). 
 The War on Terror reveals stark convergences in these domestic racial projects and 
international geopolitics. In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush established a 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a federal cabinet department tasked with preventing 
and responding to acts of terrorism. Yet in 2003, the Department of Immigration and 
Naturalization Service was absorbed into the DHS. Thus, the anti-terror measures became 
inseparable from the record detentions carried out under the Obama administration or the 
passage of measures such as SB 1070. As Bill Ong Hing describes, flaws in U.S. intelligence are 
partially to blame for the events of 9/11, yet the post-9/11 crackdown has been primarily on 
immigration (Hing 2006). Fear of Muslims and fear of undocumented immigrants (presumed to 
be Latino) were institutionally imbricated. One IRO member, Rehan, remarked to me that 
Arizona's SB 1070 “shouldn't be called an immigration law. It's part of the War on Terror. This 
anti-immigration measure wouldn't have been acceptable if Islamophobic fear following 9/11 
hadn't been drummed up. People's patriotism – and by that, I mean a certain type of racist 
American patriotism – has been given a blank check.”  
 Yet Rehan’s understanding of the intimate connections between the War on Terror and 
anti-immigrant xenophobia were not necessarily commonplace among IRO members. I sat, 
horrified, as Hammad spoke with me at a conference, lamenting undocumented immigrants 
through especially racist language. “These Latinos off the street, many of them gangbangers, 
they don't have papers to be here. I don't understand why you liberal types use this phrase 'people 
of color' as if there's any commonality between us and them. Yes, there are some Latinos who are 
basically white, you know, educated and not criminal types. But by and large, I don't know the 
statistics. But I think most Latinos are illegal immigrants. There's a big difference between their 
immigration experience and mine.”  
 But is there?  
 I knew, as did a number of IRO members, that U.S. militarism and undocumented 
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immigration to the U.S. from Latin America were strongly correlated. Be it in Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, or El Salvador, U.S. military intervention and waves of immigration to the 
U.S. – documented and undocumented – go hand in hand (Gonzales 2011). The entrenched 
history of supporting dictators and deposing democratically-elected leaders in Latin America 
neatly mirrors U.S. intervention in the Muslim world. “Whenever it has exerted power overseas,” 
Ignatieff writes, “America has never been sure whether it values stability -- which means not 
only political stability but also the steady, profitable flow of goods and raw materials -- more 
than it values its own rhetoric about democracy. Where the two values have collided, American 
power has come down heavily on the side of stability, for example, toppling democratically 
elected leaders from Mossadegh in Iran to Allende in Chile. Iraq is yet another test of this choice. 
Next door in Iran, from the 1950's to the 1970's, America backed stability over democracy, 
propping up the autocratic rule of the shah, only to reap the whirlwind of an Islamic 
fundamentalist revolution in 1979 that delivered neither stability nor real democracy” (2005). 
When I relayed to Sumaiyya Hammad's comments about “gangbanger Latinos,” she became 
visibly saddened. “See, this is divide and conquer, that old colonial strategy. He can go to 
Wharton and get a fancy business degree, but if he doesn't know the history of that region, and 
how much it has in common with the history of our regions, or divisions are just going to stay in 
place.”  
 In my interview with Hatem of the oppositional shoe-thrower blog, he remarked that “As 
bigoted as American political culture is, we'll find lots of people say that Anti-Muslim bigotry is 
unacceptable. When Palin says something about Islam, something very racist, these things are 
easy to condemn. But it's much harder to take a position on U.S. policy. Things like the mosque 
campaigns are easy to talk about, but they don't talk about the hard issues. For instance, George 
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W. Bush killed a million Muslims in Iraq and thousands in Afghanistan, but they have never 
condemned him. Instead, they invite George W. Bush to their mosques! How can anybody with a 
conscience do that? You say, thank you President Bush for drawing a distinction between good 
Muslims and bad Muslims? This takes us back to Washington, there are things they cannot say 
and they know that. They want to be accepted and appear in the media. And they're willing to 
pay the price to do that, and that price is to go ignore war crimes, controversial issues. They are 
legitimizing foreign policy! While we want to say this War on Terror is illegal and we are 
opposed to it, the government sees a few Muslims on their side. You know, they think Muslims 
and Arabs are supporting them. They invite them to their conventions. Take Condoleezza Rice. 
1500 Lebanese slaughtered under her. The same year, the American Task Force on Palestine – 
she was a speaker at their gala. She is a war criminal!” My conversation with Hatem often 
returned to the themes of colonialism, anti-colonial movements in the “Muslim world,” and 
current shades of U.S. empire.  
 Certainly, we can see the ways in which the War on Terror has transformed everyday life 
on a very local scale. The concept of 'homeland security' necessitates reconfiguring the 'home' as 
a site in need of protection: protection from terrorists (and, I'd add, undocumented immigrants) 
rather than developers (Ruben and Maskovsky 2008). The 'home' is to be defended from drug 
vials and suitcase bombs; all the while people lose their homes to the forces of urban renewal 
and gentrification. I was in a Manhattan apartment with members of a Muslim professional 
networking group shortly after starting fieldwork, and they played a clip by comedian Chris 
Rock. “They keep trying to scare us. They keep telling us to be on the lookout for Al-Qaeda. I 
ain't scared of Al-Qaeda! I'm from Brooklyn. I don't give a fuck about Al-Qaeda. Did Al-Qaeda 
blow up the building in Oklahoma? No! Did Al-Qaeda put anthrax in your mailbox? No! Did Al-
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Qaeda drag James Byrd onto the street till his eyes popped out of his fucking head? No! I ain't 
scared of Al-Qaeda! I'm scared of al-Cracker!” (Rock 2004). Thus, 'homeland security' can serve 
as a distraction from domestic troubles, all the while American social harmony is deployed to 
justify things undertaken in the name of homeland security. The vicious cycle is, according to 
Maira, part of an unfolding tale of U.S. Imperialism (2009). Maira argues that there is an 
intimacy of empire, a way in which imperialism is active on public and private levels, producing 
surveillance, fear, and solidarity. This drumming up of fear of foreign evils is an age-old practice 
in assuring domestic complicity (Harvey 2003). 
 The hunger strike at Guantanamo Bay Detention Center perfectly embodied the 
connection between domestic multicultural politics and the War on Terror. The hunger strike 
captured popular attention in 2013 as approximately 100 inmates at Guantanamo Bay (the 
detention center created by President Bush in the aftermath of 9/11) protested their detention 
without trial or their being held in spite of being cleared for release. In response to this hunger 
strike, the US government initiated a force-feeding program that the U.S. medical community 
deemed torture. Rapper Yasin Bey (formerly Mos Def) attempted to voluntarily undergo force 
feeding on camera to demonstrate the painfulness and inhumanity of the process. When the holy 
month of Ramadan converged with the hunger strike in the summer of 2013, the government said 
it would continue its practice of force-feeding the inmates on hunger strike, albeit with 
observance of Ramadan. In other words, force-feedings would occur before sunrise and after 
sunset to accommodate observant Muslim inmates' religious beliefs. As one IRO member 
observed, “They will engage in torture while respecting diverse religious practices.” This, 





What does it mean to be a hypervisibile population, living in an age of purported racial 
‘colorblindness’ and stealth imperialism? How is it that a racially diverse group is, ostensibly, 
being reconfigured as a racial group? What do the public debates about the nature of Islam – now 
a religion, now a political orientation – mean for the political nature of representational acts of 
Muslims in the U.S.? What does it mean that the Huntingtonian “clash” of civilizations has been 
resurrected since 9/11 while vocal IRO’s articulate a quintessential Americanness of Islam? 
My research used these questions to intervene in larger issues, attempting to make 
connections between representational politics and global geopolitics. It rejects notions of identity 
and considers, instead, the agentive capacity to produce an identity, and the consequent use of 
that identity in ideological projects. It has moved past traditional notions of site and community 
to understand a population that is at once elite and marginalized, situated in the age of purported 
“postracialism” of the Obama age and the heightened militarism of the enduring War on Terror. 
What understanding the imperial homeland means is connecting the age of racially biased mass 
incarceration (“the New Jim Crow,” as Alexander has dubbed it (2010)) to the age of indefinite 
detention and the merging of law enforcement and immigration authorities. Scholars must 
struggle to understand the years of record detentions under the Obama administration in relation 
to incarceration at Guantanamo. The gutting of the Voting Rights Act in 2013 was coterminous 
with public debate about U.S. citizen’s rights to not be assassinated by their own government 
without trial, as was done to American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki and his 16 year-old son. Any 
debate about whether a mosque should be built or election of a new IRO president exists amidst 
these upheavals.  
 Much of this ethnography has revealed entrenched ambiguity and paradox, caught 
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between telling a story of belonging and exclusion, privilege and marginality, assimilation and 
revolution. The sense of political engagement by IRO members was opaque, not falling along 
any neat linear orientation or even having a consistent goal. I have shown how IRO members 
will come out full-force in support of Palestine, using anti-colonial and anti-racist language often 
reserved for the radical left. Yet these very members might also vehemently support a politics of 
respectability or argue that success in a capitalist system is the only way to beat Islamophobia. In 
one interview, a hedge fund banker spoke passionately about the need to “decolonize” Palestine; 
a few minutes later he spoke about how Venezuela and Cuba were the only two pockets of the 
“unfree” world. I was present for a tense conversation (about Palestine, once again) between two 
young men, one arguing that the wealth of Muslims in the West alone could liberate Palestine, 
and the other arguing that support from a “greedy system of capitalism” would never give rise to 
a just social configuration. I heard one panelist eschew “leftists” in a well-attended lecture, while 
another panelist spoke earnestly about U.S. neoliberal economics and involvement in Chile; 
based on my observation, attendees seemed equally amenable to both poles, even oblivious to the 
fact that herein lay a major clash.  
 The relationship between IRO's and the state is revelatory of this ambiguity. As I've 
described, IRO speeches often lambasted American foreign policy and the entrenched history of 
U.S. racism. Yet – especially at the larger, nationwide IRO events – a Congressman, Senator, or 
local councilperson was often among the prominent guests. While IRO members expressed a 
deep-seated pessimism in the possibility for transformative politics (i.e. whether Muslim activists 
would ever be heard on the issue of Palestine), many IRO events centered around writing letters 
to elected officials or how to get Muslim voters registered. I could never reach a conclusion as to 
how this contingency felt about the state and its possibilities.  
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 IRO members described to me the very public controversy surrounding Hamza Yusuf's 
White House visit to meet with President George W. Bush in the aftermath of 9/11 and at the 
dawn of the Iraq war. Many thought he was behaving as a traitor, wearing a suit and tie (as 
opposed to “traditional garb” he often wore) to this event and speaking with the man on the brink 
of waging another war against the Muslim world. Others, though, celebrated his decision to go to 
the White House, remarking that it signaled that there was room for dialogue between the state 
and Muslim Americans.  
 In the summer of 2014, the White House hosted an iftar during the month of Ramadan, as 
it does every year. Yet this year, the iftar coincided with the massive U.S.-backed military 
incursion by Israel into Gaza. It proved for this reason to be a divisive issue. There was a 
movement for Muslims to boycott the event altogether in protest of US military support for 
Israel. Yet the proposed boycott was unsuccessful, and several prominent IRO leaders attended 
the iftar, where President Obama reminded the attendees of Israel's right to defend itself. This 
inspired the ire of those who had called for the boycott. Attendees reminded them that “dialogue” 
would be the only way to gain political traction.  
In my attempt to answer the question “what are the aspirations of IRO members?”, I 
found the struggle – between reform and revolution – to be constitutive of my ethnography. At 
once oppositional and assimilative, IRO politics escaped any neat classification. Similarly, the 
rules for being classified a “good Muslim” proved equally murky. As I've shown, being a 
“moderate” Muslim in the sense of religious practice is not a necessity in good Muslim politics; 
in fact, IRO discourse revealed a strong assertion that Americanness and orthodoxy were not at 
all at odds. Similarly, I have shown that Muslim women's unveiling was not necessary for “good 
Muslim” status. In my discussion of whiteness, I was careful to not equate whiteness with a 
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“good Muslim” designation, either – indeed, figures like Jihad Jane or John Walker Lindh 
complicate the binary. Perhaps it is less likely to locate the specific qualities which classify one 
as a “good Muslim” and more important to locate the ways in which marginalization and racist 
exclusion is mitigated through several indicators that relate to capitalism, patriotism, or even 
liberal principles such as diversity, in specific ways. A “good Muslim,” I have argued, cannot 
stand up to empire and can never claim a radical politics, even if their orthodoxy is at odds with 
secular liberalism. Radicalism, that quintessentially anti-American form of dissent, is anathema 
to liberal multiculturalism.  
This work opens up a number of questions, rather than conclusively answering any one. 
The sense of uneasiness I am left with echoes what I felt in Chicago in July of 2011, as I sat 
frustrated with IRO commitment to radical or transformative possibilities. Yet I am not 
unsympathetic to the burdens of representation or hypervisibility. I have seen how earnest speech 
(about Palestine, the drone program, or surveillance) is tantamount to treason and quickly 
silenced by a well-funded, vocal Islamophobia network, a small group terrified of another terror 
attack or a takeover of American culture by Muslims. Yet I have also seen upward mobility and 
allegiance with a ferocious neoliberalism prioritized by those who speak out against 
Islamophobia. Caught between a counternarrative remaking of America and a quest for 
legitimacy, IRO contingencies are not easily pigeonholed. What becomes apparent instead are 
the profound impossibilities of speech and action, the ways in imaginative possibilities have 
become constrained in the terror age, the ways an exceptional multiculturalism actually limits the 
range of acceptable social difference.  
In 2012, I drove between a mosque in Dearborn where a regional conference was being 
held and my housing in nearby Detroit, where the Allied Media Conference had convened 
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activists interested in using media to eliminate inequality. Detroit’s depression was apparent; 
what was clearly once a bustling and vibrant city resembled a ghost town that July. Just minutes 
away, Dearborn boasted its Arab influence on Arabic-language street signs and numerous people 
in Islamic attire. Again, my time in Michigan was marked by a sort of apprehension and sadness 
that marked much of my time in the field. Could the folks in Dearborn begin to understand the 
issues they were hotly debating – questions of diversity, Islamophobia, and race – in conjunction 
with the economic downturn of once-industrial cities like Detroit? Would the IRO members in 
Dearborn ever consider merging with the Allied Media activists, the way they eagerly ally with 
Congressmen or local sheriffs? Was there any meaningful way to create these connections, or is a 
quest for legitimacy the only realistic approach for any marginalized group? Is simply imagining 
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